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HOW FAR CAN THE PASTOR GO IN COUNSELING?

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How FAR can the pastor go in counseling? How far can he go safely? How far should he dare to go if it is clear that help can be given only through him? And how far must he go if his obligation as a Christian shepherd is to be fulfilled?

There are times when I think the proper question is not how far the pastor can go—but is instead: Which pastor? Those pastors who are sensitive and conscientious enough to recognize that they have limitations, who believe that the souls and personalities of men deserve a better fate than falling victim to unintentional pastoral malpractice—it is this group which is most likely not to go far enough in helping people. And it is, therefore, this same group which is likely to be least in need of admonitions concerning the complexities of the human psyche.

What is said, in the light of this fact, will not be directed at the ministerial bulls in the pastoral china shops, but at those who are too well aware of the dangers of going too far in attempting to help people. In a measure this will alter our question though not basically. But it will enable us to focus on the more constructive aspects of the answer to the question; that is, establishment of the criteria or standards of judging the instances in which a pastoral obligation is present and must be discharged, and then considering how it may be discharged most safely and with the largest chances of successful outcome.

The Obvious Limits

We may well begin with elaboration of the obvious, in this case reminding ourselves of the practical assumptions we have about the limitations on our counseling efforts.

The pastor, for example, cannot afford to spend five hours a week with a parishioner for more than a short period of time, as a psychoanalyst often would with his patient; and he probably cannot spend more than a few hours in any given period with even those persons whom he is attempting to help on an intensive counseling basis. For the mediating of help through direct person-to-person relationships is but one aspect of the

minister's many-sided job. He is preacher and leader of worship, supervisor of religious education, director of evangelism and superintendent of missions, executive in church administration, and expeditor of the social outreach of the church and of Christian principles into the life of the community—all in addition to being shepherd, friend, guide, therapist, counselor, and spanker in his work as pastor.

This is not to say that these six traditional types of activity of the pastor, in which personal work is but one, can or should be understood as separate and distinct. They hang together. In fact, one of the reasons why the teaching of theological students in the practical field lags so far behind teaching in other areas of theological study is because these aspects of the pastor's rôle have too often been taught as if they were categories, as if there were six rôles—with the poor minister trying to outsmart the multiple parochial schizophrenia into which six separate and distinct rôles would tend to precipitate him. The pastor does have one rôle, but that rôle has at least six major aspects. Undue neglect of any of these aspects, or undue concentration on any one, will mean that the minister is doing something less than his full job.

One of the best pastoral counselors reports that he cannot carry more than ten or twelve persons at a time on his more intensive counseling list; and he defines this list in terms of spending an hour with the person once a week or oftener. Most pastors will be able to spend even less time than that in the more intensive forms of counseling. Our first obvious limitation, then, is one of time.

The second clear limitation relates to our training for counseling work. There are wide disparities between the types and amounts of training which different ministers have had to prepare them for counseling. But over and above those differences, there are many things which none of us would touch if we knew the real facts. We would not, for example, attempt to remove a vermiform appendix or take a chance on injecting penicillin to try to cure housemaid's knee. This despite the minister who was reported to combine the practice of chiropractic (*gratis*) with a rather undue concentration upon pastoral calling and a heavy emphasis upon female parishioners. The general principle is that, with the tremendous rise in the modern world of specialized knowledge of all kinds and expert professionals to apply that knowledge, we do not presume to do in amateur fashion that which can be done much better by professionals. The principle is simple. And in some respects its application is easy; we do not pull teeth or, I hope, manipulate backbones. But in other respects it is far from easy. For in relation to the ills of the personality and the spirit, there is—and I consider this fortunate—no single group of experts who can lay claim to the field, and this includes ourselves. We shall be trying all through this essay to delineate this issue.

So much for the obvious limits of time and training. There are also the limits placed upon us by our faith and our ethical convictions. These are, I want to make clear, also and mainly opportunities; but we should be less than honest if we did not recognize that, in our approach to many people, they possess a limiting quality. For example, here is the wife of a deacon in a church, a woman who has been active and useful in many church activities, who has sought out the pastor, told him how completely irresponsible her husband has become in relation to his family, and informed him that she has just about decided on a divorce. As she concludes telling her story she says: "Well, that's about it. I know it may shock you, especially since we've both been so active in the church. And Paul always puts up a good front when he's around here. I just don't see anything to do except get a divorce. Don't you think I'd be justified?"

One thing the pastor clearly cannot say is: "Why of course. Don't give it a second thought. I believe in divorce. Go right ahead." His ethical convictions are a limiting factor. On the other hand neither does he say: "Why that's terrible. How can you think of such a thing? Divorce is ruining our society." It is comforting to realize that both these approaches, in addition to being out of harmony with our ethical principles and our Christian concern for men's souls, are also bad counseling. But there are times when we shall be limited in counseling by what we stand for.

A brief statement on the positive side of this point may be in order. Because we represent the church and Christianity in a particular way, some people may hesitate to come to us; but when they do come, what we can do may be much more important than what another counselor could do who is assumed to have different convictions from ours. Let us look again at the deacon's wife. If she is talking with a psychologist or psychiatrist or social worker, she will not be surprised if the response is: "You've been trying with might and main to make this marriage work; but you just don't see now how it can be saved without making things worse for every one concerned. And yet you're still not quite sure." She may be astonished that she is genuinely understood—which is a rather rare experience in life—but at least she does not expect condemnation from these professionals because she does not associate them with particular ethical standards.

But if she gets such a response from a minister, she will not only be astonished and pleased at being understood; she will also feel an immense weight lifted from her. She had thought Christian standards rigid, had not realized that personality always comes before abstract legalistic standards. With the consequent sense of being understood by one who represents Christian standards, her chances of taking those steps in insight and action which may truly save the marriage are greatly increased. So our faith and ethical convictions do have their limiting quality; but if this is recognized as a fact, it can be turned into great and far-reaching opportunity.

The Obvious Obligations

Alongside our obvious limitations in counseling we need to stack up our obvious obligations. We act on behalf of the Christian community. As members of the Christian fellowship, we are members one of another. Hence it is our obligation to have some special kind of relationship with our people, whether it be a counseling relationship or not, in connection with all the crises of life. Working backwards, we are concerned in the regular crises of life: bereavement, marriage, vocational choice, adult entrance into the Christian fellowship, and concern for babies and children.

We shall comment on our pastoral obligation in relation to but one of these crisis situations, bereavement, with the implication that we are also concerned with the others. When death occurs, the pastor is at hand. He helps prepare for the funeral service and conducts it. But he has a continuing job of helping the bereaved find their way again, despite their loss. There can be no question that the minister has an obligation and that it continues until real readjustment has been made. No one would think of criticizing the pastor as he tries to help the bereaved remake their lives. The real question here is: Does he know what to do and how to do it?

Some recent studies by the Department of Psychiatry and the Chaplains' Department at the Massachusetts General Hospital throw a flood of light upon this question and also by implication help us on our larger question of how far the pastor may go in counseling. At the time of the catastrophic Cocoanut Grove night club fire in Boston, a large number of the injured were taken to this hospital for treatment. Nearly all of them had lost relatives or close friends by death in the fire. The medical department became puzzled over many of the cases, because they did not seem to be responding as well as they should in view of their physical condition. The psychiatrists were called in. They suspected that the slow recovery some patients were making might have a connection with the fact that they had been bereaved. Wisely they decided to look at those patients who were making a rapid recovery, to see if they could learn anything about the successful handling of grief.

They discovered that the successful griever were those who had learned how to deal with and accept the "image" of the deceased person, and they found that this learning had fairly definite (as well as painful) stages. First the patient reviewed in his own mind, and usually by talking about it to a doctor or friend or chaplain, the events of the day or two before the fire in which he had been with the deceased person; he also idealized the deceased and spoke in the most glowing terms. Then he was able to go back over the past week, and the past month, and finally over the more distant past. This was not a mere recollection of the deceased person as one apart—but in the contacts and relationships he had had with the patient. That is, the memory was participative, not objective. The

patients who had spontaneously carried through this process without urging or stimulation got over their own burns rapidly, and also got over their grief in the sense that they were able in a remarkably short time to live with the image of the deceased person and to make new plans for their own lives.

In contrast, those who were having difficulty recovering from their burns were taking some other way of meeting the grief situation. They were just keeping a stiff upper lip and trying to put it out of their mind altogether, or they were trying to concentrate on making plans before they had faced the reality of their loss, or they were attempting to reassure themselves prematurely that the deceased was not really lost, or in other ways were not accepting the stark pain of grief and working it through.

If counseling is the attempt to help a person think through for himself a life situation problem in order that he may see it more clearly and be better prepared to use all resources in meeting it, then what is done in bereavement is counseling. It cannot be a dispassionate glance at issues. There is no place, within a few days of the death, for trying to get people to have a stiff upper lip and make new plans—until the first phase has been worked through. But to be a support, to permit a person to talk about the deceased in the fashion mentioned above, to be unembarrassed in the face of such emotion—that is proper help near the time of bereavement. And later, when the reality of loss has been faced, when the image can be lived with, counseling which helps people to look at new plans for a new life, and to look also with assurance at the Christian hope of life everlasting—such counseling is clearly on the job.

Even in relation to bereavement, through the ages the special job of the priest and pastor, it is well to note that this research points to instances in which something is needed in addition to what the pastor is able to bring. It is not that the pastor, by being in the situation and doing what he can, does harm—but rather that a special situation requires special therapy which the pastor is probably not equipped to bring. If the pastor is interested that the maximum help be brought, then in such a situation he will not ask merely: Will I do harm? He will also ask: Will somebody else in this do more good than I can do? Either way, he has a limitation—the standard being what is possible to be done for the person involved.

What has been said of bereavement could be said of the other regular crisis situations of life: marriage and the rest. The pastor has a function in relation to them. Many times what he can do will be all that needs to be done. But at times a psychiatrist or social worker or other specialist can do something which vitally needs to be done. The existence of these specialists does not remove the pastor's obligation, for example, in connection with premarital counseling. And ordinarily the pastor can do much of what needs to be done, at least in coöperation with the physician. But

sometimes more is needed; and in the sense that the pastor needs to be supplemented, he has reached a limiting point.

In addition to the regular crises that occur in most lives, there are the special crises of illness, vocational adjustment and readjustment, counseling on education, counseling on family problems, and all the rest. Again, the question is not whether the pastor is related to the situation, but whether he knows how to be properly related to it as a pastor and also get the other expert help that may be needed if the maximum potentialities are to be fulfilled.

Where the Pastor Needs Help

We have considered the more obvious limitations, and the more obvious obligations, of the pastor in relation to giving counseling help. A general principle has emerged in that the pastor gets help from others not alone when he thinks that what he would do might be harmful, but also when something else is needed to be most helpful. There are at least seven points at which pastors ought to try to get help when it is available.

1. *When there is psychosis, actual or incipient.* Psychosis implies hospital treatment, and over-all responsibility, for its care is properly in the hands of the medical profession. Pastors have two obligations in connection with it: first, knowing the danger signals that suggest its presence and second, maintaining a supporting pastoral rôle with the person—that is, continuing the friendly pastoral relationship so long as the person does not reject it.

What are the main things to look for in terms of danger signals? Not much can be said in a paragraph. But, roughly speaking, they are when we see in reasonably gross form “excessive” responses, or wholly inappropriate responses. Ordinary shyness may be merely an expression of basic temperament. But extreme shyness needs a second careful look. Feelings of guilt are something everyone has. But the person who is convinced he has committed the unpardonable sin may be on the psychotic road. Some people are built to be the life of the party. But people who get extremely elated for no reason at all may be manifesting a danger signal. We are not experts. But we do have the obligation to see that in such instances a psychiatrist or at least a doctor has a chance to look the person over.

2. *When technical information is needed.* There are many kinds of technical information, of which we may use vocational information as an example. Vocational counseling is never a mere matter of information; the pastor can do much to help someone think through what he wants to make of his life. But, in the process, we had better see that the young person gets in contact with those who can tell him the possible vocations and how to proceed in connection with them, and who can also help him find out the areas for which his own abilities seem best to fit him.

3. *When there is a medical problem or where there are psychosomatic complications.* A girl in late adolescence came to her pastor. The skin on her face showed a few acne signs, and she told him the rest of her body was covered with them. He knew the parents were of a dominating disposition, but had not realized how extreme this was until the girl pleaded with him to advise her what she could do to get away from home. He saw that the skin disorder undoubtedly had a connection with her family situation, and in this case he did not have access to a good psychotherapist who might help both the girl's acne and her personal problems. But he did get her into the hands of a good general physician; and between them, they helped the girl understand and eventually deal with her family situation. The somatic condition was definitely caused by the psychological and social situation. But the pastor felt a clear and proper obligation to see that a physician as well as himself was on hand to help.

4. *Generally when financial aid is involved.* There may be exceptions to this. But as a general rule pastors are not experts in knowing when financial aid is or is not genuinely needed, and in so giving it that it will perform the best possible rehabilitative function. Help on such problems is usually now available anywhere in the United States.

5. *When environmental alterations are needed.* If one of our families has a mentally deficient child and appeals to us to know what they should do with him, we do well to get a good case worker on the job along with us. If the family of an alcoholic appeals to us, we are probably wise to get a good doctor or Alcoholics Anonymous or both on the job while still not losing contact ourselves. By and large, case workers are experts on environmental alterations of all kinds. Whenever it is possible, I believe a pastor is wise to have a private arrangement with a good case worker whom he can consult by telephone as needed. Several city councils of churches are developing this kind of service for pastors, and some day every city of any size should have it.

6. *When extended psychotherapy is needed.* We have agreed that the pastor, even if he had the training, cannot handle the kind of counseling which requires a great deal of time. The point then is: How can we tell when short-term counseling will give some help, or when only long-term therapy will do the job? Largely, I believe, through whether our short-term counseling has brought observable release and freedom and insight to the person involved. If we have done this properly, we will not have made the problem worse, but we may not have made it much better either. In that case, the implication is that the patterns are so deeply rooted, that the whole personality structure is so infected, that long-term help is required. In that case, we try to help the person find such resources. I recognize how difficult this is in many places. But even where we cannot find them,

we can continue to play a supporting rôle in the situation, and in that way can often help in keeping the situation from becoming worse.

7. *When the pastor has not been able to establish the proper relationship with the person.* Even if all other indications suggest that the pastor can help, he will be unable to produce the goods if the parishioner does not feel confidence in him. We need to be objective about this. Our pride should not be involved. No pastor can help everyone. Sometimes people do not see us as we are but as hazy projections of their confused ideas of what the church stands for. Or again, they may dislike men with moustaches or bald heads or those who are hair pullers. At any rate, it is important that we not put the equal sign between capacity to be helped and willingness to accept help through us.

In no one of these types of situation has it been suggested that the pastor has no function—but only that someone else, with a particular kind of expertness or relationship, is also needed. There are, so to speak, many situations in which we will play the rôle of chief helper. But there are others when we will play a supporting rôle. Both are of equal importance when our concern is the total well-being of the person.

Defining the Pastor's Counseling Function

In March of this year I participated in a very unusual conference. At the College of Preachers in Washington there were brought together twenty pastors and twenty psychiatrists—each member of both groups having had some successful experience in working with one or more members of the other group. That is, we did not want a purely theoretical fight on the truth or falsity of religion or the degree of morality of the psychiatrists.

We made a serious and rewarding attempt to define the function of each group in relation to the other. At first, and naturally, there were some attempts by the psychiatrists to put up fences and tell the clergy to stay inside their own fence; and on the part of the clergy, to do the same about the psychiatrists. As discussion proceeded, however, it became clear that meaningful definition could not come from building fences. The important thing indeed was not definition in the sense of arbitrary limitation—but was rather a clarifying understanding of the *focus of function* of each group, and then recognition of a borderline area in which both groups properly operate.

What is the pastor's focus of function in counseling? In a general sense, it is Jesus Christ and the Christian community. The pastor is not merely a professional worker. He is the representative of a concerned fellowship and a transforming Lord. That clarifies his focus of function. It is true he has, or is supposed to have, a field of knowledge in which he is

expert; but it is not of the same order as other fields of knowledge. He is not, therefore, an expert in the same sense in which most professional workers are experts. His prime characteristic is not his knowledge but his rôle as representative.

If we wish to be more theological, we may say that the pastor's aim is to better the parishioner's relationship with God and Christ, and to evaluate in terms of the degree to which that relationship is deepened or vitalized. His focus of function, then, is to help the person move from where he is as much closer to Christ as he is capable of at this time. Whether the obstacle which must be overcome is lack of religious knowledge, or stomach ulcers, or no money to secure schooling, or a nagging wife—the pastor is concerned with it because it cuts the parishioner off from being able to move toward a deeper understanding of God and fellowship in the Christian community.

This conception of the pastor's focus of function is not, be it noted, a legalistic one. He does not say: "I have not made any counseling progress unless the person reaches such and such a stage of Christian understanding and practice." We do not expect a literary masterpiece from a moron; neither can we expect a wholly loving conception of God to spring full-blown in the mind of a troubled adolescent who has been batted around the slums since babyhood. What we are interested in is the direction of movement. We evaluate by direction, not by fixed goals. So long as this is kept clearly in mind, then we are correct in saying the pastor's focus of function is as a representative of the concerned Christian community guiding people to a deeper and more vital awareness of God.

When it came to clarify the psychiatrist's focus of function, the Washington conference was also significant. The psychiatrist is concerned to help people to grow emotionally through clarification of the conflicting forces that have been impeding them, so that they may be free to act not in an arbitrary fashion but so that they may choose that way of life which represents their particular highest potentialities and their deepest desires.

When the conference discarded the idea of defining through the erection of fences in favor of clarifying through stating the focus of function, many otherwise controversial points became clear. When the pastors asked the psychiatrists, "Should the pastor try to help neurotic persons?" psychiatrists in effect answered: "A lot of them will never get help if they don't get it from you. Know what you're doing. Know the limitations of your own individual training and experience. If you can help a person within your own focus of function, by all means do so."

This is not to say that even the best trained pastor will say, "I can handle all the neurotic problems that come to me." For if he is well trained, he will know that no one can give more than temporary help in a case of

severe psychoneurosis in the time he is likely to have at his disposal for counseling. But he will avoid the arbitrary judgment, and frequent excuse, that because a neurotic pattern is involved therefore the situation is not within his field. He must judge on the basis of his time and training, and objective self-criticism of his own skill, what he will and will not do. But his decision is not made blindly, nor in merely arbitrary and categorical fashion. And indeed, if he finds himself searching too compulsively for categories, not being content with the personal evaluation which this more flexible approach requires again and again, he may well ask himself whether he wants to help people even if there is at times an element of risk involved, or whether he is merely concerned to clear his conscience in the matter of wanting in a general way to help people.

Counseling and Human Destiny

One of the ablest psychotherapists in the country told me recently that he thought at least half of all the people who consulted psychotherapists were at root troubled by the lack of significant meaning in their life. Beneath a large number of the family troubles, job troubles, money troubles, and other troubles is the question, "What is my life for? What am I for?"

There are some religious leaders who, hearing this statement, would applaud and conclude that the psychotherapists now recognize the importance of the pastor's counseling function. But this is much too hasty a conclusion. Pastors may know about human destiny, about the goals of human life, but do they know the steps by which people can be helped to find that meaning and that destiny? If a man wants to go from Philadelphia to San Francisco, he is not likely to seek direction from one who knows all about San Francisco but who answers all questions about how to get there with remarks on the beauty of the Golden Gate or the quaintness of Chinatown. To say that people are troubled about human destiny and want help in finding the meaning of life is not to say that the clergy can help them—unless the clergy have taken the trouble to get road maps that are recognized as road maps by the people who feel lost.

Alcoholics Anonymous is one of the most vital and significant religious movements of our time. But it is not run by pastors. Few alcoholics can move in the direction of transformation and cure unless something takes place in their lives that the pastor would recognize to be a religious conversion. But that does not say the organization would get results if we lined up the alcoholics and talked to them about religious conversion. Pastors can help alcoholics, and many do so. But such pastors study alcoholics until they know—and realize the importance of the knowledge—how they can be approached in a way that will mean most to them. Such knowledge is of primary importance if we are to help people or any group of people or any particular person.

There seems no good reason to say that *no* minister can deal with any particular type of problem that concerns primarily the human soul. Even when we are inclined to feel that psychosis is the realm of the psychiatrist, we are confronted with the evidence that few psychiatrists have a better therapeutic record in dealing with a certain type of schizophrenic patient than does the Reverend Anton T. Boisen, a mental hospital chaplain. Boisen knows more about the heights and the depths of the inner world than do most psychiatrists, and he has a deeper understanding of what the schizophrenic patient is experiencing. Schizophrenia is an extreme disease of the human soul, what we might call the "broken heart with a vengeance." The fact that most of us are not trained to deal with schizophrenics does not mean that such dealing is foreign to pastors, and it does not mean that no pastor should be trained to do it. It simply means that most of us had better not do it. And I think it may mean that we should all be concerned that there be a few pastors who *can* deal with it.

We deal with the human soul and the human spirit. We can hardly expect that God would have made the soul less complex than he made the body. And it may be just to say that most of us are at the stage of spiritual first-aid in our counseling work, and have a long way to go before we shall understand sufficiently the complexities of the soul to be able to risk more in saving it. This underscores both the tremendous potentialities of the pastor in the future, and also the great need for more adequate and more widespread training of ministers while still in seminary that they may enter their ministry with a fuller and more exact knowledge of the heights and depths of the human spirit. The better we are trained to help people, the less we shall be worried about how far pastors as a group can go in counseling, and the more we shall direct our attention to how far we individually can go and be helpful.

It has not been possible here to discuss the increased understanding of the methods of pastoral counseling which are emerging out of the careful observation of actual counseling experience. This movement is still in its infancy, but it contains great potentialities. We are learning both a way of learning and a way of teaching counseling, which take fully into account the individual personality of each pastor and which help him to use his already strong points and improve his weak ones. Especially are we learning what it means to say that counseling is helping people to help themselves—not doing something to them or even with them. This, it seems to me, is wholly consistent with our Protestant view of man's direct relationship to God, and also with democratic aspirations which assume that individual responsibility must accompany individual freedom.

We know a few elementary things. If a young woman comes to us a few months after her father's death and tells us she is worried because she

seems to have lost her faith since her father died, we know enough not to say, "Then you didn't have much faith to begin with"—and condemn her; or "Were you overattached to your father?"—and scare her to death; or "I don't think you have the right idea about faith"—and slap her face; or "Just listen to this section from one of my sermons and your problem will be solved"—and bore her to death. We know that we must understand what people feel and try to convey to us, however conflicting it is and however much we may not approve what we hear. And we must convey in return the clear fact that we do understand. It is strange how often, when real understanding is had and is communicated, judgment—which at first seemed essential—is either minimized in importance or even drops out altogether. There is more to counseling than this; but it starts here.

Harry M. Tiebout, New York psychiatrist, has devoted much attention to the process which goes on within the personality when the transformation which is the goal of psychotherapy occurs. He now believes that the most accurate word to describe the heart of this process is "surrender." In using this, he says he does not mean everything that every religious leader has from time to time packed into it. But he does mean what he understands to be the essence of the Christian conception. Whereas a patient took comfort during his psychic suffering in having good intentions, or in working very hard at high things, or in being sure to take the blame when things went wrong, or in making new and better resolutions—and found that it profited him nothing—now through psychotherapy he gets a whole new slant. He surrenders. And a new life begins. He doesn't have to blame even himself if he has the key to understanding. He knows he has both good and bad intentions, recognizes both as part of himself, and in doing so can make ethical choices on his own responsibility. He can work hard, but he knows the difference between working hard and working compulsively.

It is strange, in a way, that it should take a psychiatrist to illuminate a process we have taken for granted. And yet, if we want transformation of life, and believe it is necessary, do we not need to know what happens inside and beneath the surface? The lovely and restful metaphor in which we speak of not knowing the nature of electricity but being able to press buttons and have light has little meaning to an electrician—and still less to a physicist who is studying the nature of electricity. If we can only push buttons, let us push them. If we can string wires, so much better. But let us realize too that, if our basic concern is to help men to turn to God through Christ and his fellowship, we need to look more deeply—and learn even the processes by which men's souls, restless and unhappy and divided as they are, may be helped to turn to God who is their peace.

THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE

EUGENE AYRES

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SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON, the late Quaker astronomer of England, once said, "When I close my eyes and retreat into my inner mind, I feel myself *enduring*, but I do not feel myself *extensive*. It is this feeling of time as affecting ourselves and not merely as existing in the relations of external events which is so peculiarly characteristic of it; space on the other hand is always appreciated as something external. That is why time seems to us so much more mysterious than space. We know nothing about the intrinsic nature of space, and so it is quite easy to conceive it satisfactorily. We have intimate acquaintance with the nature of time and so it baffles our comprehension. It is the same paradox which makes us believe we understand the nature of an ordinary table whereas the nature of human personality is altogether mysterious. We never have that intimate contact with space and tables which would make us realize how mysterious they are; we have direct knowledge of time and of the human spirit which makes us reject as inadequate that merely symbolic conception of the world which is so often mistaken for an insight into its nature."

Any modern description of the physical universe must be merely symbolic and therefore inadequate. To the physicist such things as atomic particles, space, time, and light are as abstract as the letters of the alphabet until they are arranged in such manner as to form a concrete idea. Furthermore, the creation of word pictures to bring the phenomena as nearly as possible into terms of our everyday experience is never wholly satisfactory because description and "explanation" must lean too heavily upon the fragile reeds of imperfect analogies. The description that follows is neither worse nor better than a description of the atom.

There may be such a thing as "absolute space," but the only space we have any physical evidence for is our particular three-dimensional space, and this is believed to be finite. Einstein explains the idea by analogy between three-dimensional and two-dimensional space. It is easy to see the difference between a boundless surface of infinite extent and the surface of a sphere which, while also boundless, is of finite extent. But just as the surface of a sphere must curve through a third dimension, so three-dimensional space cannot curve except through a fourth dimension. Time is accepted as the fourth dimension, and the universe is regarded as a "space-time continuum." Time thus becomes merely another dimension which differs from length, for example, merely in units of measure-

ment. The physical reasons for our special subjective reaction to time will be dealt with in later paragraphs.

It is quite impossible for anyone to imagine a four-dimensional space, but it is easy for mathematical physicists to deal with spaces with any number of dimensions. For example, the imaginary quantity, $\sqrt{-1}$, has the interesting ability to rotate anything it multiplies through ninety degrees. Time, as a dimension, must be at an angle of ninety degrees from each one of our three dimensions. This is quite impossible for the engineering imagination, but the task is automatically simple for the mathematical factor which is, itself, imaginary and inconceivable. So we find it convenient to make use of this obliging expedient wherever we have a mathematical expression including time as well as the ordinary dimensions. And this is very often indeed.

The inadequacy of our imagination is not disturbing, for science has long since abandoned the idea that all physical phenomena can be explained in engineering terms. It is not possible to construct an engineering model of either an atom or a universe. Both problems are difficult; in the one case because the actors of the drama are so small, while in the other case they are so far away.

The space-time continuum constituting our universe can be considered to be a finite portion of four-dimensional space. Theoretically, there could be any number of other finite portions or other universes, just as there can be any number of rubber balloons floating around in our space. The rubber balloon is an imperfect two-dimensional analogy because the rubber film has thickness, but we must try to imagine it as without thickness—merely a two-dimensional surface. This comparison will be helpful throughout this discussion.

Two billion years ago our space-time continuum was only six million miles in diameter—about seven times the diameter of the sun. This is extremely small compared with the present size of the universe, so small in fact that proportionately it would be invisible in a universe ten miles in diameter. Our space then was completely filled with densely packed neutrons, seething with terrific heat and restive under pressures far beyond any we can produce on the earth. Neutrons have been mentioned often in current discussions of atomic energy. Perhaps the philosophers can decide whether neutrons are tangible or intangible. To the physicist they are merely symbols. They were discovered in 1932. Neutrons have a number of measurable properties but like other atomic particles they have no geometry. They can be easily manufactured, but they are difficult to hold. They will pass easily through three feet of solid steel. They are known only by their effects. They are the things that cause an atomic bomb to explode, and they are formed in abundance by the explosion,

but under ordinary conditions they have a life of only about half an hour. When they "die," they emit light and break up into protons and electrons. Thus neutrons can be regarded as the parents of all chemical elements and of all energy. They are characterized by relatively large mass and by the absence of an electric charge. Hence, without repulsive fields, it is theoretically possible to obtain great densities by their concentration.

The primordial ball of neutrons had a density of ten thousand billion times the density of lead, and constituted in this tremendously compressed form all of the substance of the universe. This is equivalent to the compression of a steel ball eight feet in diameter into one which is only one hundredth of an inch across.

The primordial ball of neutrons could not expand because there was no empty space in our system to expand into. It was constrained by the boundaries of our space—an implacable shell through which it could not move. At that time there was substantially no "past" (as far as this universe was concerned) and there was no progression toward a "future." There was only a persistent "present."

This peculiar state of affairs can be best understood by going back to the two-dimensional analogy of the rubber balloon. Suppose that a balloon is made of film not only without thickness but sufficiently elastic so that when it is completely deflated it is still globular in shape. The interior of the balloon is infinitesimal in size but is under heavy pressure. In order to inflate, the surface of the balloon must move radially in a third dimension. To complete the analogy we may call this third dimension "time" instead of "thickness." Unless there is progression in the time dimension, the balloon simply cannot inflate, and Einstein has shown that there must be a definite relationship between the average density of space and its radius of curvature. When one is fixed the other is fixed. This is what is meant by a "persistent present."

This was only about two billion years ago. Two billion is not a large number. It is only about twice the time required by geologists and palæontologists to explain the evolution of life on the earth. It is a very tiny fraction of the distance in miles from the earth to the nearest star. It is about equal to the number of people who inhabit the earth.

Two billion years ago something happened to this hot dense ball of finite size that occupied all of space. Its density became less, the boundaries of space began to recede, time began to "march forward," and there was a cataclysm of unimaginable violence. The mass of neutrons exploded suddenly into countless billions of fragments, which went whirling off in every direction. There was blinding light, and our chemical elements were created.

Now this is not like the bursting of our rubber balloon. Imagine

that some unknown condition caused the density of the rubber film to be lower. The pressure in the interior of the balloon would start inflation which would be accompanied, not by the breaking of the film but by a redistribution of two-dimensional material on the surface. Instead of a uniform film density we would have a highly heterogeneous condition with dense spots floating in areas of very low density.

In the case of our universe, as the fragments separated from each other, the average density of the universe became less and the dimensions of space increased. One of the fragments was our sun. During the early stages of the explosion, there was ample opportunity for collisions and partitions of fragments. Much study has been made of the ways in which the earth could split off from the sun and the moon split off from the earth. If these things happened, the events must have taken place soon after the primordial cataclysm because the earth is not appreciably younger than the universe itself. The fragments arranged themselves into groups forming our solar system, with planets around our sun and moons around our planets; forty billion other solar systems to make up our galaxy; and five hundred trillion other galaxies. All of this makes up our universe, which is still expanding from the explosion two billion years ago; and our space which has grown in that time from a diameter of less than 10^7 miles to a diameter of more than 10^{23} miles. The density of the universe has dropped from 10^{14} to less than 10^{-34} . Instead of being enormously denser than lead, it is now less dense than the most nearly perfect vacuum we have been able to devise. This low density comes about from the very high proportion of empty space. The curvature of space is becoming less but can never disappear as long as there is any matter in the universe at all.

Soon after the explosion occurred, the universe was much like it is today except, of course, for its size and density. During its life, the sun, for example, has lost only a few per cent of its mass. Its internal temperature is about twenty million degrees centigrade, and its pressure is about one hundred and sixty billion atmospheres. The other stars—even *γ Cygni*, a thousand times as bright as our sun—have internal temperatures and pressures of the same orders of magnitudes. The thin outer crust of the earth has cooled down enough to permit life, but the core of the earth is still molten. Apart from the slow but steady conversion of hydrogen to helium (atomic energy that supplies the comfort and the beauty of the world), the chemical constitution of the universe remains almost unchanged. At least thirty per cent of the universe is hydrogen. For all practical purposes the stars and the planets today are like the fragments soon after they were hurled from the centre of the original explosion. Some of our present stars (those of abnormally great density)

are believed to be composed of neutrons, and may be fragments of the primordial ball which have remained practically unchanged.

Time has two distinct qualities. First, there is its dimensional quality which we feel extends like length in both directions—forwards and backwards—indefinitely. It makes just as much sense to say “last week” as it does to say “next week.” The other quality of time which has puzzled philosophers and scientists alike is what Eddington calls its “arrow.” We are acutely aware of our steady progression forward in time—never backward. If time is merely a dimension, why should it have an “arrow”? Length has no “arrow.”

One way to approach a “symbolic conception” of this peculiarity is by returning to the two-dimensional analogy of the rubber balloon. The two dimensions of this world would have no “arrow.” But the third dimension is just as singular in a two-dimensional world as time is in our three-dimensional world. For it is obvious that there is a profound difference between moving out of the surface into the interior of the sphere, and moving out of the surface away from the sphere. In the former case we should move out of the space with the certainty that if we moved right ahead far enough we should reënter it. In the latter case we could never reënter the space unless we turned back or unless the space expanded (like blowing up the balloon) until it overtook us. So here is an easily conceivable case in which length and breadth are ordinary dimensions, but thickness, in addition to being a dimension, has an “arrow.”

There are a number of intriguing corollaries to this conception. For example, if we could move even an infinitesimal distance in time out of our three-dimensional space, it should make some sort of difference to us whether we moved into the interior of our space-time continuum or into the exterior of it. By analogy we can regard all of the “past” as in the interior of our space-time continuum, while all of the “future” is outside. This would make the “present” the boundary of space. Two billion years ago the implacable shell around the ball of nuclear fluid was the “present.” Mathematically speaking, it would seem that the past is finite. Whether the future is infinite depends upon the stability of the curvature of the time dimension. To illustrate this point it is necessary to go back to a one-dimensional space. Imagine a line in the form of a circle drawn on the surface of a rubber balloon. If the balloon remains fixed in size, the circle in expanding finally reaches a maximum diameter equivalent to the diameter of the balloon. It can get no larger unless the balloon itself expands. Similarly, our three-dimensional space cannot expand indefinitely unless our space-time continuum is expanding at least at an equal rate. There is now no basis for predicting the duration of the future of

our universe, and the conception of an "absolute future" seems to mean as little as "absolute thickness." The "beginning of time," or rather the beginning of the progression in time toward the future, would appear to have been the moment when the universe started its expansion.

Space cannot be perfectly spherical without uniform density. The universe is made up of dense bodies like the earth with empty space between. Hence, the shape of the space of the universe is believed to be only roughly spherical with great variations in curvature. This is like a rubber balloon which, because of weak spots in the film, would show blisters on inflation. A quantum of light in passing from a distant star to the earth must be always in the "present," relative to its location in space; but in relation to the earth, light must go far into the "future" while it traverses the vastness of empty space, and then, to reach the earth, it must bend backwards in the time dimension to get into *our* "present." This difficulty could be avoided by defining the "present" as a function not only of radius of space curvature but also of local density of space. Professor P. W. Bridgman, professor of mathematics at Harvard University, would say that the whole conception is meaningless because it ascribes physical reality to light in intermediate space: "... and light as a thing traveling must be recognized to be a pure invention."

The foregoing account is, for the most part, a synthesis of the ideas of many competent men, expressed in definite terms not because the facts are all known or because the data are sufficiently accurate, but because a specific picture helps to expound the present stage of evolution of scientific thought. Almost no part of the picture can be accepted without reservation. Substantially all of it is controvertible. And yet, in the present stage of our knowledge, there are what seem now to be adequate reasons for each postulation.

Dr. George Gamow, professor of theoretical physics at George Washington University, has computed the temperature of the original ball of neutrons at about eight billion degrees centigrade and the pressure at more than a billion billion pounds per square inch.

The dramatic conception of the expanding universe was developed during the 1930's largely by E. P. Hubble and his associates of Mount Wilson Observatory by careful measurements of the rates at which the distant nebulae appear to be receding from us. The accuracy of the work is believed to be within ten per cent. A velocity of recession of twenty-four thousand miles per second was found, for example, for a galaxy in Boötes, which is two hundred and twenty million light-years away. The rate of expansion is terrific, compared with any velocities we know on the earth (except for subatomic particles), but small compared with the vast size of the universe. It has been computed that it will take nearly

one and one half billion years to double the radius of curvature of our space.

The evidence seems irrefutable, but those responsible for it still have their fingers crossed. Eddington said that the phenomenon of the expanding universe is "so preposterous that I feel almost an indignation that anyone should believe in it except myself." It was the distinguished scientist-priest, Abbé Georges Lemaitre, of the University of Louvain, who first described the bursting of "a lone atom" and the subsequent "terrific race through space." The age of the universe itself has been computed from the rate of expansion, and the answer is about two billion years.

There are four entirely different ways of calculating the age of the earth. Certainly any one of these methods could be wrong. Possibly any two could be wrong. But it seems highly improbable that all four could be wrong. And they are in surprisingly good agreement with each other. It is believed now that the earth cannot be older than three or younger than one and one half billion years. In passing, it is interesting to observe that the ancient Hindus calculated that the earth should now be 1,972,949,048 years old! It seems that the more we know the less definite we become.

The conception of curved space is an essential part of the theory of the evolution and nature of the universe, because it is from Einstein's mathematical relationship between the radius of space curvature and average density of space that it is possible to calculate the probable size of the primordial ball of neutrons. We should not regard this equation too lightly, for it has already helped to solve a number of astronomical problems, and it will be remembered that another of Einstein's extraordinary equations, relating mass to energy, has been verified by the atomic bomb. There have been numerous other less spectacular verifications of Einstein's work.

The idea of curved space has stimulated the imagination of laymen. It has suggested the possibility of the existence of any number of three-dimensional spaces infinitely close to our own but not coincident with it—just as the pages of a book can lie adjacent to each other, as close as we please, but always separated by a third dimension. The conception ceases to be fanciful when we accept time as the fourth dimension. There are, indeed, an infinite number of three-dimensional space systems lying adjacent to each other but not coincident. They are separated by the dimension *time*. We live not in a single space, but we pass continuously from one space to another. Each space has less curvature than the one before (the expanding universe), and we move centrifugally into the future. Perhaps we are intuitively aware of the decreasing curvature of our space—of this

continuous shift from one space system to another, which bends a little less sharply through time.

The immense progress that has been made in the study of the universe has depended in large measure upon a 100-inch telescope. With this instrument it has been possible to examine nebulae nearly half a billion light-years away. The 200-inch telescope now being prepared for use on Mount Palomar should make it possible for us to see three times as far, which according to calculations is just about the present radius of curvature of space! With this marvelous instrument many new things will be learned, and many of the things we think we know will be disproved. In the meantime, nuclear physics, on which we must depend for interpretation of celestial phenomena, is just beginning and should take prodigious strides from now on. The next decade will be an exciting one for cosmogonists.

INDIAN THOUGHT AND ITS METAPHYSICAL GOAL

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OUR AGE is one in which a certain intermingling of cultures is inevitable. In this respect a familiar process in history repeats itself. We have but to remember the eastward conquests of Alexander the Great, the imperial expansion of Rome, the westward conquests of Islam, the Mongol invasions, and the crusades of the Middle Ages. All these broke down barriers, enforced travel and observation, and induced cross-fertilization of ideas. So, likewise, do the accelerated intercommunications and world-wide wars of our time engulf all historic cultures and traditional memories in a common maelstrom of change, compelling peoples of Occident and Orient alike to note one another's basic ideas and meanings. This is not to say that violence and destruction which history has so often shown as precursors or concomitants of cultural interpenetration are in themselves desirable. They are not, and their incidence on some peoples and cultures has been irretrievably tragic. It is, however, to recognize that every great civilization attains some values which it accounts as highest. Where these are of universal quality, they deserve to be known and, in times of catastrophe, treasured over against the day when something like a universal world culture may emerge.

For students of philosophy the above consideration is legitimate reason for taking an interest in the best thoughts and insights of all peoples. For us here in America it is ample reason for granting some attention to the philosophic inheritance of India and China, lands where the grand patterns of thinking were shaped for the peoples of Eastern Asia. India in particular is noteworthy for its philosophical traditions, especially in the sphere of the metaphysical interest. In this essay, accordingly, I am directing my attention to Indian thought and its metaphysical goal.

Indian thought, fortunately, is no longer so inaccessible to the Western reader as once it was. As Professor J. H. Muirhead, distinguished editor of the *Library of Philosophy Series* has said:

The contribution of India to the philosophical literature of the world may by this time be said to be an open book to English readers. For the last sixty years, since Max Müller began the publication of the Sacred Books of the East in 1875, the great scroll of the story has been gradually unrolling itself before their eyes. Within the last few years comprehensive and scholarly histories of Indian Philosophy in all its many schools by Professor Dasgupta and Sir S. Radhakrishnan and many monographs and handbooks by less-known writers have been published in India and in England.¹

¹ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, 1936, p. 13.

My chief problem, in fact, is less that of finding adequate materials than of limiting them for purposes of concise presentation.

The limitation here proposed is to consider Indian reflection in terms of its answers to the fundamental metaphysical question: What is the real nature of the universe by right knowledge of which man ought to live? The question does not elicit a uniform answer from Indian thinkers any more than from philosophers in the West. It has been pursued earnestly, however, and it has controlled answers from various positions in relation to a central point. With this problem as clue we may thread our way through the labyrinth of India's reflective development, not without profit to our own thought on the question.

It is a long story. Indian wonder about the world and man's status therein began as far back as the composition of certain hymns in the *Rig Veda*, that literature connected with early religious sacrifice and ritual which Aryan invaders introduced into the Punjab region during the millennium before 600 B.C. Reflection, beginning thus amid primitive myth and poetry associated with worship of nature gods, gradually worked its way to free and many-sided expression. We can see its emancipation in those meditative treatises known as *Upanishads* which were developed between 700 and 300 B.C.² Later, around the beginning of the Christian era, various proliferating tendencies of thought, both within and without the Vedic tradition, assumed systematic shape among several religious groups. Brahmins, Jains, and Buddhists consolidated their ideas and developed subsidiary schools of thought. From then on main traditions continued in all of them, with many interchanges and logical refinements, down to about A.D. 1700. If we regard the general outlook of the oldest Vedic poems as in some sense rudimentary philosophy, dating them around 1500 B.C., we can say with Professor Dasgupta that the whole development is a story of three thousand years.³

Before tracing this story for our specific purpose, however, let us first look at the outstanding characteristics of Indian thought as a whole. Professor Radhakrishnan, of Calcutta University, has detected the following traits. Philosophy in India is essentially spiritual, evoked fundamentally by problems of religion. It is predominantly metaphysical, concerned to know the inner truth and reality of things as against all mere appearance in ordinary experience. It is subjective, taking as primary data for its speculations our psychological experiences in all their phases, conscious and unconscious. It is synthetic, striving grandly after unity and seeking to "embrace in one comprehensive vision the origin of all things, the history of the ages, and the dissolution and decay of the world."⁴ From

² R. E. Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, 1921.

³ See Dasgupta's chapter on Philosophy, in *The Legacy of India*, edited by G. T. Garratt, 1937, p. 122.

⁴ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 31.

this characterization we can see in advance that Indian thought shares neither the predominantly ethical interest of Chinese reflection, nor the objective urge of our scientific philosophizing in the West. Its main drive is toward spiritual realization through immediate awareness of ultimate reality, however variously conceived. Since the practical end is thus religious, the goal of thought becomes the deliverance from the bonds of ignorance through right knowledge which may make the practical end possible. Thus we may say that in India philosophy takes largely the form of a metaphysics of salvation. If we forget this, we are not likely to penetrate its real spirit nor appreciate the pertinence of speculative ideas which at first appear alien to Western modes of thought. With this reminder we may now enter upon our survey.

Beginnings of metaphysical quest are detectable, as we have said, even in the Vedic hymns. Although priestly poets were for the most part occupied with praising and invoking great nature deities such as the sky, the storm, fire, sun, dawn, and the like, they had their reflective moods. In these they did not hesitate to express now and then the thought that the many things in this world have some common source or ground, a creator possibly, or a first progenitor, or an ultimate divine being who is the one reality behind all particular gods commonly worshiped. "Him who is the One existent," says one verse, "sages name variously."⁵

What is present only as occasional mood in the early *Vedas*, however, flowers into full expression as persistent reflective tendency in the literature called the *Upanishads*. Here we have an astonishingly rich and complex collection of free-ranging speculations. It all centres about questions arising through priestly meditations on old Indo-Aryan notions of gods and men and the traffic between them by sacrificial rituals. To our modern Western minds much of it is puzzling. It reads like experimental associating of ideas by thinking children, delighting in the discovery that it is possible to weave together in concepts all sorts of diverse things. Yet in the midst of the speculative luxuriance certain great and suggestive notions arise. In the serious thinking of later generations these were destined to have strong influence. At these we must look briefly.

First of all, there is the frequently recurring conception that all the vast variety of the world and its changes is rooted in an inner essence that is one and unchanging. To this being, ground or soul of the universe, is given the name Brahma. "As all the spokes are held together in the hub and felly of a wheel, just so in this Soul all things, all gods, all breathing things, all selves are held together."⁶ Closely related is a second idea.

⁵ *Rig Veda* 1, 164, 46.

⁶ *Bṛihad-Araṇyaka Upanishad* 2, 5, 15. Hume, *op. cit.*, p. 104. [In this essay the author, in accord with common practice, has made free use of diacritical symbols. Not all of these were available in the several fonts of type employed. The expert will, accordingly note that there are some omissions and inconsistencies in the text and notes. They are unavoidable and are not to be attributed to the author's lack of care.—The Editor]

Individual man, too, has beneath all changes and manifestations of his existence an inner, unchanging essence, a kind of inner perceiver, distinguishable from but intertwined with the totality of his personal experience. "It is," says the text, "the self which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires are true, whose cogitations are true."⁷ To this essence or inner self of the individual was given the name *ātman*. *Brahma* and *ātman*, then, are the two metaphysical entities of the *Upanishads*, the essential centres respectively of the world and the individual.

Metaphysical intuition did not stop here, however. The really exciting discovery was made when the thought arose that these two are one, that in their final nature the essence of the universe and the inmost being of the individual are identical. Cosmic and psychical principles coincide. Accordingly, the ancient seers formulated an equation, "*Brahma is Atman*," a dictum which came to be regarded as the sum and substance of *Upanishadic* teaching. Thought comes to rest in a species of pantheistic mysticism, the conviction that in their inner depths all things are one and eternal.

On the practical side such realization was regarded as emancipation and freedom. For already in the *Upanishads* we find full-blown the characteristic Indian belief in transmigration and in its correlate, the law of karma or inevitable recompense of actions. Because of deeds done in ignorance, so runs the thought, souls are compelled to be reincarnated in successive lives and bodies, wandering thus and lost among the deceiving appearances of the myriad forms of existence. In this condition that law of cosmic recompense, "As we sow, so shall we reap," keeps them chained to illusions until they waken to the one reality which is their true and abiding home.

By knowing God [says one text] there is falling off of all fetters:
With distresses destroyed, there is cessation of birth and death.⁸

Here metaphysical insight is plainly for the sake of realizing a transcendent condition, emancipation from transmigratory existence, that is, from the deceptive vicissitudes of all ordinary life. For if reality is truly known, the multiplicity of phenomena can no longer deceive.

In the *Upanishads* all this is stated in suggestive, intuitional affirmations. The ideas, while germinal, are yet rudimentary; while coherent, they are not systematically developed. Inconsistencies and even contradictions lie unresolved. It became the task of later thinkers to develop such initial

⁷ *Chandogya Upanishad* 8, 7, 1. I here follow Dasgupta's method of interpretation in his *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 45-48. The inner self of the individual turns out to be the inner self of the universe, *Atman* spelled with a capital *A*, but that is the end, not the beginning of the reflection.

⁸ *Svetāśvatara Upanishad* 1, 11. Hume, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

insights into organized expression. In fact, the *Upanishads* are the fountain whence flowed several streams of thought which Radhakrishnan calls the Six Brahmanical Systems. Familiarly they are known in India as the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Pūrva Mīmāṃsa, and Vedāntas. All these represent different facets of the Vedic-Upanishadic tradition.

Interestingly enough, the stimulus to the work of constructing these systems appears to have come, not so much from within the Hindu tradition itself as from the heretical system which we know as Buddhism. During the period between A.D. 200 and 500 the most independent and energetic thinkers in India were Buddhists.⁹ They rejected the authority and tradition flowing from the *Vedas* and the *Upanishads*, and took their stand upon the newer teachings of the founder of their faith. Indeed, so forcefully did Buddhist teachers contend in religious debate that orthodox Hindu thinkers had to systematize and rationalize their teachings in self-defense.

Buddha himself, as is well known, avoided metaphysical discussion in the interest of finding relief for the radical suffering inherent in all living existence. Yet his diagnosis of both cause and cure, as developed by him from personal observation and reflection, involved assumptions that called for metaphysical interpretation. For him, it was axiomatic that all existence is in a state of flux, impermanence, and misery, that both world and self as ordinarily experienced are phenomenal and inwardly empty, and that ultimate release from suffering is an ineffable state called *nirvana*. For his followers, however, the exigencies of debate made it necessary to be more explicit. It is a fact that amid many rival teachings they developed the art of logic, made finer distinctions, and framed more precise metaphysical conceptions. As a result, by the second century A.D. they had developed no less than four main speculative schools of thought. Two of these appeared in the Little Vehicle or *Hinayāna* division of Buddhism, which remained closer to the original teachings of the founder, and two appeared in the Great Vehicle or *Mahāyāna* division, which manifested greater freedom in developing ideas.

In the first two schools, those of the *Vaibhāṣikas* and *Sautrāntikas*, we find expounded a doctrine of pluralistic realism. There is postulated, 1. an external world of real objects made up of atoms whose intercombinations are always changing, and 2. another world of plural streams of mental states each of which, like William James' "stream of consciousness," is somehow aware of the plural external world. Why this picture of universal flux both without and within? Because it gives rational

⁹ See J. N. Farquhar, *Outline of the Religious Literature of India*, 1920, pp. 153-162; S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 611-669.

foundation for Buddha's axioms of the impermanence and misery of existence.

In the second two schools, those of the Sūnyanvādins and the Vijñānavādins, we have doctrines that oppose the realism of the foregoing schools. They reduce the outer objective world to phenomenal appearance in the interest of pointing to a transcending reality, awareness of which is the true summum bonum, deliverance from all illusions of transmigratory existence. With the Sūnyāvādins the true world is so far beyond our powers of perceiving and thinking that it can be described only by negatives. The best name to give it, they think, is The Void. Their favorite form of debate, accordingly, is destructive criticism of every positive metaphysical doctrine, somewhat after the manner of F. H. Bradley in his *Appearance and Reality*. For this they have sometimes been called nihilists, though it should be observed that they do not doubt the reality of their unstatable absolute. The Vijñānavādins, on the other hand, are out and out metaphysical idealists. In their major contention the entire universe is nothing but the totality of surface wavelets playing over an infinite ocean of mind. Universal mind, as the sum and container of all being, is called the Repository Consciousness. Reading the arguments of this school, the Western student finds himself reminded sometimes of Berkeley, sometimes of Kant, sometimes of Josiah Royce. For they show how contradictory are all ordinary notions of supposedly extramental objects in order to demonstrate that the sense world spread out in time and space is ultimately mental representation only. Pure consciousness alone thus constitutes the inmost depth of everything—of all seeming self-entities and of all seeming objective entities also. To achieve realization of this truth is, then, to arrive at eternal peace and deliverance from the vicissitudes of existence. Such a purification of consciousness from illusion is the attainment of the Enlightened Ones, those who are called Buddhas. This is what Buddha really knew and intended, say the Vijñānavādins, though he could not fully impart it to his followers and therefore taught first a lesser doctrine.

So long as Buddhism remained dominant in India, Buddhist philosophers were a strong challenge to old tradition. Their destructive logic put other teachers on the defensive. Hindu thinkers were impelled to use more careful methods and more systematic statements in handling ideas inherited from the *Upanishads*. Gradually there arose the Six Systems, discussed among learned Hindus even to this day. In content these exhibit variety, but are alike orthodox in veneration of the *Vedas* and *Upanishads*. Here we find other metaphysical positions that have furnished classic alternatives in Indian ways of thinking.

In the system known as Nyāya we find a major concern with rules of logical inquiry and debate. Since thinking is an important pathway to

truth and reality, exponents of this school analyze the nature of definition, proof, inference, the syllogism, etc. They discuss doubt and fallacies, meanings of truth and error, and develop a theory of knowledge. Metaphysical ideas, however, are not wanting. According to these the world exhibits two grand divisions of reality. First there is the world of physical nature. Second there is a world of immaterial substances or selves. Each self stands in a temporary relation to its body. This conjunction, which is regarded as unfortunate, is seen to give rise to all confusions and sufferings of life. Destruction of bondage to body, accordingly, becomes the great desideratum. Yet this is far from being a simple matter of separation of soul and body at death. For, as Radhakrishnan puts it, "The body is formed under the influence of the unseen force of destiny, and is the result of the persistence of the effect of previous acts. Each man becomes endowed with a body fit for being the medium of the experiences which he has to undergo."¹⁰ Death, to a believer in transmigration, will simply mean transition from one body to another unless some special method is used to annul the workings of destiny under the law of karma. What is this method? Right knowledge. What is right knowledge? Precisely all the understanding of logic which Nyāya philosophers teach.

To our Western minds this doctrine of salvation by logic appears initially odd and alien. Yet it is not dissimilar to Plato's thought¹¹ that only when the soul is purified by dialectic from the imperfections of the body does it enjoy pure knowledge of the eternal essences of things. Meanwhile we may note that we have here a system of logical realism in the sense of primary emphasis on correct knowledge of the real world by means of logical apprehension.

Closely related to the foregoing is the atomistic pluralism of the next system which is called Vaiśeṣika. Here too we find recognition of a real world made up of material and nonmaterial substances, but we are given more careful analysis of the material phase. Physical things are conceived as composed of a plurality of atoms, capable of action and moving in space and time. In themselves indivisible and eternal, individually imperceptible to the senses, they give rise in combination to perceptible objects. The objects as compounds, however, are divisible and transitory, making up the world of physical change. Four kinds of physical atoms exist, those of earth, water, air, and fire. They are the ultimate reality of the material world.

On the other hand, no less real and eternal than the ultimate material atoms are the nonmaterial substances. These are listed as ether, time, space, souls, and mind.¹² Souls, it should be noted, are not themselves

¹⁰ *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 149.

¹¹ *Phaedo* 66-68.

¹² Cf. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 285; Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 188 ff.

atomic compounds, as in the theory of the Greek Democritus, but simple, spiritual entities whose existence is inferred from certain facts of experience. Thus, soul is that to which the personal pronoun "I" refers. It is that which binds our discrete sense perceptions into unitary objects. It is that which governs breathing, the movements of body and of mind. It is that which receives sense-affections, feels pleasure, pain, and antipathy. It is that which exerts will and effort.

Here again in Vaiśeṣika we behold metaphysics in the service of religion. To what end is this atomistic pluralism and soul theory? To show precisely how atoms and souls in their particularity are separable, how the soul when rid of all materiality regains freedom from reincarnation and remains pure in its own natural state. What is this state of essential purity? A condition devoid of all qualities, say the Vaiśeṣikas, hence free from all suffering and sorrow. Can more be said? Some followers of the school have attempted to contend that it can be further characterized as a state of positive enjoyment. If it is qualityless, however, this is difficult to maintain. For in true absence of quality, as Radhakrishnan observes, "the state of freedom comes perilously near the unconscious condition of a stone."¹³

Exigencies of debate appear to have caused Vaiśeṣika philosophers to posit a certain notion of deity in order to account for order and coherence among the discrete elements of their universe as a whole. Religiously the conception is otiose, however, and plays no rôle in their process of salvation. The latter remains the wholly cognitive effort of purifying the soul from error by correct understanding of the pluralistic universe as Vaiśeṣika sees it.¹⁴

Logical realism and atomistic pluralism, then, are metaphysical venturings we have so far observed in Hindu speculation. In the next system reflection takes a different and highly significant turn. What is known as the Sāṃkhya philosophy presents us with a metaphysical dualism. There are but two ultimate realities, nature and spirit, and in the conception of nature we have something very like an evolutionary naturalism. For this philosophy conceives the whole physical universe, including man's body with its organs and psychic functions as having come about by an evolution from a primordial substance or material principle called Prakṛti. This primal entity or universal matter, as we might call it, while serving as the unitary source of all physical objects, is yet complex in that it is made up of three inseparable but interacting constituents called *guṇas*. These constituents, which are likened to strands in a rope, may be said to stand for three distinguishable aspects or tendencies in physical reality. The first one, called *sattva*, stands for the fine, pure, pleasure-giving

¹³ *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 363-366.

¹⁴ See Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 363-366.

potency of the primordial matter. The second, *rajas*, is the active fiery or passionate tendency which is pain-giving. The third, *tamas*, is the dark, heavy inert aspect which, on the side of psychological effect, produces ignorance, sloth, indifference, and so on. When the three constituents are in a state of equipoise and balanced tension, nature rests in a kind of equilibrium in which all determinate existence is implicit but unmanifest. So soon as the equilibrium is upset, however, the three *guṇas* begin to interact unequally. Change, development, and differentiation take place. The result is the immense variety of the evolving world of manifest natural objects, including the physical nature of man and all its accompanying psychological states.

Such an evolutionary naturalism appears to account for all explicit phenomenal existence. But Sāṃkhya philosophy has yet its other primordial reality to set alongside its primordial matter. This is the world of spirit or *puruṣa*. This world consists of the infinite number of nonmaterial souls, eternal, self-determining, which are found in conjunction with matter in its living forms but are not of it. Behind all the physical and psychological states of every individual there stands, as it were, a solitary, indifferent, passive spectator, a kind of mirroring consciousness, which reflects in itself the endless play of the evolving material principle but without sharing either the vicissitudes or the fate of its particular forms. This *puruṣa* (we can, without too much violence, call it spiritual self, soul, or inmost core of us) knows the ups and downs of both body and mind, but is not identical with them. So long as spirit is linked with these (*i.e.*, body and mind), however, the individual is prone to identify himself with the moving play of physical and psychological events, suffering consequently the pain and sorrows inherent in the changes. The definite purpose of Sāṃkhya philosophy is to make so clear the distinction between the physical and spiritual natures that the living individual may recognize as his true self, not the ever-evolving and dissolving world of *Prakṛti*, but the eternal, pure intelligence of *puruṣa*. All ethical activity, indeed, is regarded as instrumental to the fuller realization of the spirit within. When true knowledge completes this striving, illusion is removed, there is return into one's true self, and the spirit is forever freed from its conjunction with matter, consequently from the sufferings of continual transmigration. As Radhakrishnan puts it, "When freed, the *puruṣa* keeps no company, looks to nothing without itself, and entertains no alien thoughts. It is no longer at the mercy of *prakṛti* or its products, but stands as a star apart, undisturbed by earthly cares. . . ." Like a mirror with nothing to reflect, it "will subsist in lasting freedom from *prakṛti* and its defilements as pure intelligence in a timeless void."¹⁵ In other words, the

¹⁵ *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 312.

dualistic metaphysics of the Sāṃkhya system is conceived for the sake of casting the vote wholly for the unchanging spiritual principle as against the evolving material principle in its world of reality.

We may note that in its strictest form Sāṃkhya thought is atheistic. It recognizes no Supreme Self within its world of souls. When we take up the next system, namely, Yoga, we find a change made at just this point. Yoga is primarily a psychological system and not an original metaphysical theory. Characteristically, its concern is with certain practices of concentration cultivated in order to produce a supernormal state of consciousness which is regarded as precisely the condition of isolation of the self described in the Sāṃkhya system. For our purpose, however, we may ignore Yoga practice in order to note the particular treatment of Sāṃkhyan ideas in what is known as the Sāṃkhya-Yoga metaphysics. Here we find the same recognition of evolving nature set in distinction from the world of immaterial selves, but now there appears, set above all, the conception of a Supreme, everlastingly perfect Self. This being, to whom is given the name *Īśavar* or Lord, is a self "that has never been subject to ignorance, afflictions, or passions."¹⁶ All knowledge and power are his. Among all other selves he is the one who was never in bondage to matter. He is the one who disturbed the original equilibrium of *Prakṛti* and thereafter helps its blind evolution to follow the intelligible order which we behold in the universe. Thus, somewhat after the manner of the God in Whitehead's cosmology, the *Īśvara* is guide of the process of the evolving universe though not, indeed, its creator.¹⁷ In his relation to other and lesser selves he is designated Supreme Teacher, for he is the perfect ideal of a free spirit. Finite spirits in bondage, by meditation on him, are aided along the path of liberation. This meditation is only one practice among many in the Yoga discipline, however, and the whole idea of the *Īśvara* is but little developed. This fact has led some scholars to suppose that we have here a concession to popular ideas rather than a necessity of thought.¹⁸ Yet however loosely this notion of a personal god sits to the rest of Sāṃkhya-Yoga doctrine, it is evidence of a tendency which was later to find its fullest expression in one branch of the greatest system of Hindu metaphysics, to which we now must turn.

The Vedānta system is the highest peak in the mountain range of Indian philosophy. Its name in Sanskrit signifies the end or final summing up of the traditional teachings stemming from the *Vedas*. More especially it is the systematic organization and statement of the philosophy in the *Upanishads* according to the work of two famous commentators. One of

¹⁶ Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 259.

¹⁷ Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 369.

¹⁸ Garbe and Radhakrishnan. *Cf.* the latter's *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 371.

these was Saṅkara, who flourished around the first quarter of the ninth century of our era. The other, Rāmānuja, lived later in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Both Saṅkara and Rāmānuja profited by the labors of many predecessors. Somewhere around the fourth century there had been composed a highly condensed digest of Upanishadic ideas known as the *Vedānta Sūtras*. This work, like the famous *Sentences* of Peter Lombard in the Western Middle Ages, gave rise during the passing of centuries to endless discussion and comment. In the midst of this process two great tendencies of interpretation gradually assumed shape. It was to these that Saṅkara and Rāmānuja respectively gave the final systematic form.

When we examine Saṅkara's exposition we find a work which, according to Sir Charles Eliot, "in consistency, thoroughness, and profundity, holds first place in Indian philosophy."¹⁹ If in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems we found a metaphysical pluralism, and in Sāṃkhya and Yoga a metaphysical dualism, in Saṅkara's Vedānta we have metaphysics of absolute monism. That is to say, the central principle is "Whatever is, is in reality one." Only one universal being truly exists, and all our pluralistic world of ordinary experience with its vast multitude of physical psychological happenings in their space-time relations is but a veil of appearance and illusion concealing the ultimate reality. What is this absolute Being? Following the *Upanishads* Saṅkara calls it Brahman or Paramātmān, the Highest Self. Absolutely homogeneous, the nature of Brahman is pure intelligence or thought. Deeper than the primordial matter of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, it is that from which proceeds the whole phenomenal universe. Brahman is the true essence of all, of ourselves as well as of everything else. Brahman is not to be understood in terms of our limited, logical intellects, however. From the point of view of ordinary understanding this Being can be defined only negatively. It is not this or that or the other empirical thing or quality—neither stick nor stone nor star nor flower—but somehow the inner reality of all of them. Nor is it our finite selves in their phenomenal character. It is transempirical, transphenomenal. Nevertheless Brahman is not on that account unreal, as our first impulse is to suppose. Its reality, rather, is devoid of the nature of the physical, quantitative, and fragmentary world.²⁰ As Rudolf Otto put it in his Oberlin lectures,²¹ "True Being is Being itself, the eternal Brahman, unchanging and unchanged, undivided and without parts." We come nearest to its characterization when we reverse the terms of ordinary experience and say: as against the physical and the sensuous it is spiritual; as against the transitory and perishing, it is eternal and immortal; as against all

¹⁹ Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol. II, p. 208.

²⁰ Radhakrishnan, Vol. II, p. 537.

²¹ *Mysticism, East and West*, 1932, p. 3.

multiplicity and variety, it is one and homogeneous; as against all that is bound in the causal series of phenomena, it is the absolutely free, untouched by cause and effect. Where can we find conviction for any such being? The answer is, in the inmost depths of ourselves. Not indeed in the turbulent ups and downs of ourselves as psycho-physical organisms, but in the deep-lying percipient consciousness, the eternally beholding spectator within, for whom the processes both of the world and of personal life present themselves as a mighty drama, tragic it may be or comic, but ultimately not integral with the beholder any more than the images in a mirror are one with the substance of the reflecting surface itself. It is in this perduring percipency within that we are one with the infinite intelligence that is the true being of the world.

Does Sāṅkara think of this Brahman as a person? We cannot say so. For, as he sees it, the term person or *puruṣa* implies a determinate or finite self, whereas Brahman is indeterminate, infinite intelligence which, by contrast, we would have to call nonpersonal or superpersonal. For us Westerners the puzzle is, of course, to know how it comes about that if reality truly is one, infinite, and spiritual, there should arise even the appearance of plural, finite, material, and personal beings. If the noumenal is the real, how do phenomena ever come to exist? The answer is: by virtue of a certain principle of illusion or ignorance. As George Thibaut, Sāṅkara's translator, has put it, "Being associated with this principle of illusion (or *Maya*), Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearances of animate and inanimate things."²² We ourselves, therefore, as products and partakers of this ignorance, live in our pluralistic world of ordinary experience, but by attaining true knowledge of the unity of all in the being of Brahman we gain release from the deceptions and unrealities of existence.

It must be confessed that this metaphysics of Sāṅkara moves pretty high in the stratosphere of thought. The one universal being, Brahman, is real but real in a sense beyond every particular intellectual conception. To be sure, Sāṅkara does give some status to such conceptions as all-knowing, all-mighty Lord, creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world. These, as concessions to the religious needs of finite being, Sāṅkara deems of practical importance. They are, however, descriptions of Brahman only as he appears for us. Applied to ultimate being in itself, such language is invalid. In this rigorous monism, which W. E. Hocking calls "the purest still professed among men,"²³ Indian speculative philosophy attained its highest altitude. For India, Sāṅkara is *the philosopher* par excellence.

The Vedānta system in this form, however, is farther removed from

²² *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. 34, p. xxv.

²³ *Living Religions and a World Faith*, p. 101.

popular religious interest in India than is the interpretation of the other great commentator Rāmānuja. In the latter, metaphysics is given a decidedly theistic turn. Rāmānuja himself belonged to that branch of Hinduism which worships deity under the name of Vishnu. What he sees as the final meaning and truth of the *Upanishads*, accordingly, is not the impersonal absolute of Saṅkara but a Supreme Lord, a personal Self of the universe who is all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-merciful, with a nature fundamentally opposed to all evil. For Rāmānuja the multiplex world of material objects and immaterial souls is not mere appearance and illusion but the veritable body of the Lord. Ultimately, world and souls stand in the same relation to him as the living organism stands to its animating principle. Or, they are to him what the complex of physical and mental characteristics of a man are to his inner core of selfhood. Fundamentally all together make up a unity in which there are differences and distinctions. Men therefore are partakers of the life of Brahman both outwardly and inwardly, and one with him in nature. To realize this union with God, consequently, is release and salvation. Yet being forever with the Lord after this fashion is not for Rāmānuja an absorption into the infinite ocean of an impersonal, timeless absolute, but a continuing, interactive fellowship. Rāmānuja asks himself: "Is the soul, when it has reached the highest light and freed itself from all bondage, conscious of itself as separate from the Highest Self or as nonseparate in so far as being a 'mere mode of that Self'?" "The former view is the right one," he answers, "for Scripture and *smṛti* [*i.e.*, what is remembered, tradition] alike declare that the released soul stands to the Highest Self in the relationship of fellowship, equality, equality of attributes, and all this implies consciousness of aspiration."²⁴

Strictly speaking, Rāmānuja recognizes three ultimately real factors which together make up the universal unity of all.²⁵ These are matter, souls, and the Supreme Lord or God. They are inseparable yet distinguishable. For their complex organic totality he uses the term Brahman. For the Supreme Self alone he uses the term *Īśvara* or Lord. The Lord is the dominating factor which animates the totality of the world and souls in their interaction. His divine life gives the final unity to everything. He subsists in all forms as the soul of all; yet his presence does not on that account obliterate their variety. By this theistic metaphysics of a divine identity running through all the differences of the world, Rāmānuja manages to avoid the high abstraction of Saṅkara's extreme monism, gives comprehensible status to the observations of ordinary experience, and affords basis for religious devotion. For, as he writes at the close of his vast commentary, "We know from Scripture that the Supreme Lord,

²⁴ Rāmānuja's *Commentary*, IV,4,4. *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XLVIII, p. 758.

²⁵ Cf. M. Hirayanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, 1932, p. 398.

when pleased by the faithful worship of his devotees . . . frees them from the influence of Ignorance . . . and allows them to attain to that supreme bliss which consists in the direct intuition of His own true nature: and after that does not turn them back into the miseries of Samsāra."²⁶

We have surveyed the major ventures of Indian metaphysical reflection. It is evident that on the intellectual side they are expressions of the ancient and persistent prayer of the race:

From the unreal lead me to the real.
From darkness lead me to light.
From death lead me to immortality.²⁷

Among the alternatives of thought they have explored the paths of realism, idealism, pluralism, dualism, absolute monism, and theism. Even hedonistic materialism was early represented by one much-attacked group known as the Cārvākas, but their literature has perished and we know them only through the adverse views of critics.

In the main we must say that Indian metaphysics has remained true to religious striving for spiritual intuition. With surprising consistency it has held to the faith that the most valuable knowledge is that of the spiritual essence of things. This sets its basic task, that of grasping just this essence. Thus its enterprise has not been knowing for the sake of knowing, as with the Greeks, but knowledge for the sake of salvation, an attainment of a realization regarded as unique, final, invaluable. Nevertheless, just because salvation was the supreme end, the debate over what is ultimately true and real has been peculiarly searching, sustained, and earnest. In its full detail this search contains many features relevant to the Indian environment alone, problems not raised in other settings. Yet allowing for these, Western philosophical students can still discern in this vast storehouse of intellectual experiment many remarkable and suggestive observations that belong to the common life of man.

²⁶ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XLVIII, p. 770.

²⁷ *Bṛihad-Aranyaka Upanishad*, 1.3.28.

ELDER JOHN LELAND

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IN THAT endless stream of uninspired speech which flows into the oblivion of the *Congressional Record* there appeared some time ago a radio address by Senator George of Georgia on "Freedom of Religion." Georgia is a Baptist state. Senator George is also a Baptist. It is not surprising, therefore, that he referred favorably to the part played by Baptists in the struggle in our country for religious freedom and especially to the contribution of the Virginia Baptists to the ratification of the constitution and to the later adoption of the Bill of Rights.

Virginia was the hot battleground of this historic struggle. It was a formidable group that opposed the adoption of the constitution. The leader was none other than the redoubtable Patrick Henry. He said that he saw "poison under its wings" and that "it squinted toward monarchy." With him were such powerful leaders as George Mason, Monroe, Benjamin Harrison, John Tyler. The leader of the forces for ratification was Madison. He was supported by John Marshall, Edmund Pendleton, president of the convention, Randolph who had previously opposed it, Henry Lee (Light Horse Harry). It was a battle of giants. "The Baptists," said Senator George, speaking for the moment as a historian, or rather as a statistician, "had grown to be the most numerous religious body in the state." Toward the end of the campaign there was a big rally at Orange County Court House addressed by Madison as a candidate to the Virginia Convention. It was not easy for the Baptists to decide how to vote. Their friends were on both sides. Patrick Henry had been their champion in the days when they had suffered most. Madison also had proven himself their friend. Furthermore they were not satisfied that the doctrine of religious freedom would be safeguarded under the proposed constitution. Therefore they inclined to the party of Henry.

For two hours we are told Madison spoke to the audience made up largely of Baptists. When he had finished, Elder John Leland, whom Senator George describes as "the foremost Baptist minister of his day" and who was a candidate in opposition to Madison, took the stand. He withdrew from the contest and urged everyone there to vote for Madison and for ratification. The Baptists responded to Leland. Madison was elected and Virginia, by a very narrow margin of ten votes after a struggle lasting twenty-two days, went for ratification.

American history has not starred the name of John Leland; nor has Baptist history. There are references to him here and there, but no niche has been carved for him in the Baptist hall of fame. So we ask, Who

was John Leland and what did he do to merit so unqualified a place among the Baptists of his days? The story of Leland is an annal of Massachusetts much more than of Virginia. He was born and died in Massachusetts. While he was in Virginia at a very crucial moment, his ministry was for the most part in Massachusetts; but in both Virginia and Massachusetts he exerted throughout all his ministry a tremendous influence in behalf of religious freedom. In fact, it is doubtful if the Baptist idea as chartered by Roger Williams and John Clark ever had a stauncher and more vigorous champion. In 1834 he was asked to address a democratic meeting at Cheshire, his home. He began with these words:

Fellow-Citizens:—Were it not that I am publicly pledged, that “as long as I can speak with my tongue—wield a pen—or have a cry to heaven, whenever the rights of men, the liberty of conscience, or the good of my country were invaded by fraud or force, my feeble efforts should not lie dormant,” I should decline your invitation at this time on account of my age and incapacity. But, on your request, I attend with you today, and shall cast in my two mites for the support of this doctrine, *viz.*, that the rights of man and the energy of law, when operating in their proper channels, are aids to each other; but when either or both of them grow licentious and proclaim war, if no expedient is found to check their hostility, either despotism or anarchy will follow.

This is “liberty under law.” He was seventy-nine years old when he made that speech. He lived ten years longer and continued to cast in his “two mites” for freedom. He reckoned his ministry as beginning when he was twenty; so he fought for the cause sixty-nine years.

Near the end of his very brief autobiography he said, “When I die I neither deserve nor desire any funeral pomp. If my friends think best to rear a little monument over my body, this is the inscription I would wish. ‘Here lies the body of John Leland who labored — years to promote piety and vindicate the civil and religious rights of all men.’” In Cheshire there is a simple monument over his grave bearing such an inscription. On September 1, 1940, another and much more unusual monument was dedicated in Cheshire, the gift of Eugene Bucklin Bowen, a citizen of the town deeply interested in the story of Elder Leland. The monument commemorates a unique incident in American history described in the following words:

ELDER JOHN LELAND

Eloquent preacher, beloved pastor, influential patriot

FATHER OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

With James Madison, carried Virginia, in the adoption of the constitution of the United States, and the first amendment—despite opposition of every other pulpit in Massachusetts, carried every vote in Cheshire for the election of

PRESIDENT THOMAS JEFFERSON

And presented to him in the East Room of the White House, on January first 1802, in the presence of foreign diplomats, supreme court judges and the Congress

THE BIG CHESHIRE CHEESE

weighing 1235 pounds

Dedicated by

THE SONS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

It was not the Cheshire cheese that was dedicated by the Sons of the American Revolution as a hasty reading might suggest. Since, however, the cheese is so immortalized it makes a good illustration of the pilgrimage of this vigorous and eccentric Baptist parson who, even though he has been largely forgotten, was, nevertheless, a great figure in his day; possessed of an extraordinary skill in making converts for Baptist churches and votes for the cause of democratic freedom. It was his destiny to wield this influence at two critical moments in American history: the struggle for the ratification of the constitution and later on the beginning of the Anti-Federalist Republican-Democratic movement destined under the leadership of Jefferson to become with the advent of Andrew Jackson the Democratic party of American history. And the conveyance of the Cheshire cheese, entrusted to his hands and those of a companion, was in itself a little pilgrimage which mirrored his life. For, as he journeyed with the big cheese, he made good use of the opportunity it gave him, as the crowds gathered to see it, of preaching his twofold message, evangelism and freedom.

It was a matter of record, I would assume, that every vote in Cheshire, as the monument states, was cast for Thomas Jefferson in 1800. Elder John Leland had the votes in his pocket. It could not, I would also assume, be proven, as the monument states, that every other pulpit in Massachusetts opposed the election of Jefferson, but it would be difficult to find many other parsons, even among the Baptists, who supported him. The opposition of the Puritan pulpit in Massachusetts to Jefferson was something like the opposition of the Roman Catholic Church to birth control. Not only had Jefferson, as they held, brought over the subversive political philosophy of the French Revolution, which was threatening the very life of the Puritan hierarchy, but he was also in their eyes a freethinker and an atheist. One of the outstanding Puritan preachers of that day was Elijah Parish, of the Byfield Parish. This church was important as the home of Governor Dummer and other personages of note. On a Thanksgiving Day toward the end of Jefferson's first term Dr. Parish took for his text the words, "When the wicked beareth rule, the people mourn." This would seem to have been a more appropriate text for Fast Day than for Thanksgiving. The sermon shows how unalterable was his hatred for Jefferson. "The controversy is not with us," he said. "The controversy is between the Holy God and Mr. Jefferson." That is probably a fair sample of Puritan feeling in Massachusetts. Leland supported Jefferson,

for one reason because he knew him as a friend and knew how he had defended the Baptist parsons of Virginia when they were proscribed and persecuted. But beyond this, Leland was distinctively democratic in his untutored philosophy. This made him naturally antagonistic to any kind of Toryism, ecclesiastical or political.

There was another reason that made Cheshire favorable to the doctrine of religious freedom. This was the establishment of a community known as New Providence, made up of Baptists from Rhode Island, who founded there in 1769 the first Baptist church west of Worcester. New Providence Plantation is now known as Stafford Hill. It was once described by John D. Long as the only deserted village in the commonwealth. There is a memorial there to the New Providence Pioneers, and on September 12, 1937, a tablet was placed on the memorial celebrating the one hundred fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the constitution and commemorating the founding of the New Providence Church. Thus there was in Cheshire a congenial soil for the plantation of liberty and for the vigorous ministration of Elder John Leland.

So when he told the voters of Cheshire to vote for Jefferson, it would seem that following their leader nobody voted for anybody else, and they celebrated their victory by contributing the milk for one day from every Cheshire cow. Using a cider mill for the press, they made the big cheese. It was taken by ox team to Hudson, New York, and from there transported by a schooner to Washington and cut in the East Room of the White House in the presence of the mighty, as the monument records.

Dr. Hovey in his *Life and Times of Isaac Backus* begins by saying that many of the early Christians looked upon their existence prior to conversion as unworthy of being called life and spoke of the time which brought them into fellowship with Christ by his spirit as the day of their birth. "When shall I begin," inquires Pontius in his *Life of Cyprian*, but from the dawn of his faith and from his celestial life?" The great exception, of course, is Saint Augustine, who wrote in his *Confessions* frankly and somewhat fully of his life previous to his conversion, and it is not impossible that this fact as well as his profundity has helped to make his *Confessions* immortal. This mistake, as Dr. Hovey surprisingly calls it, was not confined to primitive Christians. It was common to the Puritans in New England and common to the period of the Great Awakening. So Dr. Hovey gives John Leland as an illustration and quotes him as saying, "Volumes might be written upon the wanderings, darkness and error of my life which would afford no pleasure to others in hearing of them and to relate them would be of no advantage to me. Therefore, I shall pass them by and attend only to a few of God's gracious and notable dealings with me, a great sinner, in my ministerial labors." In assuming

that the narrative of his worldly wanderings would afford no pleasure, he misjudged, I fear, the human or, at any rate, the carnal mind. But, as one reads his brief and very sketchy autobiography, there are only a few somewhat tantalizing hints. "About this time," when he was about eighteen he writes, "there was an evening frolic in the neighborhood and I concluded to go and see whether there was delight in it or not and if not, to find out the cause of its death in my mind. Accordingly I went and found nothing to please, but everything to disgust." The first event which he records after the date of his birth which was in Grafton in 1754 was his baptism. He says he was a little over three years old. Since we do not remember much that happens to us in these very tender years, it is probable that this early memory was somewhat influenced by his later convictions, but this is the way he relates it.

When my father was a young man, he was convinced (as he has told me) by reading the Bible, that believers were the only proper subjects of baptism, and immersion the only gospel mode; but when he broke his mind to his mother, she gave him an alarming warning against heresy; and as there were no preachers thereabout but pedobaptists, he sunk from his conviction, and concluded that his mother and the ministers were right. Accordingly, after he was married, and had a son born unto him, he presented his child for baptism; but after the rite was performed, his mind was so solemnly arrested with the text, "Who hath required this at your hands?" that it was with difficulty he held his son from falling out of his arms; nor did he get over the shock until he had six more children born. He then got his scruples so far removed, that he invited the minister of the town to come to his house on a certain Sunday, after public service was over, and baptize all of them. At this time I was something more than three years old. When I found out what the object of the meeting was, I was greatly terrified, and betook myself to flight. As I was running fast down a little hill, I fell upon my nose, which made the blood flow freely. My flight was in vain; I was pursued, overtaken, picked up, and had the blood scrubbed off my face, and so was prepared for the baptismal water. All the merit of this transaction, I must give to the maid who caught me, my father, and the minister; for I was not a voluntary candidate, but a reluctant subject, forced against my will.

That was more than an incident. It was what he believed, not at the age of three, but certainly from his youth. He was an ardent and instinctive voluntaryist.

His natural gifts were undoubtedly conspicuous even as a child. The minister of the town urged his father to give him a collegiate training. The doctor urged him to study medicine. He himself thought of law, but his father decided that he should stay at home and become the support of his declining years. When he was about eighteen, he met a preacher by the name of Elhanan Winchester, a Baptist, who later became a Universalist. Under the influence of Winchester he was converted, baptized in the voluntary fashion, and joined the Baptist church at Bellingham.

The Bellingham church is one of the oldest Baptist churches in Massachusetts and one whose early history is an interesting picture of the struggle between the Baptists and the standing order in the middle of the eighteenth century. He began the exercise of his gifts right away and was granted, as was the custom among Baptists, a license—as he said of it, “to do what he had already been doing.”

Thus he had no academic schooling. His flashing and rugged mind was uncorrupted by the processes of a formal education. The result was that he retained through life a certain intellectual roughness, a great understanding of common people, and the compelling power of eloquence as a native gift. It would not be just, however, to think of him as an uneducated man. His writings, such as have been preserved, are filled with historical, political, and, to some extent, classical allusions which reveal him as a self-educated man, thinker, and reader. Furthermore, his independence, common sense, honesty, and penetrating mental power made him an educated man in the truest sense of that word. He also knew his Bible. This in itself, as we have long been told, is no small part of an education, if one not only learns its words, but pursues their meaning. The respect in which he was held by some of the great Virginians, like Jefferson and Madison and even Washington, are striking testimonies to the vigor and the breadth of his mind.

In 1775, a momentous time in American history, he went to Virginia and remained there preaching for several months. He then returned to his home and married Sally Devine, of Hopkinton, and went back with his bride to Virginia where he had found, as he believed, a place to labor. Since this did not prove to be the case, his ministry in Virginia became somewhat itinerant.

The Baptists at this time were divided into two sharply contending groups, the Separates and the Regulars. This contention was very bitter. It is not easy now to make the difference clear. It is blurred as are the brands of Calvinism. But, then as always, there was a tenacity in the Baptist fellowship which stood the tension and finally overcame it.

Leland himself was little interested in controversy over polity or theology. In his *Virginia Chronicle* he refers to the havoc wrought among the Baptists by a theological contention over fate and free will. It split the Separates, which is what always happens, and continued for several years. “But,” he added, “after both parties had contested till their courage grew cool they ceased hostilities, grounded their arms and formed a compromise upon the middle ground of “think and let think.” “I am acquainted with men of all these principles,” he said, “who are equally assured they are right. No doubt they are right in their own conceits and they may be all right in their aims, but I am assured they are not all

right in their systems; and far enough from being right when they bitterly condemn each other."

His ministry in Virginia became itinerant and his fame traveled with him. In 1784 he came to Philadelphia, where there was a considerable Baptist group, but, as he came in company with Mr. Winchester who had become a Universalist, he was not invited to preach in the Baptist meetinghouse; so he preached in the hall of the university and in private houses elsewhere, which was a custom among Baptists of those days. He soon returned to Virginia and, for about fifteen years, made Orange his home.

The story of his ordination is very interesting and characteristic. He was, in fact, ordained twice. His first ordination was in Mt. Poney, Culpepper County, in the church he started out to serve. This was done, however, by the church without the imposition of the hands of a presbytery. This was not in line with the general usage of the Baptists at that time, and they refused to recognize his ordination. Some years later he was ordained with the laying on of hands, a concession on his part, and so brought into the more or less turbulent Baptist fellowship. A periodical of the time known as the *Baptist Weekly* gave an account of it. The fact that he had become a conspicuous figure and that his previous ordination had not been recognized made the occasion one of popular interest. It was in consequence largely attended. The account runs as follows:

The council, consisting of three staunch Calvinists, was called, the day appointed for the ordination arrived and with it came a multitude of people to witness the ceremony. The work was divided among the several presbyters: one was to ask the usual questions concerning his faith and call; another was to offer up an ordination prayer, and another was to deliver the charge to the pastor and the church. Leland took his seat long before they appeared and, resting his arms on his knees burying his face in his hands, awaited their movements.

The presbyter appointed to conduct the examination at last began: "Brother Leland, it becomes my duty, according to previous arrangement, to ask you a few questions upon the subject of your faith, and in reference to your call to the ministry."

"Well, brother," said Leland, slowly raising his head, "I will tell you all I know," and down went his head into his hands again.

"Do you not believe that God chose his people in Christ before the foundation of the world?"

"I know not, brother, what God was doing before he began to make this world."

"Brother Leland, do you not believe that God had a people before the foundation of the world?"

"If He had, they were not our kind of folks. Our people were made out of dust, you know, and before the foundation of the world there was no dust to make them out of."

"Do you believe, Brother Leland, that all men are totally depraved?"

"No, for if they were, they could not wax worse and worse as some of them do. The Devil is no worse than totally depraved."

"Well, there are other questions that will embrace all these in substance. I will ask whether you do not believe that sinners are justified by the righteousness of Christ imputed to them?"

"Yes, provided they will do right themselves. I know of no righteousness that will save a man if he will not do right himself."

"Brother Leland, I will ask you one more question. Do you believe that all the saints will persevere through grace to glory and get home to heaven at last?"

"I can tell you more about that when I get there myself. Some of them make a very bad start of it here."

The presbyter, seeing that the audience was very much amused, proposed to his colleagues that they should retire for a few minutes and consult together. After their return they remarked to the congregation that Brother Leland had not answered their questions as satisfactorily as they could wish; but, as they all knew that he had many eccentricities for which they should make every allowance, they had concluded, accordingly, to ask him a few questions touching his call to the ministry.

"Brother Leland, you believe that God has called you to preach the gospel."

"I never heard him."

"We do not suppose, Brother Leland, that you ever heard an audible voice, but you know what we mean."

"But wouldn't it be a queer call, with no voice, and nothing said?"

"Well! well! Brother Leland, you believe it is your duty to preach the gospel to every creature."

"Ah, no, I do not believe it is my duty to preach to the Dutch, for instance. When the Lord bade the apostles to preach to every creature he taught them how to talk to all sorts of people. He has never taught me to talk Dutch."

The council retired and reported favorably much to the surprise of Leland who was compelled to submit to ordination. After they had ordained him in due form he said, "Well, brethren, when Peter placed his hands on people, and took them off, they had more sense than before; but you have all had your hands on me, and before God I am as big a fool as ever."

He remained in Virginia for fourteen years. During that time he preached three thousand sermons and baptized seven hundred people. He was very careful all his life to keep a strict tabulation of his baptisms. This was to him a proof of his ministry. He founded two churches in Virginia and left them strong and flourishing. In 1791 he returned to Massachusetts and settled in Cheshire, serving the church there with various interruptions for forty years. By the sheer force and vigor of his character he became the citizen-parson not only of the town, but of the general region. In 1811 he served in the Massachusetts legislature, going there in order to continue his lifelong battle for religious freedom and to fight against the law which supported the Congregational churches as the standing order of the state.

In this connection there is a revealing story quoted in the history of Bellingham as well as in other places. A certain Congregationalist once said that Leland could not preach so well unless his sermon was committed to memory and offered him the use of a Congregational church if he would preach from a text given to him on the spot. The offer was

accepted. The text was written on a piece of paper which Leland opened after he went into the pulpit. These were the words: "And Balaam saddled his ass." The text, he said, could hardly have been more appropriate. Balaam, the unrighteous prophet, was the oppressive Congregational church. The ass represented the Baptists as the patient endurers of their oppression, and the saddle was the unjust exaction of church taxes; from which point he proceeded to defend one of his lifelong doctrines, the separation of church and state.

Religious liberty was not the only political and moral cause that he espoused. He was one of the earliest and most outspoken of those who might be called the preabolitionists. In 1789, at an associational meeting of the Baptists at Richmond, he presented the following resolution which was adopted: "Resolved, That slavery is a violent deprivation of the rights of nature and inconsistent with a republican government, and, therefore, recommend it to our brethren to make use of every legal measure to extirpate this horrid evil from the land, and pray Almighty God that our honorable Legislature may have it in their power to proclaim the great jubilee, consistent with the principles of good policy." He struck many blows against slavery in the south as well as in the north. When he left Virginia, he wrote a letter of valediction to his friends in the State. It is a beautiful letter couched a great deal in the words of St. Paul's parting with the Ephesian elders. Almost one third of it, however, was a plea for the cause of the slaves.

In one of his political speeches, carrying as he did the principle of democracy to its logical conclusion, he advocated the popular election of judges. It would probably be difficult to find many earlier advocates for an elected judiciary in America.

He wrote a little poetry, none of which, quite properly, has survived. There is one exception, however. It is an "Evening Hymn" which has found its way into many of our hymnals, and most of us I doubt not have sung it sometime.

The day is past and gone.

The evening shades appear!

O may we all remember well

The night of death draws near.

We lay our garments by,

Upon our beds to rest;

So death will soon disrobe us all

Of what we've here possessed.

Lord, keep us all this night,

Secure from all our fears;

May angels guard us while we sleep,

Till morning light appears.

In 1857 Ex-Governor Briggs of Massachusetts, who knew him well, wrote a very interesting letter about him which can be found in Sprague's *Annals of the American Pulpit*. In this letter he tells how Mrs. Briggs and he visited the Leland home at Cheshire. Elder Leland at that time

was eighty-five and his wife was eighty-three. They had been married for more than sixty years. They had ten children, all of whom were living. In all those years there had never been a death in their home. When the supper had been prepared by the "good old mother" and they had gathered about the table, the venerable patriarch implored the blessing of heaven upon them. "In the fulness of my heart," wrote Governor Briggs, "I said to him, 'Sir, I never sat down to a table with more pleasure than I do to this.'" To this Elder Leland replied with a gracious dignity, "You never sat down to a table where you were more welcome."

During the afternoon Governor Briggs referred to a eulogy on Madison given by the Honorable J. S. Barbour of Virginia, in which he gave large credit to Leland for the adoption of the constitution, and he asked him to explain what Barbour meant by it. Leland replied that he had doubtless received more credit than he deserved. He then went on to explain that after the convention which framed the constitution adjourned Madison remained in Philadelphia in order to collaborate with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay in preparing the historic articles which were published as the *Federalist*. During this time the opposition led by Patrick Henry had been marshaling its forces to defeat ratification at the Virginia convention. Madison was a candidate for Orange County, where the Baptist population was large and Leland was the opposing candidate. On his way home Madison visited Leland and discussed the constitution with him for half a day. As a result Leland swung over to Madison, and when the big rally was held to which Senator George referred, he "took the stump, which was a hogshead of tobacco standing on one end," and withdrew in favor of Madison. "This one act," added Governor Briggs, "entitles him to the respect of mankind."

The death of Leland was like that of Mr. Standfast in *Pilgrim's Progress*. "There was a great calm at that time in the river." One of his friends who attended him in his final illness said that early in the evening of his last night a young preacher called to see him.

"Well, Father Leland," he said, "we are going to hold a prayer meeting this evening. Have you any advice to give?"

"If you feel it in your hearts, I am glad. Forms are nothing."

These were nearly his last words; but his arm was not paralyzed, neither was his heart chilled. With his own hand he gave his own tobacco to his friends present, and indicated by signs that they should smoke. About 11 o'clock, he beckoned me to him, and tried to say, "Go to bed." I found his limbs were stiffening and his senses lulling, and anxious to be near him till all was over, I hesitated, but finally, at the solicitation of one of the watchers, left the room. The man soon followed, and said, "You had better come back." I came. Not a finger had moved. His spirit had taken rest in the bosom of its God. Thus died John Leland, a man whose place in society, in the church, and in the ranks of the ministry will not soon be filled—in the hearts of those who knew him—never.

TOO MANY COOKS

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IN THE *Atlantic Monthly* for August, 1947, an editor of a Michigan newspaper gives a significant personal testimony: "I'm going to try," he says, "to live down my portentous past, and live up to the expectations of free people to get guidance and not exhortation in a bewildering world from their editors, publicists, scholars, scientists, politicians, and other leaders."¹ If one will allow the time-honored practice of emendation to the extent of adding after "other leaders" the words "particularly their preachers," this sentence will serve admirably as a text for some thoughts about one of the real problems connected with the task of the parish ministers. Free people do expect to get guidance and not exhortation from their preachers.

This same editor, Karl F. Zeisler, uses a well-chosen parable to portray the prevailing climate in which the average man is forced to live. Recently, he says, he sat in a football stadium along with about 89,999 other spectators. "Between halves students pushed an amiable, tail-wagging hound out on the playing field. Instantly a chorus of whistles, dog calls, and shouts arose from the jammed stands. I watched the mongrel rush frantically toward a half-recognized voice, and then wheel in response to a more piercing whistle. I couldn't help thinking that the American people had been in exactly the position of the hound in the stadium."

As I review the stirring appeals to which I have been subjected—and I confess, to which I have, in turn, subjected others—I have considerable sympathy for the bewildered dog. To change the figure slightly, not infrequently do I find myself going away from worship with the feeling that I have been more hounded than helped. There are so many good causes to be promoted that the enthusiastic minister finds it easy to become an exhorter. Help build, rebuild, feed, clothe, evangelize, vote, educate, send letters to congressmen—or, if the issue is very important, to senators, or even to the President—subscribe, sacrifice, pray, meet the quota set, oversubscribe, attend, sign up, coöperate—these and many more verbs in the imperative mood one may hear in the course of a few Sundays used with ever-increasing emphasis upon a docile congregation of free men and women.

A casual visitor from Mars would never suspect, should he happen to drop in to a live-wire church, that both the church and the state agree in theory that man is a free agent, free to choose, possessing what we are proud to call "free will" and that he lives in a democracy. He might con-

¹The quotations in this and the following paragraph are from an article entitled "The Hound in the Stadium" by Karl F. Zeisler, which appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1947 (Vol. 180, No. 2), p. 102, and are quoted by permission of the publisher.

clude—this bewildered visitor from another planet—that churches are places where men are herded together and persuaded, even against their wills—bludgeoned, if you wish—to concerted action, that pulpits are high places for exhortation and high-pressure salesmanship. There are many happy exceptions, enough to make the picture a caricature; yet, there is at hand considerable evidence for the growth of what might be termed “commercial” in worship.

I have two calendars for “The Christian Year” prepared for ministers suggesting the emphases which should be made on designated Sundays. Each runs the entire gamut of interests, philanthropic, educational, traditional. Every national holiday is to be celebrated in church; to be emphasized are the birthdays of national heroes, race relations, temperance, peace, Scouts, Red Cross, nature, rural life, prayer, Bible, Reformation, old home church, missions—both general and men’s missions—Kingdomtide, Christmas, and the conversion of St. Paul. So many are the emphases for February 22 that the minister is forced to choose between four: George Washington’s birthday, second Sunday in Lent, brotherhood day, or the Red Cross. Each year new emphases are being added. Besides mother’s day, we now have father’s day, children’s day, young people’s day, youth week, and student recognition day. And all these various interests are promoted with ever-increasing pressure by boards and committees within the denominations and without. The minister—provided his name is printed in one of the standard directories—need no longer search his soul for some message for the sermon; he need but wait for the mail to bring him the appropriate theme for emphasis on Sunday.

As one watches from the side lines this growing tendency to use the churches to promote causes, he cannot help but ask some questions. Is the church to become a chain store? Are the “commercial” crowding out the programs which interest and help people? Does it mean that the minister, the man who knows best the needs of the people he serves, must abdicate his office of leadership and leave the program to those in higher and more distant places? Does it mean that a minister who joins Mr. Zeisler in his resolve to give people guidance and not exhortation is to be considered noncoöperative by his colleagues and unsympathetic to the many good causes in our world?

To be portentous is a peculiar temptation to us who are ministers. Read over some of the old sermons and see the threats we have made, the oracles we have so effectively uttered, the stern warnings we have given: the end of the American way in the depression days and after, the threat of dictatorship, of totalitarianism here and abroad, danger of communism, the danger which quickly gave way to the danger of criticizing our noble and brave ally to the east, the dangers of the veto, the atom, the ambassador to the Vatican, Catholics in school busses, capitalism, and

later labor unions. On the social side we have recited such appalling facts, as more money spent on liquor and dog food than for missions, flayed the movies for low morals, called attention to juvenile delinquency and the stupidity of the military in Germany and Japan. These and countless other alarms have aroused us at one time or another until like the hound in the stadium we—and those who listen to us—are completely bewildered and don't know quite which way to turn. Surely—were this the preacher's only task—there are enough social ills, sore spots in our earth, to fill each Sunday of the year.

Here someone is sure to conjure up the Hebrew prophets. Were they not bold men, who, without fear, spoke out about national and social ills? Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, and others did just this. But it is often overlooked that these outspoken men did not come into their own until they had had some successors who took quite a different turn. A good case can be made, I think, for the claim that it was the Second Isaiah who really made Isaiah. The helpful tone of Second Isaiah—"Comfort ye, comfort ye my people" and the attempt to give guidance to the bewildered, without any compromise in principle or social righteousness—was the climate and mood of later prophecy. Or consider Jeremiah's oracles, which are second to none in the influence which they have had on religious thought. He was, so he said, sent to tear down and to root out; but his task was also to build and to plant. Many would agree today that what he planted was of greater value than all his destruction. One can quote some passages of castigation and some of exhortation, but most prominent are those bits of kindly advice by which he sought to direct the bewildered exiles in Babylon. The author of the book of Jonah could have delivered a broadside against wicked cities like Nineveh, or against stubborn men like Jonah; but he chose to make people see, by means of a simple story, the evil provincialism of the pious Jew.

In the last analysis free people do not come together in churches to be exploited for causes no matter how good or how ecumenical; nor do they come primarily, I think, to hear the portentous warnings which we can so glibly utter in the name of religion—prophetic religion. Free people come for guidance and for help.

As I have been thinking about these things and the resolution of a small-town editor in Michigan to live down his portentous past, and to live up to the expectation of free people, there comes to mind a fine word, preserved in the Hebrew text of I Kings 20. It is fine because it is so true, I think, in quite a different setting. Tear it out of the context and apply it to a minister and his parishioner: "While thy servant was busy with this and that, the man was gone." We have resources for giving men guidance; if we fail because of busyness with this and that, we too may find our man, our free man, gone.

THE CHASID MAGGIDIM

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WE HAVE all heard that old sad gag to the effect that no souls are saved after the first twenty minutes of a sermon. Well, here is one to top that one! It is recorded that a Polish rabbi, who was a scholar of great learning, would sometimes study a single verse for weeks. This caused him considerable difficulty when he came to preach. He began one of his first sermons as follows:

It is fitting that a Rabbi always preach the truth, that he speak briefly, and that his theme be taken from the *Sedrah*. I wish to say that I do not know what *Sedrah* is to be read on this Sabbath. This is true; it is brief; and it has the *Sedrah* for its theme. Amen!

Not one reader in a thousand, I suspect, can tell the source of that tale. Nor could I until very recently when, by accident, and while doing some research on another subject, I stumbled upon a veritable treasure-trove of lore and wisdom hidden away in the obscure but fascinating literature of Chasidism. Through a unique literary medium in some ways uninviting, and fabulous to anyone who has not known intimately the life of east European, Yiddish-speaking Jewry, it is yet possible to discern a philosophy and a way of living which has depth, power, and charm, while displaying also the deep constant elements of the Jewish *psyche* and *ethos*. Under the skillful hand of such translators and interpreters as Martin Buber, this rich literature becomes dynamic and pregnant with meaning for all mankind. Here there are elements of beauty and of permanent validity for all of us. There are many items of particular interest for preachers; instruction not found in the usual homiletical textbooks.

II

It is probably necessary to say, even in writing for readers of the CROZER QUARTERLY, that the Jewish movement known as Chasidism (or Hasidism) originated in the eighteenth century in the Carpathian Mountain districts of Poland, Roumania, and the Ukraine. Its founder was one Israel ben Eliezer (1700-1760) to whom the faithful gave the name Baal-Shem-Tov (Master of the Good Name), or more briefly, the "Besht." The later leaders of the Chasidic settlements were known as "Zaddikim" (holy ones, righteous ones), and their followers came to be known as "Chasidim" (pious ones). The preachers among them were called "Maggidim." Through the power and charm of their own lives, these Zaddikim were able to save the Jewish masses from the disillusionment created by

the collapse of the Sabbatian Messianic movement of the seventeenth century and restore a new confidence in religion. Over the years the Baal-Shem and the Zaddikim produced legends and folk tales, aphorisms, anecdotes, hyperbole, and sayings, many of which remind one of the parables and teachings of Jesus, Lao-Tse, Gautama, and the saints. This oral tradition of lore and wisdom and myth was threatened with oblivion until Martin Buber became the interpreter and evangelist of this Eastern European religious movement.

Chasidism is surely one of the most remarkable and appealing manifestations of the religious spirit of modern times. While tinged with superstition and miracle, there is here something tender and reverent, authentic and wise, deep in ethical insight, and timeless in its spiritual sensitivity. It is a genuine Jewish movement and culture with unique points of emphasis and practice.

The Chasidim were a humble and devout folk, often despised and persecuted for their eccentric ways. Chasidism was regarded by its enemies as an uncouth superstition and a mass religious frenzy. In a time of corrupt social conditions and persecution inviting despair, it was in fact a kind of "revolt of the masses" against the barren formalism and dry scholasticism of orthodox rabbinical Judaism prevailing at the time in Eastern Europe. Like the early Christian movement, it was an appeal from the "letter" to the "spirit" of the law. Like Jesus, Baal-Shem-Tov came not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it in a spiritual and joyous way. The Chasidim were free, undecorous, uninhibited in their religious worship, jubilantly directing their service to God, each in his own way—a way that might express itself in laughter, song, or dance. Redemption lay in devout works, loving deeds, fervent prayer, and single-hearted devotion to God and man. The Besht counseled against asceticism and self-mortification. The world was not to be fled, but sanctified through the service of God and neighbor. God's glory was to be found in all things; consequently a life of holiness and purity was to be lived *within* the world. Loving the world in God was their secret.

A natural and active mysticism, ecstatic communion of man with God, a belief in the presence and power of the holy spirit, the joyful affirmation of life, the cultivation of religious fervor, a strong and loving spirit of brotherhood, a self-denying loyalty to the community, inward piety and its fruits in acts of justice and mercy—these were the main elements in the Chasidic teachings. And they produced lives of winsome humility, charity, and moral strength. This may be shown in one of their anecdotes of exegetical comment:

When a war broke out between the Hasidim and their opponents, Rabbi Elijah of Wilna did not resort to argument; he fulminated against those who upheld

Hasidism a decree of expulsion from the community. When Rabbi Dov Baer heard of this, he turned to his disciples, expounding the law: "Our adversaries hold with his commandment: You shall remove the evil from your midst (Deut. 21:21). Be it our part to hold with another: Thou shalt not avenge nor bear malice" (Lev. 19:18).

III

In comparing Chasidism with Christianity (their origins, character, literature, etc.), Rabbi Louis I. Newman writes:

Though originally a Jewish movement, Christianity moved outside the circle of the national life of Israel; Hasidism, however, persisted as a Jewish movement . . . remaining dominantly a message to the Jewish folk. It gives an inkling of of what the preachment of Jesus, the Master and his Disciples, might have become if Hellenic, Roman, and other alien elements had not been synchronized with it, in order to form the basis for the new faith of Pauline Christianity.¹

Christians may, indeed, note several interesting parallels. I suggest that these are not odious comparisons, but the kind of resemblances found in all authentic and intense religious faiths. For example, the Chasidim derived their name from the appellation given many centuries ago to the "Chasidim" who formed the vanguard of the heroic defense against the Hellenizers in pre-Maccabean Palestine, and who were the precursors of the Pharisees, from whose ranks, some maintain, Jesus himself arose. In the religious history of the eighteenth century, Baal-Shem-Tov was a contemporary and counterpart of Count von Zinzendorf as founder of a pietistic sect. They gave to the world the same great message: the gospel of constant mutual relations between God and man.

The Besht was apparently an illiterate but compelling figure of great magnetism, intense fervor, and keen human insight. Both he and Jesus had a strong mystical sense of the immediacy, omnipresence, and gracious self-giving of the Loving Father. The Besht was noted as a faith healer and a worker of miracles, reminiscent of the wonderdeeds of another young rabbi. Both Baal-Shem and Jesus gathered about themselves little bands of loyal disciples. Both had a messianic ideal. Both gave a personal direction, content, and urgency to the traditional Hebrew teaching. Both had an immense and compassionate love for suffering humanity. Dubnow writes that St. Francis may be called a "Catholic Chasid" comparable to Rabbi Moshe Leib of Sassov who said: "He who cannot suck the boils of a child sick with the plague has not gone half-way up the heights of love for his fellowman."

Another familiar story reports the following:

¹ See the introduction to *The Hasidic Anthology* (New York, Bloch Publishing Company), 1944, p. lxxi.

Upon a midnight, as Rabbi Moshe Leib was absorbed in the mysteries of the law, there came a knocking at his window. Without stood a drunken peasant desiring shelter and lodging. For a moment the heart of the Zaddik was hot with anger and it said to him: "What insolence in a drunken lout! and what business has he in my house?" But the righteous one answered unto his heart: "And what business has he in God's world? If God can endure him, how dare I refuse?" And at once he opened the door and prepared a couch.

There can further be said of Baal-Shem-Tov what Joseph Klausner said of Jesus: that he was "an artist in parable and a master of morality." For he, like Jesus, made effective use of simple, homely parables, folk tales, aphorisms, and sermons wherein the most untutored listener might comprehend the moral point intended. These colorful and pointed stories, as will be seen, show profound human insight, remarkable good sense, keen wit, as well as original artistic form. They breathe forgiveness and loving kindness; they exalt the inwardness of faith and the practice of charity; they teach equality of high and low; they preach sincerity and ardor in worship. To the Christian reader, much of this literature seems to be "Christian" in spirit and text.

IV

The Chasidic exegetes and preachers took considerable poetic license with biblical texts, and paraphrased the Torah and Talmud according to their own ethical and doctrinal interests. But isn't this what all great preachers do, while trying to remain faithful to the original? Individual Maggidim were allowed great freedom in their approach to rabbinical literature; and it must be admitted that many of their preachments and comments equal, if they do not surpass, the original in their pungency and moral insight. Some of the Maggidim developed the homily to an unusual excellence of both style and content. They were great teachers of the people, and their parables, proverbs, and moral messages were marked by terseness, brevity, and directness. The rabbi of Ladi was once asked: "Wherein does the rabbi demonstrate that he is greater than other persons?" He replied, "You can recognize the truly great man by observing how he talks to various types of ordinary folk. It requires sagacity for the learned man to be able to converse with a commoner and to hold his attention." The Riziner rabbi remarked on homiletical method: "There are two ways to influence men for good. One is by sermons of serious and profound character, when the hearers are of high intelligence. The other is by sermons of a light nature, interpolated with tales and parables, when the listeners are ordinary men and women of little learning." As an example of the method by which the Zaddikim instructed their humble followers, consider this little story about the villager who

lamented that his evil desires constantly overcame him and caused him to fall into evil ways.

"Do you ride a horse?" inquired the rabbi.

"Yes," replied the villager.

"What do you do if you happen to fall off?"

"I mount again," said the villager.

"Well, imagine the Evil Impulse to be the horse," continued the rabbi. "If you fall, mount again. Eventually, you will master it."

I am not a preacher, but the following appears to me as sound advice in support of "preaching from the Bible." The Pulnoer rabbi declared:

It is the rabbi's duty to exhort and reprove his congregation. If a direct reproof is displeasing to most of his congregants, he should not resort to it against their wish, and acquire thereby their enmity. In such a case, he should use words of admonition and warning found in the Torah, without adding words of his own. If his congregants then become angry, their displeasure is against the Lord, who inspired the Torah.

Something of the same high regard for the compactness and rugged power of the Bible is contained in the account of one Rabbi Elimelech of Lizensk who came to the city of Nikolsburg where Rabbi Schmelke was the leader. On being asked to deliver the sermon, he said simply and directly:

Your rabbi's method is to cure your spirit by means of delicate medicines, like the good physician. I am but a horse doctor, and I cannot do otherwise than treat you with plain and homely medicines. I must adjure you to beware of breaking the Ten Commandments: not to steal, not to bear false witness, not to covet, and the like.

The words of the Mikolayever rabbi also offer a good suggestion for the preparation of sermons:

In the same way that a tailor sketches the design and cuts away the extraneous material before making up a garment, so the preacher must first outline his subject of discussion, and with questions eliminate the nonessentials, before he brings his analysis to a point.

The Zaddikim were judicious in matching their instruction with the mood and needs of their listeners. For example, the Pulnoer rabbi said:

A healthy-minded man thirstily absorbs words of exhortation and reproof in a sermon, welcoming their explicit and frank message. But he whose soul is sick finds direct reproof too bitter and too personal. It is necessary for the preacher to clothe his admonition to the soul-sick in a garment of parables or tales. At the same time it is necessary to guard against the danger that those who hear, absorb merely the outer meaning and miss the inner message.

Those Chasid preachers knew all too well that pitfall of young ministers: the corrosive power of fulsome praise from their congregations, especially from the dear old ladies who are overly impressed by the eloquence of their handsome young pastor. It is related that a learned man took the Sabbath meal with Rabbi Baruch Medzibozer, the grandson of the Baal-Shem, and he said to his host: "Let us now hear you talk of your doctrine; you speak so beautifully!" "May I be struck dumb ere I speak beautifully!" was Rabbi Baruch's reply; and he said nothing more.

V

Some other problems which disturb the sleep of many ministers are analyzed in the following anecdotes; which also display keen insight into human nature. A famous rabbi asked the Lubliner: "Why do so many thousands come to you and not to me? I have learned more Talmud than you, and I can discourse on the Halakhah more profoundly?" The Lubliner replied: "I am likewise surprised at the multitudes who come. Who am I that thousands should seek to learn godliness from me? But perhaps they come to me because I know how little is my worth, and they do not come to you because you are surprised at their failure to come."

Many of the Zaddikim led saintly lives; yet they had their own personal problems: they knew the reality of sin and spiritual pride, and of the necessity for repentance. The rabbi of Lizensk once said:

There are two kinds of Zaddikim. One is a true saint, but he knows it, and believes he need not repent since he does not sin. Such a Zaddik cannot influence others to repent, because he does not himself adhere to repentance. . . . The other Zaddik is likewise a true saint, but of a higher type. He constantly passes judgment upon his own actions, to discover whether they were performed from holy motives only and for the sake of pleasing the Lord, rather than for the sake of his own soul's benefit. If he discovers an impure motive in his conduct, he repents of it with fervor. Such a Zaddik is able to influence others to repent, for he himself cleaves to repentance.

The Besht also knew of the struggle with evil inclinations. Said he:

When a man squeezes winegrapes into a vessel, he must first use a sieve with large holes to strain it; later he uses a cheese cloth. But no matter how many times he will strain it, some sediment will still remain. It is the same with the Zaddik. He must rid himself of his evil inclinations and continue to do so his entire life. But there are always a few dregs left over.

In their moral zeal and in their battle against sin, ministers sometimes forget that even sinners have a right to some consideration. It is easy to do justice to the good man; it is often overlooked that even bad men have certain human rights. Not so the rabbi of Lublin. He was describing the secret weaknesses of the soul to one of his followers, when

the man interrupted him, saying: "Rabbi, thou shamest me." "If I shame you," said the rabbi, "if I shame you, I beg your pardon."

Long before the modern world had been instructed in psychiatry, the Chasid Zaddik apparently had discovered and employed many of the insights and methods of psychotherapy in his pastoral counseling. Consider, for example, this saying of the rabbi of Koretz: "The true Zaddik is always able to see without his eyes and to hear without his ears. A man comes to ask my counsel, and I hear that he himself is telling me, unknowingly, what I should advise him."

Our churches are shot through with divisiveness, denominational pride, and vested interests. All of us, and especially our churches and their ministers, might well give heed to the lesson contained in the following allegory:

A king sent forth several armies against his enemies, one of them under his son's command. The son loved his father deeply, and concerned himself only with pleasing him, rather than with his own glory. Hence the victory of his army gave him little joy unless the other armies were also victorious. The commander of another royal army, however, cared only for his own reputation, and welcomed the tidings that his companion-armies were repulsed, since this heightened his own prestige.

By the same token, the truly pious man rejoices to hear that another is greater than himself, since he seeks only to please the Lord, and it matters not to him who gives the Lord this satisfaction. But the falsely pious man envies another's fame and seeks to detract from his repute, desiring that only his own goodness shall be praised.

Every good Protestant, especially every Protestant minister, should appreciate this pithy parable of the Besht about a weaponless leader:

A hero promised to defend his city, and showed to the inhabitants his many weapons. He was met by the foe unexpectedly, however, when he had no weapons on his person; he was captured, and the undefended city fell. In the same way, people depend upon their rabbis to protect them against irreligion. But, if Satan succeeds in deceiving the rabbi, all of them fall into error. Each man should learn his duties for himself, and he should be able to prevent wrong deeds by indicating their falsity, if the leader should happen to be weaponless.

VI

The Chasidim would explain and justify their eccentric and unrespectable ways in this fashion. Said the Riziner:

I will illustrate to you the necessity of warmth in the service of the Lord. The Torah bids us when we become unclean to immerse ourselves in water and thereby be purified. But if the water is frozen, can we immerse ourselves in it? A frozen heart cannot purify an unclean life.

The Besht himself said many things to underscore the teaching that a man's ecstasy for the Lord is not genuine unless he takes joy in it. The following laconic aphorism about a drowning man is typical:

Laugh not at the motions of a man who prays with fervor. He makes these motions in order to save himself from foreign thoughts which intrude upon him and threaten to engulf his prayer. Would you laugh at a drowning man who makes motions in the water in order to rescue himself?

On the importance of maintaining an active and regular devotional life, Rabbi Moses Sophar used to say: "On a day when I read no book of moral instruction, I feel my reverence for the Lord growing cold." He also knew the truth of the saying of Rabbi Bunam: "When a man's heart is heavy and full of anxiety, he may lighten it through ardent prayer and a belief in God's mercies." And said the Tarnigrader rabbi: "He who worships and allows his thoughts to stray from God is like him who prepares a banquet for the king and then leaves his home."

Yet the Zaddikim knew the weaknesses and failures which attend human flesh. Again this sympathetic understanding of human nature is displayed in the account of certain disciples of the Besht who were prompted to call upon a man who was reported to be very wise. They inquired of the master: "How shall we know him for a true Zaddik?"

Ask him to counsel you [replied the Besht], how to keep your thoughts from going astray when praying or learning. If he offers counsel, you will know that his wisdom is nought; for it is part of man's bondage, until the hour of his death, to wrestle with alien thoughts, time and again, and to subdue them in any ascent of the soul.

The Zaddikim had a ready and pointed answer to the question of mixing business with religion. Rabbi Nachman Kossover taught that we should always have the Lord in our thoughts, wherever we are and whatever our doings. But he was asked: "Can we think of the Lord when we are engaged in buying and selling?" "Surely we can," answered the rabbi. "If we are able to think of business when we are praying, we should be able to think of praying when we are doing business."

What minister has not, at one time or another, felt like reënacting the following satire? The Berditschever walked over to certain members of his congregation when they had finished the Amidah, and shook hands with them, greeting them with the words, "Shalom Aleikhem." They were greatly surprised at such an unexpected salute, inasmuch as they had not been out of the city, and were not guests, who are usually thus greeted. The rabbi noted their confusion and explained himself as follows:

The reason for this salutation is that I could read in your faces while you were reciting the Amidah, that you did not have in mind the meaning of the words of the prayers, but were thinking of the grain market in Odessa or the woolen market in Lodz. Now that you have returned from so long a voyage, it is appropriate for me to extend to you a welcome home.

These Zaddikim were not only shrewd judges of human nature, but they were deeply pious and powerful in prayer. After the Rimanover was disclosed as a holy rabbi, so goes one lovely—and true—story, a Polish noblewoman came to him and entreated him to pray for the life of her son who was dangerously ill. The rabbi asked: "Do you come to me as a worker of miracles?" "Nay," replied the mother, "I come to you as a man who is nearer to God than any other living person." The rabbi prayed for three hours and sweat covered his entire body. At noon he said to the noblewoman: "I hope that my prayers have been heard. Return home." When she arrived at her home, she was told that the child had opened his eyes and had asked for a drink. In 1883, when the boy had become a man of eighty years, he came to Rimanov accompanied by his own son, the cardinal of Lemburg, to visit the grave of his early benefactor. Another prayer which has not been so clearly answered, and which displays both the pathos and the humor of Israel, is the one attributed to the rabbi of Koznitz: "O Lord of the world, I beg of you to redeem Israel. And if you do not want to do that, then redeem the goyim (gentiles)."

VII

How many hard-working, underpaid ministers, struggling along on a pittance, traveling on clergy fare, resenting the false deference of parishioners who seem to think that the minister ought to be holy enough for the whole community, will not feel the justice of the following tale, while also wishing that on occasion they had had the courage to do likewise?

Rabbi Teitelbaum said: "The true Zaddik does not derive personal gain from his piety. We find in the book *Hovoth ha-Levavoth* the story of a pious man who entered a shop where he was known, to make a purchase. The storekeeper asked him a ridiculously low price, whereupon the Zaddik remarked: 'I came, my friend, to purchase with money, not with piety.'"

The true Zaddik served God and his Chasidim without thought of reward. This is well illustrated by a tale told of the Great Maggid. It seems that when his wife pressed her starving child to her bosom, the Maggid heaved a rebellious sigh. Forthwith a voice from Heaven thundered into his ear: "Thou hast lost thy share in the World-to-Come." "It matters not," cried Maggid joyfully. "The thralldom of reward has gone; henceforth I will serve God as a freeman." After that sinks in, the reader may derive some comfort from this little exegetical fable about rewards:

Said Rabbi Bunam: "We understand from the Midrash that Rabbi Abuha was discouraged with his work of admonishing the people, since he found that he accomplished but little. Then he dreamed that he went up to Paradise and was shown his great reward. He then applied to himself the verse (Isaiah 49:4): 'But

I said: I have spent my strength for naught and vanity; yet surely my right is with the Lord, and my recompense with my God.' It is like the counselor or the physician who receive payment, even if they are unsuccessful, inasmuch as they have done all within their power."

These quaint Chasidim knew how to live joyously; they also knew how to die, for they had learned the lesson of death. Their whole life was a dying to self. In the hour of his death, the Besht said: "Now I know the purpose for which I was created." And when Rabbi Bunam was lying on his deathbed, his wife wept bitterly. Thereupon he comforted her, saying: "Why dost thou weep? All my life has been given me merely that I might learn to die."

So when, as it does to all men, death comes to us, may our epitaph be similar to that of Rabbi Sussya who lived to a great age. For seven years before his death, he was bedridden and in pain, in atonement, it was said, for the sins of Israel. His gravestone is inscribed: "Here lieth he who served God in love, rejoiced in pain, and turned many away from guilt."

[[For anyone who desires to read more tales of the Chasidim, I suggest: Martin Buber, *Tales of the Hasidim* (New York: Schocken), 1947; Louis I. Newman, *The Hasidic Anthology* (New York: Bloch), 1944; S. Ansky, *The Dybbuk, A Drama* (New York), 1926.

I have the permission of both Schocken Books, Inc., and Louis I. Newman to use some of the tales appearing in the above-mentioned books, provided due acknowledgement is made to the publisher and copyright holder. For this gracious permission I express my hearty thanks to authors and publishers.]]

From Off the Campus and On

OCCASIONALLY, to spice up this column, we have risked the wrath of our friends by printing excerpts from their letters in the place of a more formal word of introduction. Again we take our life—or is it *lives?*—in our hands in the case of the author of the first article, a man already known to most of our readers:

“ . . . here's a running account of my background. Born in 1909 in Tyrone, Pennsylvania. Graduated from Lafayette College in 1927, where I majored in English and psychology and got tied up with an inordinate amount of extracurricular activities. Had four years at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. During my theological school summers I took clinical pastoral training. I finished my comprehensive background work for Ph.D. in 1934, but had trouble finding dissertation project. I finally found Ed. Aubrey, but was lured by the call of the Council for Clinical Training in 1935 to become its executive secretary. Three years later I came on the staff of the Federal Council, and have been here ever since. . . . I have published one book . . . and edited two others. . . . I should be chagrined to have to add up all the articles of all kinds I have published. Total funds earned as an author—not worth mentioning.”

A man who has this ability in realism, self-analysis, and downright honesty should be a good guide for the perplexed in the thorny subject of which he writes.

Following his graduation from Swarthmore in 1912 Mr. Ayres spent several years with the duPont Company and then started his own business, largely concerned with industrial consultation. More than fifty patents are registered in his name covering many important chemical processes, some of which, as in the case of refining vegetable oils, revolutionized the current industrial processes. Since 1929 he has been in charge of chemical research for the Gulf Oil Corporation. He is not only a distinguished chemist but a musician of marked ability. His connections with Crozer are intimate: son of the late Professor Ayres and son-in-law of Professor Meeser, he has been in recent years a member of the board of trustees.

Professor Hamilton, a native of Iowa, has been since 1931 professor of philosophy of religion and Christian missions in the Oberlin Graduate School of Theology. He is a graduate of the University of Chicago (A.B., 1910; Ph.D., 1914). For thirteen years he was head of the department of philosophy at the University of Nanking, China. His books and articles, for the most part dealing with phases of religious thought of the East, have been many and important. A member of many learned societies, he has been since 1940 chairman of the American Council of Learned Societies' Committee on Chinese Studies. It is a pleasure to welcome him to our pages.

No history of Andover Newton will ever be written without a long chapter devoted to Everett Carleton Herrick, the astute and able president, first of Newton Theological Institution and subsequently of the combined Andover Newton Theological School. He came to Newton from a brilliantly successful pastorate in Fall River at a time which might well have been critical. He retired a year ago with the school prosperous, enlarged, and securely established. Not only is he an administrator who knows all the problems and most of the answers, but he is a man with a

sure appreciation of many of the lovely things of life and with an ability to set them forth in a winsome and captivating way.

Professor Pritchard needs no introduction to our readers. Since he joined the Crozer faculty as professor of Old Testament there have been few issues of the CROZER QUARTERLY which have not carried book reviews from his discriminating pen. Several longer articles have also appeared in these pages. This competent scholar, who is at present engaged in editing a volume of texts, eagerly awaited by biblical students and specialists alike, sounds a warning in the short essay appearing in this issue which will be easy to read but less easy to forget.

Professor Pfuete, head of the department of philosophy at the University of Georgia, is a native of Kansas. Following graduation from Kansas State College he spent several years in the Far West, in the course of which, despite ill health, he taught in several schools and earned a master's degree from the Pacific School of Religion. After subsequent work at Yale he was for five years on the faculty of the University of Connecticut, inaugurating its program of courses in philosophy and the history of religions. From the latter institution he went recently to Georgia. His present article, a by-product of his study of the writings of Martin Buber, in the course of a volume upon which he is now engaged, will almost certainly carry our readers into a field which most of them will find refreshingly new.

Thirty-eight pages devoted to new books await our readers in this issue. And once again the reviews show the candor and freshness which regularly characterize these pages. To the twenty-five reviewers we once again express our appreciation. Dr. Atkins was for many years professor of homiletics at Auburn Theological Seminary and is a Congregational minister of distinction. Dr. Aubrey, high in the ranks of systematic theologians, is president of Crozer, of which Mr. Batten is dean. Professor Beck has the chair of Bible at Syracuse. Dr. Bixler is president of Colby. Professor Bond is head of the department of religion at Bucknell. Professor Branton has the chair of New Testament at Colgate-Rochester. Dr. Brightman is professor of philosophy at Boston University. Dr. Cranston is on the faculty of Dartmouth. Dr. Derwacter is professor of Greek at William Jewell. Dr. Edgerton is professor of Sanscrit at Yale. Professor Enslin is on the faculty of Crozer, of which Dr. Franklin is president *emeritus*. Mr. Gehr is minister of the Universalist Church of the Church of the Restoration, Philadelphia. Professor Goodenough is a member of the department of history at Yale. Dr. Herrick has already been introduced. Professor Keighton is professor of homiletics at Crozer, of which institution Dr. Matthews was for twenty-five years professor of Old Testament. Dr. McCasland is professor of biblical literature at the University of Virginia. Professors Moehlman and Parsons were for many years, until retirement, members of the Colgate-Rochester faculty, the one in church history, the other New Testament. Mr. Schultz is a Baptist minister in Syracuse and an authority on religious broadcasting. Professor Tuck is a member of the department of New Testament at Andover Newton. Mr. Westphal has just celebrated his twenty-fifth anniversary as minister of the Lansdowne (Pa.) Baptist Church. Dr. White was for several years a psychologist with the Veterans Administration.

BOOK REVIEWS

Modern Nationalism and Religion, by Salo Wittmayer Baron, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. x, 363, \$5.

The author of this volume, which is an enlargement of the Rauschenbusch Lectures delivered in the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School in 1944, is well known for his wide and accurate scholarship, his keen analysis of complex currents of social and national life, his cogent reasoning and sound objective judgment, couched in clear and unambiguous language. His reputation will be in no way marred by this publication.

The early chapters, I to III, lay the broad foundations for the later discussions. First the author differentiates the interrelated nationalistic types—as political, cultural, economic, and religious—recognizing that religion and nationalism rise and fall together, and are both colored by ethnicism (pp. 1-22). Leading exponents of nationalism, Rousseau in France, Burke in England, Jefferson in America, Fichte in Germany, and Mazzini in Italy, are then brilliantly interpreted in a chapter entitled "Nationalist Fathers" (pp. 23-60). This is followed by an incisive study of their "Nationalist Epigoni," the fantastic, rabble-rousing chauvinists: Maurras, the French follower of Rousseau and Barrès; Mussolini, who exploited Mazzini in Italy; and Rosenberg, who in Germany carried to its extremest form the theories of Fichte. But, it is significant, that in neither England nor the United States did extreme nationalism ever run riot, either in theory or in practise, as in Germany and Italy (pp. 61-89).

From this illuminating background, Dr. Baron moves forward to a careful presentation of the interplay of nationalism and religion in Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Russian Communism, and Judaism. After a careful analysis of the exceedingly complex background—geographic, economic, racial, and historic—of each of the above-mentioned organizations, a penetrating scrutiny of the pressures of external forces, and the conflicts of internal ideologies of each, he has then offered his conclusions, modestly, not dogmatically, as to the resultant national and religious attitudes of each.

Catholic Interterritorialism comes first (pp. 89-116). In its beginning the Catholic Church (Roman) claimed world-wide authority in all affairs of religion and assumed the primacy in the state. However, as the result of long and distressing experiences, the church has been compelled to moderate or relinquish not a few of its claims. Catholic minorities within Protestant lands have gained self-government (p. 91). In many countries the right has been granted to establish Catholic seminaries for the training of a native clergy (p. 92). While in the field of thought, the Roman church still holds that the Thomist philosophy is the absolute and only source of truth, it has found it expedient to be tolerant of heresy, to admit a growing freedom of speech, though as yet liberty of conscience can be practised only in accordance with Catholic doctrine and law (pp. 114, 115); and it still claims that to it belongs the spiritual jurisdiction over all Christendom (pp. 91, 93).

In the study of "Protestant Individualism" (pp. 117-164) the close interdependence between religion and economic theory as operative in competition, capitalism, and mercantalistic nationalism is stressed. To this is added, on the side of religion, the use of the Bible in the vernacular, the secularizing of the clergy and the elevation of the laity, and the repudiation of a foreign hierarchy. Each of these

contributed its quota to nationalization. In Germany Luther was a political nationalist and Schleiermacher, who called for full religious tolerance, also glorified the Hohenzollern dynasty (pp. 136-142). But in England, the United States, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries, influenced by Calvin who emphasized doctrine, the tendency was toward internationalism. The Lambeth Conferences and the Ecumenical movement are conspicuous evidences of this outlook.

Passing to Russia (pp. 165-212), we find the stage setting, the actors, the drama, and the ideal belonging to another world; no Wycliffe, no Luther, no Calvin, no exponent of religion has there ever officially played a major rôle. The czar has ruled. The Eastern branch of the Orthodox church, with headquarters in Constantinople, and the servant of strong Byzantine rulers, became the official religion of Christianity in the Orient; and Russia is the heir to both the religious tradition and the empire. Owing to the impact of alien rule—Mongolian and Turk—the long conflict with Islam, and the aggressiveness and ability of a number of the rulers, in Russia the head of the state was the head of the church. Church and state were one and indivisible, and the religion was state worship, here aptly designated as "Orthodox Cæsaro-Papism."

The Bolshevik revolution was inevitable. The military defeats in the Crimea in 1855, by Japan in 1905, and Germany in 1915; the abominations within the church, of which Rasputin was but a symptom; the growing disgust among the clergy; the heartless rapacity of many princes and the rising wrath of an irate populace; the idealism of writers such as Dostoevski and Tolstoi; and the reactionary excesses of Pobedonostev—all these contributed to the bloody elimination of czarism in state and church. The most attractive guidepost for the rebels, in fact the only one with a wide appeal, was Marxianism. This promised the restoration of long-violated human rights and called the proletariat in a mass movement to rebuild the nation in order to insure the well-being of world humanity. Thus it provided the challenge of a Messianic age to all world toilers. Yet, in line with czarism, communism, this new religion, was only the old nationalism, cleansed from individualism and the corruptions of the aristocracy in state and church. The old pattern of thought, consecrated by the devotion of more than a thousand years, with the power transferred from recreant priests and princes to the people, whose right it was, naturally made an irresistible appeal to the masses. It was traditional; it was the working out of justice; it was for the sake of a world brotherhood that called for an aggressive mission; it was Slavic; it was divine. No wonder it inflamed the imagination of the angry mobs and left a trail of blood and horror in its rear.

But Soviet Russia, governing under one head the largest integrated population in the world, in one specific area, yet divided by many distinctive cultures, has, during the quarter of a century of its existence, made some most promising and revolutionary adjustments. The development of national cultures is permitted. Minority rights have been granted to more than 180 nationalities. Liberty of worship is assured to all. The Patriarchial church, wiped out in the revolution, has been readmitted to official registration, and now more than sixteen thousand Orthodox churches are functioning within the Union. The ceremonial installation of Alexei, successor of Sergius, as patriarch in Moscow, in 1945, was the final seal to the religious privileges of the Orthodox church. However, probably the most important innovation, is the fact that the church is completely separate, save for treason, from the state.

While the outlook of the new Russian nationalism is by no means certain, the diverse cultures, the aggressive minorities, the concessions already granted, make

it hopeful that a rampant nationalism may be toned down, that religion unhampered by state control may contribute to a world brotherhood, and that a working internationalism may be attained. The USSR has within herself a league of nations and thereby is qualified to make a real contribution to the United Nations Organization.

Jewish ethnicism is the closing study in the book (pp. 213-249). The broad features are clearly and objectively presented. The problem is ancient and has been the cause of untold tragedy for two thousand years. Through the ages it has lined Jew up against Jew, gentile against Jew, and gentile against gentile. It still does. Within Judaism itself there are bitter dissensions. Political Zionism for half a century has carried on a passionate propaganda for national autonomy in Palestine. Reform Judaism has opposed it. Many leading Jews in America and Britain have demurred against it. Some three million in Russia and small units settled in other lands are either disinterested or resentful. But since the publication of this volume political Zionism has, by the vote of the UNO, been granted the privilege of establishing an autonomous state in Palestine, and thus has gained at least a part of its objective. This must be added to the facts with which the historian must deal. The author holds that nationalism, which is variously interpreted, and universalism, *i.e.*, the brotherhood of man, have always been integral parts of Judaism, and apart from both Judaism cannot long exist.

The book closes with "Postwar Challenges" (pp. 250-271). It is hoped that as Europe learned through the devastating experience of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) that apart from liberty of conscience there could be no peace in Europe, so the world may learn by the thirty years war of nationalism (1914-1945) a new liberty of conscience, that is, the national rights of minority groups, for apart from this there can be no world peace. As a result of the recent inhuman débâcle the world has learned that the political nationalism of small nations has passed and that the future of mankind will be determined by the Great Powers (p. 255). This being true, hope lies in two factors. Each of the great nations must be willing to relinquish something of its exaggerated sovereignty; and as religion has often aggravated nationalism, the great world religious must reform themselves so that they may aid in reforming the world. While the reviewer has a few questions in mind, and even a modicum of criticism to offer, the book is so important that on all who are interested in this crucial modern, world problem he would lay the responsibility of reading, reflecting, and judging for themselves.

I. G. MATTHEWS

God and Men, by Herbert H. Farmer, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1947, pp. 203, \$2.

Professor Herbert H. Farmer, British Presbyterian theologian of Westminster College at Cambridge, has made two important visits to this country, the first as professor in Hartford Theological Seminary a few years ago, and the second as Lyman Beecher Lecturer at Yale in 1946. *God and Men* is the fruit of this second visit.

The style of the book before us is nontechnical and easy for the untrained reader. The tone is that of a moderate liberalism which avoids equally the extremes of neoorthodoxy and of naturalism. The outstanding merit of the thought is its emphasis throughout on personalism. God is a person; and the essence of Christianity is the confrontation of human personality by divine personality with the claims that God makes on man. Where impersonal categories creep in, or where personality is set aside or forgotten, values are confused and debased, and the content of Christian

revelation and the purpose of Christian life are frustrated. This wholesome and philosophically sound personalistic note is associated with a strong emphasis on the love of God and on freedom. The analysis of egotism as impersonalism toward God is striking. One finds very little that is distinctively Presbyterian in this book. Rather, it is universal in its accent and in harmony with the evaluation of personality which one finds in the Russian Berdyaev, great-souled Catholic personalists like Mounier, Gilson, Maritain, and the Mexican José Vasconcelos, and Protestants like Rashdall, Knudson, Flewelling, and Hartshorne.

The chief topics discussed are Man the Sinner, God's Action in Christ, the Holiness of God, and the Love of God. Farmer soundly rejects Calvin's view that the newborn babe, on account of its original sin, is "odious and abominable to God," and he adds: "The doctrine of total depravity . . . is not that everything in man's being is utterly foul; it is rather that even the good things can become utterly foul and . . . [that] they are always infected with sin." Here original sin is still recognized, but in a moderated version, further moderated by the explicit rejection of predestination in favor of "a free personal world" (p. 107). The final chapter, on Skepticism and Faith, is the most vividly realistic in the book. The gnawing sense of doubt in the presence of evil is presented frankly and in concrete detail.

It would, however, be unfair to leave the reader with the impression that everything is on the credit side of the ledger. In fact, the book suffers from serious defects. There is an avowed aversion to definitions, for example. On p. 38, Farmer remarks: "If I am asked at this stage what I mean by the words 'personal' and 'personal relationship,' I must reply that it is not possible—and I believe not necessary—for me to say. . . . I am bound to assume at the start that everyone knows in a general way what the words mean." The trouble is that Farmer never gets around to an exact definition of "person" or "personal." The nearest he comes to it is when he mentions "intelligent, self-directing, self-conscious personal wills." This is not enough. We need a Socratic insistence on definition at every stage; imagine the way that Socrates would get to work on what "everyone knows in a general way," or on a definition of personality which omits both memory and emotion.

Worse than the lack of exact definition is a certain exaltation of mystery. Heaven knows that every honest thinker runs into plenty of mystery; but why should he regard the mystery as laudable and honorable? The idea of God, as mediated through the Christian revelation, does indeed, as Farmer says, lay hold of man's being "with constraining force." Well and good! But when Farmer says that this happens "not merely in spite of the unilluminated mysteries, but also in some measure because they are there," he seems to exhibit a strange preference for the night in which all cows are black. Farmer protests that he is "not arguing for any sort of stark irrationalism, or for an unteachable obscurantism," but this reviewer wonders whether Farmer's conscience did not suggest the epithets to him. Methinks he doth protest too much. Later, he returns again to irrationalist pastures; "all of this," he says on p. 137, "defies our understanding. . . . The mode of being of one who is eternal . . . is utterly beyond us." But again his conscience pricks him and he adds that the mystery is not "complete meaninglessness," as it really should be if he meant exactly what he had said. Again he declares on p. 178 that God is a will "utterly transcending our understanding." If this be so, how could God reasonably say, "Come now, let us reason together," or how could Jesus properly compare God to a father? The relations between faith and reason, between mystery and meaning, between the empirical and the rational, are not clearly grasped by Farmer in this book.

The defect of Farmer's thought is particularly glaring in connection with the

problem of evil. The powerful closing chapter depicts faithfully the dark side of experience. The data that Farmer sets forth point naturally to the idea that somehow God's power is limited. But, no! Farmer has already rejected the thought of a "finite and struggling God" as "utterly repugnant to the Christian mind." In saying this he not only forgets the force of the evidence, but also the fact that for many ordinary Christians, the suffering, dying, and rising Jesus is the only God. The idea of a finite God, Farmer thinks, "denies . . . that God is the sole ultimate reality." He overlooks the possibility of a view that rejects dualism as firmly as does his own, but finds within the divine personality factors which the divine will does not create.

Having thus brushed off the very thought of a finite God, he still has evil on his hands. He proposes the very sound principle that God and man together may conquer evil with love. Within limits, this is one of life's profoundest truths. But there still remains the great "Why?" Why so much unjust evil that needs to be conquered? Here Farmer falls back again on mystery, a recourse doubtless better than the banal claim that all evil is good wholesome necessary discipline. But it passes this reviewer's understanding to see how divine love can be deduced from or grounded in blank mystery. Farmer gives skepticism almost free rein. History, for him, reveals God only as "inscrutable power." God's love cannot "be inferred from, or read out of, the facts of nature or of history" (see pp. 184 and 187). If Farmer is right, all of the observable evidence is against faith. The love of God is revealed only in Christ. All else is inscrutable darkness.

Has not Farmer viewed the facts with the jaundiced eye of a pessimist? For him, the fact of marital and parental love, or of unselfish devotion among human beings, is no evidence at all for a loving God. Hosea was quite wrong. Jesus was on a false trail when he suggested that the love of a good shepherd for his sheep suggested the love of God. Buddha had not a leg to stand on in experience when he said that "hatred is not appeased by hatred but by love." In short, the whole of experience, if Farmer be right, is a refutation of the claim of Jesus to be a revelation of God. A God who reveals nothing of his true purpose except at one point in history is a God for whom many would find little love. Such a God would be a Calvinistic, Barthian, Hitlerian despot, not a loving Father. Farmer is right in finding significance in the fact that God's light shines out of darkness at Calvary. But God's light of love also shines in Plato's soul, in Socrates drinking the hemlock, in the *Bhagavad Gita*, and in the Stoics who taught the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. If there is no evidence for faith in the martyred Gandhi, but only in Jesus Christ, we of today are without evidence or support for faith in God. We confront only an unverifiable hope, a blank mystery. It is unsound to exalt Christ by decrying all else that God has done in nature and in history.

God and Men, then, is a somewhat irritating combination of light and darkness. It would be a calamity for any reader of a Religious Book of the Month to take Farmer's thought as the best that can be said for faith. Yet the book makes a real contribution by exposing the inadequacies of current fads, both secularist and neoorthodox, by building on the basic fact of personality, and by its simple honesty.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

Darkness of the Sun, by Richard Terrill Baker, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1947, pp. 254, \$2.50.

The title is suggested by the flag of Japan, a white banner with a red ball at its centre, over which, symbolically, dark clouds have been gathering in recent times.

The author is a young man who has spent the last few years in the several countries of the Far East, devoting himself to religious journalism and giving close and sympathetic attention to the struggles of the Christian forces in Japan, Korea, China, and the Philippine Islands against the currents that threatened their destruction. The larger part of the volume is devoted to Japan as the storm centre in the Far East, but attention is given also to areas that were occupied by Japanese forces.

First of all it is made clear that in Japan Christianity became a secondary faith to Shinto which drove the Japanese war machine, sanctifying aggression and atrocities. His purpose is to indicate what happened to Christianity in Japan and its occupied areas in the years when warfare cut off the Japanese Christians from their fellow Christians in other lands. He states the opinion of some that there was no defection from true Christianity in Japan at that time, and the contrary view that Japan's wartime Christianity was a hypocrisy and a pose. He feels that the Japanese Christians lived through the war about as Christians in other lands have gone through similar periods in their national life. Yet he devotes a chapter to "The Church that Yielded," as a "patriotic church," thoroughly obedient to imperial rescripts and resolved on the successful completion of the "holy war," but with professed "love" in their hearts. Many Japanese Christians came to identify some of their national principles with the Christian conception of the kingdom of God, as others have done again and again.

The Japanese state recognized that pure Christianity was opposed to the policies of the nation and many methods of control and forms of persecution were employed to direct the procedure of Christian churches and schools. The formation of the United Christian Church in Japan upon the insistence of the state was one of the mildest steps toward control. One unified body with authoritative officers in control promised to be more easily directed than many separate organizations. Under such conditions the churches fared badly in wartime, and it is believed by some that the entire structure of Christianity in Japan was in danger of collapse if the war had continued much longer. Yet many Japanese Christians refused to surrender to all of the state's demands and defied efforts in countless instances to weaken their witness in church, school, or home. This reviewer does not know any other volume with such a comprehensive and detailed account of the struggle of the Christian institutions in Japan for their very life.

For some reason Americans have not been so fully informed as to the vastness of the physical destruction in Japan as in Europe. Perhaps that is due to our attention being taken up with news of Japan's surrender just when the aerial campaign against Japan proper was in its early stages. In illustration the author tells us that in Greater Tokyo, including its vast suburbs, nearly half of the total area was cleared by incendiary bombs. Tokyo itself, the region inside the belt railway, was fireswept nearly 100 per cent. The destruction included hundreds of church buildings and many schools. And the descriptions of the effect of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, narrated in tragic detail, is enough to raise grave questions as to the righteousness of and necessity for our procedure at that stage of the war, and to lead to increased effort to avert future wars.

An entire chapter is given to the discussion of the wartime record of Toyohiko Kagawa as a Japanese subject. The matter is covered thoroughly, and the debate leaves the reader with the impression that Kagawa acted as most Christians do when their countries are at war, especially when they are cut off from communication with other lands and are subjected to the propaganda of their own governments exclusively. Mr. Baker believes "Kagawa became too nationalistic during the war,

but he was driven by the sincere if somewhat naïve belief that his nation was doing the right thing to free Asia from Western domination."

While the greater portion of the book is given to developments in Japan, considerable attention is given to the course followed by Japan in Korea, China, and the Philippine Islands in an attempt to influence, if not control, Christian institutions in those lands. In Korea, a part of the Japanese empire after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, in 1904, the methods employed were largely similar to those used in Japan itself, and the resistance there was just as stubborn, although some of the Korean groups became quite militaristic and nationalistic in their declarations under the leadership of politically minded ecclesiastics. "Oriental compromise and political horsetrading took place." In Korea, as in Japan, the Holiness Church was notably courageous, often even unto imprisonment and sometimes unto death. The position of the Roman Catholics was eased somewhat by the Vatican's recognition of Manchukuo and the presence of German and French missionaries. In Korea there were numerous instances of collaboration with the Japanese militarists.

In China there was, on the whole, a more obvious attempt to win the sympathy of Chinese Christian leaders through visits of Japanese Christians, but, for the most part, such overtures were spurned. The Chinese churches were bearing heavy crosses in the form of hunger, poverty, plunder, and separation from fellow Christians in other lands, but Dr. Baker affirms that they developed in their spiritual life, self-support, and the administration of their work, despite all the hindrances placed in their path. But no attempt is made to convey an impression that there was not great destitution in the life of the Chinese churches as millions of the Chinese people lost all their property and fled into unoccupied territory.

The chapter on the Philippine Islands is intensely interesting. There the Japanese authorities made special efforts to come to agreement with both Roman Catholics and Protestants in a country where practically all the inhabitants are professed Christians. Experienced Catholic and Protestant Japanese Christian leaders with ability to speak English, which had been taught in all schools in the Philippines for forty years and more, were sent to the Islands almost immediately after Pearl Harbor in an attempt to persuade the Filipinos that Japan was not fighting them but was striving to secure freedom for the peoples of the Orient who were being exploited by Western powers. Liberty had long been the dream of Filipino patriots—long before American occupation of the Islands began in 1898—and some of them did collaborate with the Japanese, but the mission of the *fraternal* visitors from Japan was a failure, and soon they were recalled to their home land. The work of the American schoolteachers and missionaries in the Philippines had been successful in showing who were the real friends of the Filipinos.

Reference is made to American missionaries who were beheaded by Japanese soldiers. A special illustration is that of the "Seventeen American Baptist missionaries, who fled into the hills of Panay to escape the Japanese and hold out against them," and who "were captured and massacred, women and children among them." This reviewer remembers the number as eleven, among whom were two, Reverend and Mrs. James Covell, who had served for many years in Japan, where he was well acquainted with Reverend Isamu Chiba, one of the outstanding members of the *fraternal* group sent out for *fraternal* conferences with Filipino Christians. Dr. Baker writes: "Chiba was largely responsible for the release of missionaries and for saving the American Bible Society as a Filipino institution, a move which provoked the wrath of the army against him, and sent him back to Tokyo in 1942." Perhaps Chiba's memory of association with the Covells and other missionaries in Japan prompted the service which Dr. Baker attributes to him.

"After the Storm" is the caption of the last chapter, in which there is an attempt to indicate some of the results of Japan's mad career in recent decades when dark clouds cast their shadows over "The Rising Sun." He finds the ground disturbed by grave problems everywhere. He recognizes especially the appeal of communism to the masses of suffering people but questions the readiness of the churches to meet it. However, here is his conclusion: "This is an urgent hour in which Christians live today. And an hour of opportunity."

Here is a book of tremendous value, to historians in particular, but to all who are interested in religious movements, if the reports given the author are authentic, as surely they are.

JAMES H. FRANKLIN

United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly, Vols. I-III, International Documents Service, [New York, Columbia University Press], 1947, pp. 65, 64, 247, 75 cents, 75 cents, and \$2. (resp.).

This report, the careful work of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), should be studied by all who are interested in the question. This is the eighteenth official attempt to solve the problem within recent decades. The essential documents, the claims of interested parties, the evidence supplied by a host of witnesses, and most of the cogent facts are here presented in brief and well-tabulated form. In fact, it would be difficult to present all phases of the case in a more objective or judicious manner.

A statement of the origin and the activities of the UNSCOP is followed by a summary of the geographic significance of Palestine, its area—some 10,000 square miles, of which about half is uninhabitable desert—the story of recent economic developments and growth of population. Between 1922 and 1946 the Arabs increased from something over 486,177 (Moslems plus many native Christians) to 1,203,000, chiefly by the natural increase of births over deaths, while at the same time the Jewish population rose from 83,790 to 608,225, chiefly by immigration. It is estimated that from 1922 to 1947, covering the mandate of a quarter of a century, the population has trebled. At the same time, due to various causes—Jewish immigration, capital from abroad, and enterprise in agriculture, chemicals, and water power; to the Arab response to the new opportunities and methods; and to British aid, especially the vast war expenditures—the economic and living conditions have kept pace with the growth of population.

This almost unparalleled development could scarcely fail to produce serious, if not tragic, tensions. Alien peoples, with high hopes, pouring into "a country that is arid, limited in area, and poor in all essential resources"; a native population that for the first time in centuries had the opportunity and a challenge to advancement, convinced that it had been sold out by Western potentates, and fearing for its independence and very existence; the language, customs, and ideals of each group often in violent conflict with the other, and over all a foreign power under the mandate of the League of Nations in the seat of authority—these fundamental antagonisms did not augur well for the peace of the country. The result has ended in an acknowledged impasse, and the UNSCOP has laid the responsibility, in varying degrees, at the door of the three parties, the mandatory Power, the Arabs, and the political Zionists.

The political Zionists, by no means a majority of Jewry, a highly financed, well-organized and vociferous body has insisted on gaining Palestine as an autonomous Jewish state, or at least of obtaining an autonomous Jewish state in Palestine. They rest this on their interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, promising

them a *homeland in Palestine*. Further they would expand the absorptive capacity of the land to highly fantastic figures, demand unlimited immigration, and disregard entirely the restrictive clause "that nothing shall be done that may prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities." They support their claims further by emphasizing their achievements and investments in a land otherwise poverty-stricken. Then to make the claim impregnable they invest all with divine sanction dating from the time of Abraham. The massacre of untold numbers in Europe, and the 250,000 Jews at the present among the displaced persons all add poignancy to the stubborn demands of these Zionists. They will not lessen their demands so long as there is a glimmer of hope. They must shoulder part of the blame.

The Arabs have been equally insistent on their rights. The land has been theirs by virtue of conquest and continuous residence for 1,100 years. Thus it is theirs by "natural right." Added to this is their "acquired right" assured by official pledges such as the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915-1916, the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918, the "Hogarth Message," and other official commitments in all of which Arabic independence was either assumed or pledged. Further they draw attention to the phrase in the Balfour Declaration, "that nothing shall be done that may prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities." On these grounds they have insisted that the action of the League of Nations in appointing a mandatory Power, and that all the activity of that Power has been illegal, and that likewise the interference of the United Nations in Palestinian affairs is beyond their jurisdiction. It is power politics overriding the acknowledged right of self-determination of minority groups. So here they stand.

And Great Britain, the mandatory Power, is blamed for muddling along, for not having developed governing institutions and having failed to bring about peace in these warring camps. The Jew hates her, the Arab wants her out of the country, and the United Nations Assembly has approved the recommendation that her resignation of the mandate be accepted. Blamed by Jew and Arab alike, she has the consolation that she cannot have been unduly partisan.

The most significant features of the majority report of the committee, which has been adopted by the United Nations, may be briefly stated. The mandate shall be terminated at the earliest practicable date. Independence shall be granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable date. Palestine shall be divided into three parts politically, while economic unity is to be maintained under the control of the Economic Union of Palestine which shall appoint a Joint Economic Board. The Jewish state shall include the Upper Jordan valley; the Esdraelon valley; the coastal plain from Acre to Jaffa, which latter city, though almost entirely Arab, is included, and considerable territory lying inland south and east of Jaffa; and the Negeb to the south of Hebron and west of the Dead Sea and the Araba, in which the Beersheba district is included. The Arab state is to occupy the Galilean hills, the high land from Esdraelon to below Hebron, and the old Philistine plain from below Jaffa to the Egyptian border and thence to Aqaba. The city of Jerusalem, with boundaries extended to include Bethlehem and other local villages, shall be under the control of the United Nations, which shall operate through a Trusteeship Council. A governor of the city, not a Jew, nor an Arab, nor a resident of either state, nor of Jerusalem at the time of appointment, shall be appointed by the Council. The city shall be demilitarized, and a special police force, recruited from outside Palestine, shall provide protection for the Holy Places, which shall be accessible to all pilgrims and worshipers. The Jewish state will have a population

of 905,000, of whom 407,000 are Arabs; the Arab state 735,000, of whom 10,000 are Jews, while Jerusalem will have 205,000, of whom 100,000 are Jews. For further details of this carefully prepared report the reader should turn to the text of the published documents. A careful perusal of them would end much reckless, flamboyant oratory and cause the wise to stay some of the present-day propaganda.

The majority report has been adopted by the United Nations Assembly, as of November 29, 1947, by a vote of thirty-three to thirteen, with ten abstentions and one absent. The Arab delegation, consistent with their earlier contentions, refused to consider it binding. The mandatory Power expressed its unwillingness to continue its obligations unless both Jew and Arab agreed to its continuance. The Jewish group was happy, though not entirely satisfied, to receive the concessions. The interested parties have already set to work to implement—or to frustrate!—the decisions. It is too much to hope that all trouble is now at an end. Jaffa, an Arab city, the centre of their ancient citrus orchards, their only seaport, now in the Jewish state? A Jewish state in which 400,000 Arabs are ruled by 500,000 Jews? It is hoped that in affecting the necessary drastic changes that have to be made the spark that will start a world conflagration may not be kindled. But in any solution of the problem there is a lot of dynamite lying round.

I. G. MATTHEWS

The Bible Today, by C. H. Dodd, New York, Macmillan, 1947, p. ix, 168, \$2.50.

Any book by the Norris-Hulse professor of divinity in the University of Cambridge is welcomed by those who have seen his volume on Romans in the Moffatt commentary or his book on the Parables of Jesus. This book represents a course of open lectures given under the auspices of the Divinity Faculty of the University. The lectures begin with the question, What is the Bible? and continue with the approach to the Bible, a discussion of the Old Testament as a continuation of the history of a community. These are followed by an appreciative approach to history as revelation and the meaning of the Bible for our own time, both individually and socially. Since these are open lectures, they are popular in form and cover an amazing span of time and material. Nevertheless, many conclusions of biblical scholarship are woven into the presentation. I Peter, Hebrews, and Revelation are to be placed in the Domitianic period; Mark between Nero and Domitian; Matthew and Luke perhaps before the death of Domitian in A.D. 96. The Pastoral Epistles, the General Epistles of John and Jude, and II Peter, "which is the latest book of the New Testament," all come after Domitian, with II Peter "not much earlier than A.D. 150." There are also some positive statements regarding the teachings of Jesus found in the Synoptic gospels. "The Gospel precepts, on the whole, differ from those in the Epistles in making no attempt to accommodate Christian obligation to the practical possibilities of the human situation. They represent the 'absolute ethics' of the Kingdom of God, which is 'not of this world,' though it comes in this world. We are not to suppose that we are capable in this world of loving our enemies (or even our neighbours), to the full measure in which God has loved us; . . . or to be as pure of worldly desire and anxiety and as unreserved in self-sacrifice as the words of Jesus demand" (p. 84). The obligations laid upon us can never be exhausted.

In days like these, when there is danger of losing an appreciation of the significance of scholarly work in the critical, historical field, it is good to hear Dodd say that the critical method is not antiquated though some conclusions must be revised. "We are bound to confess that where we have gone beyond them [the scholarship of the last century], it is by standing on their shoulders. Be suspicious of any

suggestion that we can afford to by-pass criticism. The way of advance lies through, and not round the critical problem. . . . The problems with which criticism is concerned are problems that face any reader who wishes to understand the Scriptures, and the critical *method*, as a means of approach to the Scriptures, is acutely relevant to any serious study of the Bible as a religious book" (p. 27). He insists that the correct placing of documents in the historical series is a part of the study of revelation. Every writer spoke out of a specific situation, and it is the service of historical scholarship to make us aware of the questions that lay before the writers so that we may understand their answers. The critical method is a corrective of older schematic approaches to the Bible and also of the license of private interpretations which are threatened by individual predilections.

There is also an emphasis upon the work of Jesus as the dawn of the kingdom of God. "It was in Jesus Himself and in His impact upon the situation that the Kingdom of God came upon men; that God was revealed in His power and glory, to shape human life to His Will" (p. 91). "Thus the Kingdom of God is no longer a visionary ideal, or a remote goal of the historical process. It has broken into history . . . in the action of Jesus Himself. Here indeed God was confronting men with His Call" (pp. 92-93).

The book argues that the Bible is a unity so that the Old Testament cannot be understood apart from the New, nor the New from the Old. It is the continuous history of a community—the Israel of God. In the New Testament there is the consciousness that the promises of God have been fulfilled in the church. All of the deeds of the Old Testament have found meaning through Christ in the New. Dodd moves from this position to the conclusion that history is revelation. An historical event is an occurrence *plus* the meaning it had for some portion of the human race. The prophets felt that God was in the total experience of life, and so their visions and auditions are more than their own subjective experiences. The Pauline experience of Christ is of the same type. In this unity of the experience of God in history the Old Testament prophets and the apostolic witnesses are brought together to form the transition from a Jewish to a universal faith. In the Bible the meaning of history is presented in a framework of myth beginning with creation, and continuing with the fall of man, the deluge, the building of Babel, and on to the end of the world and judgment. All represent history, but history presented as myth or symbol. The creation is the myth embodying the chaotic state of Israel till in the appearance of Moses God brought order out of chaos. It was a beginning of the meaning of history. So in like manner other myths are elaborated. The meaning is to be sought in pairs: the deluge is judgment followed by renewal in the covenant with Noah; the destruction of Babel is followed by the call of Abraham; the end of the world is to be followed by the new heaven and new earth. So the myths symbolize God at work in history.

The conclusion of the book is an appeal to study the Bible for insights of God's will and judgment upon our times and for any insight for renewal. Toynbee's work is used to characterize our day and to issue a warning that to look to the past with idealization is hopeless, to look for a utopia in the future is futile; but to seize the present to save the "City of Destruction" from its doom is creative and gives promise of a better day.

In a book with such ambitions as this one there are always unfulfilled promises. It is too brief to do more than suggest answers to many questions raised, and yet these questions are of such magnitude as to demand more than suggestions: such questions as the significance of biblical history for our day and how it is to be

comprehended and implemented, of the criteria used in discovering revelation in history, and the like. There are also questions relative to the use of historical, critical processes in the biblical field where myths are found so easily and where they seem to be peculiarly designed for our day. Nevertheless this is an interesting and excellently written book worthy of our study in the many areas mentioned in the main body of this review and in others too numerous to mention.

J. R. BRANTON

The Person and the Common Good, by Jacques Maritain, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. 98, \$2.

It has become a commonplace that the great conflict of our era is between totalitarian communism and individualistic democracy. At the same time there is a conflict within democracy itself between the tendency to anarchy and the trend toward despotism. The little volume under review is a meticulous analysis of the fundamental problem underlying both these conflicts.

Jacques Maritain, a prolific writer of the Neothomist school of Roman Catholicism and at present French Ambassador to the Vatican, states his general conclusion as follows: "The relation of the individual to society must be conceived after an irreducibly human and specifically ethicosocial pattern, that is personalist and communalist at the same time; the organization to be accomplished is one of liberties. But an organization of liberties is unthinkable apart from the *moral* realities of *justice* and *civil amity*, which, on the natural and temporal plane, correspond to what the Gospel calls brotherly love on the spiritual and supernatural plane" (p. 92).

The key word here is *liberties*, and in discussing liberty he is very critical of what he calls "bourgeois liberalism." He lays its weakness to a false individualism which, by stressing the absolute liberty of the individual and ignoring his responsibility for the common good, makes inevitable the artificial control by the state which takes the place of genuine community. Thus despotism ensues upon the threat of anarchy.

In communism, on the other hand, there is a reaction against such irresponsible individualism; and a protest against the dehumanization of the person. But because the personality of man is inadequately conceived along materialistic lines, communism is unable to emancipate man from domination by society.

It is true that there is a correlation between personality and society, and the person must be positively related to the common good. But the nature of this good—*i.e.*, whether it is turned in upon itself, or reaches out toward an end which transcends it—determines the effect of the society upon its constituent members as persons. For the social good might be defined as a gangsterlike exploitation of other groups, or it may be thought of as justice and amity. The latter principles, however, transcend the well-being of any single group and point toward the good of the whole human society. Only in the whole is the person fully realized; and so the maximum development of personality and the universal rule of justice belong together.

This contention of the author rests on a view of personality as transcending both its physical aspects and its social environment. It is at this point that his basic distinction between individuality and personality becomes important, for from this distinction his whole solution of the problem is derived.

Unfortunately it is at this point that M. Maritain is unconvincing. He is concerned to distinguish individuality as a derivative of matter from personality as relative to "the deepest and highest dimensions of being." But he fails to distinguish two modes of individuality: the bare physical disparateness of separate entities or

selves, and the rich, differentiated uniqueness of a person by virtue of cultivated qualities or specialized function in society. The latter is caught up into Maritain's conception of personality, without being recognized as individuality.

As a consequence he is led to serious confusion as to the nature of liberal individualism. While the older, atomic individualism of the Newtonian-Leibnizian epoch was subject to his strictures, they do not apply to more recent philosophic individualism with equal force. This latter form of individuality requires three things: physical discreteness, uniqueness in social relations, and a distinctive personal aim transcending physical and social immediacies. In a word, it includes all the factors which he identifies as components of personality.

This would be a mere verbal quibble, were it not that he bases his whole argument on the invidious distinction. By doing so he attempts to solve the problems of contemporary society by a priori definition. Here lies the methodological weakness of his treatment not only in this book but in others like *Scholasticism and Politics* where the same distinction is made fundamental to his whole social theory of "personalistic democracy." The weakness is inherent in his procedure of starting from the definitions of Thomas Aquinas whose scholastic method of analyzing words prevails over the available data of psychological investigation; and the old risks of Abelardian logicism reappear.

Thus he reaches good conclusions from unsatisfactory premises, while insisting that only from these premises can the conclusions be reached. Whereupon he levels his attacks on liberal Protestantism and converts an apologetic into a polemic argument. Herein lies the subtlety of his Roman Catholic propaganda, which explains why a writer of such apparently irenic temper could have written the virulently sarcastic *Three Reformers*.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

The Religion of Philosophers, by James H. Dunham, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947, pp. 314, \$4.

The dean *emeritus* of Temple University proves in the book before us that his retirement was not occasioned by any flagging of his powers or by any deterioration of his scholarship. The book could be written only by a man of extraordinary industry, critical insight, and close familiarity with the primary sources of classical occidental philosophy. It repays careful study. Its style is lucid and pleasing, save for a tendency to overwork the term "conceit," in the sense of a regrettable concept.

The purpose of the book is to give an account of the philosophy of religion of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Marcus Aurelius, Augustine, Leibniz, Spinoza, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Auguste Comte. Roughly thirty pages are assigned to each man. Spinoza seems to be the author's favorite philosopher, if we may judge by the many friendly allusions to him scattered through the book, as well as by the very sympathetic exposition given to his thought. The treatment of Plato, of Epicurus, and of Comte is especially thorough and enlightening. Casual allusions to Hegel make one just as well satisfied that he was not included; one infers that Hegel is a *bête noire* for Dunham; for example, he speaks of "Hegelian stupor" (p. 212).

It is not the author's purpose to present a complete account of the systems of the men discussed; but he would be an unusual scholar who did not gain new insights into their thought. Dunham shows, for example, kinships between Epicurus and Plato that are usually overlooked. The treatment of Kant's religious thought is more comprehensive and appreciative than one often finds in recent writers on Kant.

The book is not a mere historical exposition of the ideas of great men of the

past. It is definitely also an interpretation and at the same time a development of a specific point of view. In the Introduction (p. 7), the author holds that in some sense the idea of personality is central, and that Christianity proclaimed "the essential nobility of personality." He says, summarizing Augustine:

The essence of character is not emotional gratification or logical acumen but goodness, the rounded whole of the moral self, a fact which received its final formulation, said Augustine, when the man of Galilee breathed his spirit into the living church.

Thus a "new idea of personality passed into the currency of European thought." Comte, however, challenged this idea.

Such was the author's initial conception. It must be said that it is carried out in a somewhat peculiar way. In general, the author emphasizes abstract arguments for God and impersonal views of God. In dealing with Plato, for example, he identifies God with the Idea of the Good, as numerous other scholars also do, and concludes that "God cannot be *soul* in the anthropological sense of the word" (p. 36). If this means only that God is not a human soul, the conclusion is trite and banal. But if this means that God is not a personal consciousness, then it runs counter to Plato's own language in the *Laws*—a dialogue of culminating importance for Plato and one that is strangely neglected by Dunham. In the *Laws*, soul is not only "the motion able to move itself" (896A), but also "wise and full of goodness" (897B). It is "the best soul," thus defined, that "regulates the whole cosmos" (897C). And "this soul . . . every man is bound to regard as a god" (899A). That Dunham overlooks this whole passage is all the more remarkable when one recalls that J. Baillie has designated it as the first theistic argument. Dunham may be right that at one time Plato regarded God as the Idea of the Good; but as his thought developed, God became more and more clearly "soul" and less and less mere "Idea."

The book as a whole is in one respect a great disappointment. The title promises the reader a discussion of "the religion" of philosophers. Instead, the author concentrates on arguments bearing on belief in God; and to a large extent he selects those arguments about substance and cause which are most remote from vital religion. Religion itself receives scant mention and no systematic definition. The author's approach is abstract and rationalistic rather than empirical; and the result is that religion is by-passed and God is denuded of concrete reality. It is only in connection with Spinoza and Kant that religion receives much attention. Spinoza's "intellectual love of God" and the Kantian identification of religion with morality could hardly be by-passed, although the latter is used chiefly to lead up to the fact that, in the notes preserved in the *Opus Postumum* (which Dunham writes as *Postremum*), Kant hinted at the belief that "God is not a Being outside me, but merely a thought in me. God is the morally self-legislative Reason."

It is no exaggeration to say that this book on religion hardly touches on some of the most characteristic experiences of religion. Religion as faith, as prayer, as communion with God, as mystical experience, as worship, is almost totally ignored. Plato did not ignore them, if Aristotle and Epicurus did; the Stoics and Augustine and Leibniz knew more about them than is even hinted at in this book. *Caveat lector*. Let no one hope to discover in this book the religion of philosophers; let him rather look for keen and illuminating analyses of the various theistic arguments, and for flashes of intuitive insight. Were Professor H. A. Wolfson to read this book, with its appreciation of Spinoza, he would doubtless express surprise at its omission of any reference to Philo, his influence on theistic thought, and Spinoza's revolt against him.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

And Let Us Reason Together, selected from the works of the Reverend George A. Gordon, by Elise D. Gordon, Boston, Beacon, 1947, pp. 381, \$3.

This noble book—noble in conception, in substance, in organization, and in format—a labor of love done with love's wisdom has long been overdue. It was unthinkable that, in the confusions and reactions of our time, what Gordon had done should begin to be forgotten, what he preached become only a memory, and his surpassing gift for utterance become only a tradition. This anthology should go far toward reinstating Dr. Gordon in his proper station as one of the greatest preachers of the nineteenth-century English-speaking pulpits. The sources of the meditations are generally indicated by initialed abbreviations, explained in preface or else in the index of sources (p. 379). These sources include Dr. Gordon's best-known books from 1893 to his autobiography in 1925—a full generation. The range and quality of these citations will lead their readers back to the books from which they are taken—and make them free of a religious literature unmatched for luminous dignity. "There are four words," said Dr. Gordon, "that often occur to me representing qualities without which we cannot treat any subject, in a vital way. They are simplicity, sincerity, nobility and magnanimity. . . . The simplicities, the sincerities, the nobilities, and the magnanimities of life, how they conquer everything!" These are qualities native to Gordon's mind and spirit. They give his prose its elevation and range, as though the Scotch highlands had come to Boston.

Dr. Willard L. Sperry has furnished a foreword which recalls a little the distinction which Phillips Brooks, preaching from Trinity, and Gordon from the New Old South, gave to Copley Square. Its lines were literally gone out to the ends of the world. Whoever—especially if he be a minister—begins to live with this anthology will find Gordon's autobiography, *My Education and Religion*, a pure delight. It is background, interpretation, meditation, and an almost unmatched revelation of the power of genius to surmount obstacles and by apparently impassible roads to find a clear way from the frozen turnip fields of Scotland to the fellowships of the elect. It still glows with the fadeless light of a vanished world.

Dr. Gordon had, by inheritance, every gift, disciplined by a secret and unfailing comradeship with poets and philosophers and the gospel of Jesus Christ—and the road led uphill, all the way. During his earlier Boston ministry, he often, he said, secretly contrasted his fortune with Phillips Brooks'. Brooks' life, he thought, had been one long celestial joy ride, while his had been through thick woods and over rough hills without even a footpath for a guide. Temperament had something to do with that feeling—which he lost after his marriage and his gradual but complete triumph over his theological critics. It is hard now to understand the force of theological condemnation against which he had to make his way. Where were his heterodoxies, save that after two centuries "New England theology" was falling apart and the dust of its disintegrations poisoned clerical minds and embittered clerical spirits? One reviews it all now with a strange wonder: what was it all about?

Twenty years ago Dean Inge gave some lectures at Cambridge on *The Platonic Traditions in English Religion*, though the lectures were, he said, a plea for the recognition of a third type of Christian thought and belief, by the side of the two great types which for want of better names are usually called Catholic and Protestant. "The history and fruits of Christian Platonism," he thought, "justify its recognition as a legitimate and independent type of Christian theology and practice." Gordon would not only have agreed with this—if Dean Inge had been so minded, he could have cited Gordon as the outstanding Christian Platonist in America. For he recast

his inherited Calvinism in Christian Platonism and thereby found his theological tempo.

No theological system seems ever to have possessed the terrible tenacity of Scotch and American Calvinism. The shadow of it lay long and dark across generations of the New England divines. Poor Carlyle never settled his accounts with it. And yet all the while it needed only a change, so to speak, of direction to transform its whole incidence. Why the Eternal could not as consistently exercise his sovereignty for universal redemption as toward almost universal damnation would seem at least to be a debatable question. Gordon not only believed that was what a God of love would do. He also felt it his mission to say so.

Very likely this furnished the gravamen of the charges of heresy with which he had so long to contend. He was sure that God's will cannot be on the side of the highest good of some of his creatures and for others the will for their eternal misery. God's will must be a will of creative love, forever on the side of our whole humanity. Then the will of God ceases to be a tragic and enigmatical caprice. It becomes a redemptive order of divine love. Gordon's Platonic idealism not only fitted perfectly into this conception, it furnished it glowing and unfailing support.

If a reviewer could only say this as clearly as it can and should be said, all these meditations would be seen to be the play of Gordon's kaleidoscopic mind considering and interpreting life in all its experiences as an aspect of an eternal mystery whose end is human redemption and whose enabling power is divine love. They are interwoven of the true, the beautiful, and the good, as Gordon sees them in the fabric of his Father's world. God is always and everywhere. "In the great process of moral life, God is the immediate . . . possession of the soul." The highest good is to become like God as far as that is possible for man, and the possible is made actual through love. The wealth of Gordon's mind seems almost inexhaustible. It has the quality of a searchlight playing along all our horizons, seeking, resting, lifting, seeking again, but always falling upon heights and far horizons.

The organization of the book does not intrude itself. It seems to follow, loosely, the Christian year and thematic controls, but the movement is always in the progression of Gordon's mind. And the unity of his mind undergirds the unity of the anthology. There are prayers for each month, and following each meditation Old and New Testament passages felicitously chosen. For the most part these selections date from a far less troubled and anarchical world than ours, but I think Gordon's faith would still hold. God's order, he believed, would not vanish at the bidding of man's stupid selfishness. Any reviewer must note the haunting beauty of Gordon's style, wrought of strength and delicacy. One of the finest and most delightful chapters in the autobiography deals with "Education through Friendship." Friendship, he thought, is one of the sacred possessions of life, and the great friend is the great educator." With this thesis he thanks God for his friends. Well, a book may be a friend, especially if that book be itself the distillation of many friendships and fed from perennial fountains. It will, I take it, grow upon the reader and though one is not likely to read it long at any one time, he will read it often and find it waiting for his hand, rich in insight and suggestion, to be gratefully cherished.

GAIUS GLENN ATKINS

The Protestant Pulpit, compiled by Andrew W. Blackwood, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1947, pp. 318, \$2.75.

"A new anthology of master sermons representing the Protestant pulpit from the Reformation to our day," is a pretentious undertaking for a single volume. Two

volumes might have been much better—one for the great figures of the past and one for the contemporary pulpit. This, however, is offered as a comment and not as a criticism of the book. It may be taken for what it professes to be, and that is a homiletical survey by a richly experienced and outstanding teacher in that field. It is therefore from this standpoint that it should be justly judged. It is a sort of classroom resource, so presented as to be adaptable and helpful in the preacher's study as well. One of its most valuable features is the condensed, but exceedingly comprehensive, work sheet on how to study a sermon, Appendix A. The preacher sincerely intent on improving his work would thereby make it a sort of extensive course in his own sermon preparation. The bibliography is also valuable to the preacher earnest to improve his art and power. "If he is wise," adds the compiler, "he will study books of sermons and not books about sermons." This is wiser wisdom than we may realize. If preachers want to preach better sermons (and what preacher does not?), they should read great and timely sermons themselves.

Professor Blackwood has taken many of the great models which have been used in homiletic classrooms for more than a half century. Conspicuous among them are Chalmers, Channing, Bushnell, Robertson, MacLaren, Spurgeon, Brooks; and from these he has named some of the very sermons which many of us in our seminary days were told to study as great examples from these preachers for preachers, such as "The Expulsive Power of a Great Affection," and "Every Man's Life a Plan of God," two great examples, as many of us were told, of the sermon contained in the subject.

The selection has, beside this, a commendable range in that men of might are included who would not be regarded as classroom models. The most striking illustration of this is Billy Sunday alongside of Jowett. And this is the way it goes, as we very well know. "The wind bloweth where it listeth." The book could well have used more illustrations to show that powerful preaching is not constricted by our conventional patterns. Therefore we must be willing to lay aside our preconceptions when we seek to find the source of power and effectiveness in preaching.

The Boston preachers whom the book mentions are Channing and Brooks. George A. Gordon might have well been added. He was one of the last giants among New England preachers. On the unconventional side, one of Boston's most powerful preachers was Father Taylor, as he was called, who preached to sailors and thousands of others as well. Strange echoes of his power are heard even to this day, and he was in his might one hundred years ago. J. R. Dix has given a fleeting glimpse of him in his *Pulpit Portraits*, a book included in Professor Blackwood's bibliography and a good illustration of its catholicity.

Most preachers would doubtless profit by studying sermons not after their own style. The book therefore would not be weakened at all if it gave a few more of the unconventional illustrations, like Father Taylor. Some of the frontier preaching in our country might be another illustration of this point. Not much is extant but a little has come down to us from men like Peter Cartwright, and it suggests something that all too often has gone from us, since ruggedness has given place to sophistication.

When it comes to living preachers, Professor Blackwood showed his temerity in attempting to pick out twenty for a master anthology. If the reader's favorites are not all included, it is a compliment to his reading rather more than a criticism of the compiler. These are for the most part the preachers that would be put down in almost any sort of intelligent Gallup poll. Possibly New York has a little more

than its share, and perhaps it ought to have. Does the great metropolis add undue lustre to the preacher's fame? It is fortunate that strong preachers are distributed apart from metropolitan publicity.

The book provides an excellent chance to study yesterday and today. Here one is struck not so much by contrast as by likeness. For instance, there are sermons on forgiveness by MacLaren and Fosdick. "No man's sin ever is done with until it has gone through the process of forgiveness." "You are a sinful man. Christ died for you. He came to give you His forgiving mercy." The first sentence is Fosdick, the second MacLaren. They are interchangeable and they speak the same unchanging gospel truth. This suggests what is the chief value of the book. It emphasizes by its selection the verities that remain forever the same. These the preacher can search out, analyze, and emphasize, as he seeks in his own preaching to turn away from things which are local and temporal to the things which are universal and eternal. The substance which has been, certainly to some degree, the basis of selection is even more important than the names which have been chosen.

E. C. HERRICK

Paul's Epistle to the Romans, by E. F. Scott, S. C. M. Press, ©1947, [New York, Scribner], pp. 125, \$2.

"One of the priceless possessions, of the Christian world," Romans is essentially a modern book. With clarity, brevity, and practicality Professor Scott fulfills his aims as he answers three questions; "What are the principles of Christianity as Paul here presents them? How does he apply them to the needs of his time? How can we give effect to them in our world today?" This book by Scott is an excellent example of the resources of a top-notch scholar applied to the everyday demands of the minister who desires to preach expository sermons or to the student who needs a first introduction to Paul's masterpiece or to the intelligent layman who would like a study class in a classic of Christian thought. Published originally in England and evidently intended for the average Christian reader, this volume now presented in America deserves a wide reading and appreciation.

Four chapters reveal clearly the scope of the book. One chapter deals with the origin and purpose of Romans; another, totaling almost one half the pages, consists of an illuminating section-by-section commentary; the third expounds the central teachings; and the last chapter shows the value of the Epistle for today. The impedimenta of scholarship are abandoned. There are no footnotes, few references to Scripture, no bibliography, and no technical language. "Wayfaring men . . . shall not err therein," nor should they find aught but a clear inspiring light shining from these pages. Something of Paul's living, ardent spirit, his eminent ethical common sense, his wide-ranging thought, his Spirit-driven energy, his utter gratitude to God revealed in the gospel of Christ arouse the reader's mind and heart. Many of Scott's observations are memorable. "Paul was the greatest of Christ's servants" (p. 27). "There are clear signs in our own day of a return to Paul" (p. 103). "We stand in urgent need of Paul's message" (p. 110). "While we despair of ourselves we can believe in what God has done" (p. 121). "Why not forget ourselves and open our hearts without reserve to God's love and goodness? This, in the last resort, is what Paul means by faith" (p. 91). "Liberty consists in obedience to Christ, the one Master, and we obey Him by serving one another" (p. 98). "Whenever any good thing is restricted to one nation or privileged class you may be sure that it is doubtful or artificial" (p. 37).

The main element of new interest in this book is in the sustained emphasis on the relationship of Paul's thought to our own day. In every chapter the reader is addressed and invited to share the treasures of the epistle for the present enrichment and understanding of life today. In the commentary the reader will feel indebted for the sharp-edged scholarship which can trace accurately the essentials in Paul's thought and which can discern with critical skill the wrappings which should be discarded or the various imperfections which need no acceptance. Safeguards in understanding the thought and signposts for direct use stand at every turn.

The last two chapters will gather the greatest interest. The central teaching and the value of the epistle for today are interrelated and involve some repetition though discussed in separate chapters. There are many parallels between Paul's age and ours. "We have come round to an age which is curiously similar to that of Paul" (p. 104). The real theme of the epistle concerns the essential nature of the gospel and the need of all mankind for it. The reality of sin, the deliverance from God, the faith that waits on God while his power works in us, the personal response which an individual must make, the assurance that God has manifested his grace in a supreme act, that he has entered into human history in Christ and through him effected man's salvation—this is the substance of Paul's message, equally valuable today as in the first century. Our religion is not in a state of decay; our age may even be viewed as one of religious progress when "men took Christian principles and applied them, almost for the first time, to social institutions, to the intercourse of nations, to matters of industry and commerce and the whole conduct of life" (p. 115). Our lack is in the heroic conviction that God is behind our action and that his power is with us when we do his will. Reading Romans awakens that faith in God with whom nothing is impossible. Our lack also lies in an age of collectivism which engulfs the individual. "Before all else we are responsible to God for our own souls" (p. 118), and Paul's great summons makes every man answer for himself to the call of God.

In view of Scott's insistence in his opening chapter that the Epistle is personal and "not so much personal as a reasoned exposition of the main principles of the Christian faith" and "not an exposition of doctrine but an inspiring call to Christian action," it is hard to see why space was not given to a strong ethical exposition of Paul's practical views in the final chapter on the value of the epistle today.

Moreover, in the appeal to the average reader on the basis of historic fact rather than theology, it appears at times that Scott has given away too much. It may well be claimed that Christianity rests on facts about Jesus and "this sense of a historical fact is the very essence of what we call Paul's theology." Why then should Paul's message "not be sought in his theology which at most is only the wrapping of it" (pp. 82, 83, 101)? Here Scott ignores Dodd's rightful claim that events must always also have meanings for men. Facts plus interpretation are inevitable in religious thought.

Among lesser points it may be questioned whether Paul's discussion of the relation of the law to the gospel can be seen as "secondary" as long as Judaism and Christianity exist side by side. Also in view of many studies about Paul, it seems an overstatement to hold that "hardly any thought has been given to his (Paul's) essential message" (p. 27). The book is printed accurately but there appears to be an overlapping error in listing 15:13 instead of 15:8, and Paul repeats the word "hope" not thrice but twice in 15:13 (pp. 70, 74).

Taken as a whole, this book is an outstanding and successful example of the present trend among biblical scholars to write so that the inexhaustible riches of

the Book will be accessible to the common reader. It is also an addition to a list of Scott's books, now remarkably long, and for which we are grateful these many years.

DWIGHT M. BECK

Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped, by Henry H. Kessler, New York, Columbia University Press, 1947, pp. x, 274, \$3.50.

Henry H. Kessler has written a sound philosophy of rehabilitation as the result of his substantial education and firsthand experience. He acquired his M.D. from Cornell University Medical School and obtained his A.M. and Ph.D. in social service training at Columbia University. From 1919 until 1941, when he was called to active duty in the U.S.N.R., he served as an assistant director of the Rehabilitation Clinic, Newark, N. J.

The book is a well-written treatment of a subject upon which more people should be informed. The author points out that although "public and private efforts have improved the status of the physically handicapped, the repugnance and distaste with which they have been regarded through history still prevails." Psychosocial prejudice prohibits many physically handicapped individuals from obtaining opportunities for economic security and from enjoying a more normal existence. "Vague standards have been created that have condemned those with physical defects as unproductive and socially useless." But the author sees rehabilitation "as a creative process in which the physical and mental capacities of the physically handicapped are utilized and developed to their highest efficiency."

In four adequately developed sections which include significant chapters on specific aspects of the subject, the book unfolds 1. the problems of the physically handicapped, in which the crippled child, the injured worker, the disabled veteran, and the chronic disabled are considered. 2. The principles of rehabilitation are discussed in which physical restoration is surveyed with particular attention to the place of the rehabilitation centre, vocational guidance, vocational training, and selective placement. 3. Rehabilitation in practice introduces the reader to the modern trend in public health and deals with the mentally and emotionally disabled, the orthopedic patient, the blind and the deaf, and medical and surgical invalids. Finally the author concludes his subject with a section on 4. a national program which is devoted to legislation and administration, and a national challenge.

The contents of the book continually suggest to the reader similar cases among friends; hence his added interest in the solution of the problem. Even though the reader does not think of a specific case, which in this postwar era would be unusual, he will find the material interesting since no one is immune to accidents, a devastating virus, or degeneration that assaults the westward side of life. Many readers are reluctant to sample a treatise that carries an unpleasant title and deals with the grim realities of life; yet such readers will find that this book carries a message of hope to a much misunderstood afflicted group, and also sets forth a ringing challenge about which something can be done.

Ministers will find the book suggestive for a virile sermon; especially those who have a social passion. Also those in charge of denominational departments for social justice may find as a counterpart the attitude which most churches assume toward their ministers who pass the age of forty. Since big business is operated for profit and is not organized for experiments in social service, a considerable change in public opinion and innovations of this type of legislation will be necessary in order to permit handicapped individuals to pursue full-time, let alone part-time, employment. Fortunately, industry was given an opportunity during the recent

emergency to become aware of the value and contribution to the war effort by physically handicapped individuals. Also at the present time the Veterans Administration is successful in placing physically handicapped veterans in numerous occupations, but business on the whole does not wish to be bothered with such risks and supervision.

By way of criticism it may be said that Dr. Kessler has probably had difficulty with vocational counselors since he charges that they "are trying to supervise medical work, interpret medical work and act as psychiatrists." To make this general statement is either an unwitting exaggeration or, at least, a statement somewhat overdrawn. Some vocational counselors may assume such an attitude, but in all fairness most vocational counselors realize their limitations and invariably seek medical advice when a physical rating is doubtful. On the other hand, the vocational counselor often has a more comprehensive view of the handicapped person than the rating physician, and is, therefore, in a position to evaluate the overrating or underrating of the handicapped individual. Also, since the manuscript was written Congress has passed subsequent bills which have increased benefits to disabled veterans. The inaccuracy of the figures does not, however, impair the truth and the logic of the subject. In spite of these minor criticisms the book presents a treatise that is worthy of wide acceptance. The public must be made to realize that physically handicapped individuals are no longer occupationally handicapped when they can fulfill the demands of their jobs.

HAROLD BANCROFT WHITE

On the Meaning of Christ, by John Knox, New York, Scribner, 1947, pp. xvi, 117, \$2.50.

The author presents this volume, the William Belden Noble Lectures at Harvard University for 1947, as "a fresh approach to the significance of Christ for Christian faith." It begins and ends with Christian experience and is in no sense a systematic discussion of New Testament theology. The Christian believer who knows God, asserts Dr. Knox, inevitably knows him as the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Whatever our experiences, God "can make himself known in these experiences only because he has made himself known in Christ." God continues to make himself known in such a way as he cannot through nature and reason by something that happened on the stage of human history in Jesus Christ, who was "an act of God."

This event of revelation on the part of God is not simple. In a sense it includes all history but particularly the history of the Jewish people. In a stricter sense the event must be looked at as "the central and decisive moment in that historical movement" when Jesus appeared, though again the event must be thought of as including not only the event itself but also the response to it which culminated in the church.

Though the author attempts to draw a line in the gospel tradition between historical and nonhistorical (the "history" and the "story"), he regards as essential in "the event" the resurrection of Jesus as the only adequate explanation of the rise of the church. For the Christian, Christ is the *risen* Christ, and is so received in his own personal experience and in his fellowship with the church. In this fellowship with the risen Christ is realized the effective victory over death and sin. The enemies of man which confront him with the severest test of his faith in God.

The final chapter, "The Event and the Church," centres the emphasis upon the "community" as mediating the Christian faith. In view of the importance of the church, the group which in the days of his flesh found God in Christ, preserved

for us the record of the revelation, proclaimed the news of the reconciliation, and today provides the body of Christ wherein his Spirit dwells, the author propounds his rhetorical question, "Is there any conceivable way in which *that* God can be known except in and through the historical community?" The church's unique mission is making God known in Christ in the way in which he is already known among believers.

What then of the meaning of Christ? As Dr. Knox succinctly puts it, "If God did in fact choose to reveal himself in history, as Christian faith affirms, that act becomes the sign and guarantee of a purpose of God in history. . . . That purpose is the 'bringing of many sons to glory'; the creation in fact of the family of God."

FREDERICK M. DERWACTER

An Introduction to Jesus for the Twentieth Century, by R. W. Stewart, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 127, \$1.75.

The last chapter of this book might well have been the first, for here we are told what a modern study of Jesus should be and see the reason for the author's presentation of Jesus along the lines he has chosen. The last sentence of the book indicates Stewart's approach: "The portrayal of the actual life of Jesus must be undertaken to-day in the light of modern philosophical categories, and in particular the relation of Reality to Truth and Change and Chance must be kept in view."

It is pointed out that theology early turned from the actual career of Jesus to formulation of dogma under the influence of a strong Platonic tradition. Higher criticism at first began to free Jesus from the "trappings of dogma," but because of the problems which criticisms raised, a defeatist attitude was adopted. A biography of Jesus is now regarded as impossible. Form criticism has sounded a new note of uncertainty.

Stewart calls critical scholarship to present a fresh approach to Jesus in the movement of his time. Such an approach must be in the light of "a new philosophy that like Heraclitus and modern scientists, interprets reality as change and development." This interest will be in "the human life of Jesus of Nazareth" and "in the life of Jesus, not as a display of ideas or personality, but as a career."

The author desires to avoid traditional approaches to Jesus, and is successful. He sees a predominant, gentile motif running through the gospels. The chief point at issue in Judaism was over the "missionary duty." John the Baptist was missionary Judaism's prophet, preaching a liberal, universalist outlook. The Pharisees opposed Jesus because he stressed this missionary idea. Jesus cleansed the temple that men of every race might find there a place of prayer. This daring act resulted in his martyrdom.

This reviewer, while recognizing merit in the book, seriously questions whether by its implications and omissions its approach will introduce Jesus to the twentieth century.

RUSSELL C. TUCK

John, The Universal Gospel, by Chester Warren Quimby, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. xiii, 224, \$2.75.

The author of this volume has attempted to present in a popular way the essential "facts, findings and truths concerning the Fourth Gospel as set forth by present-day scholarship." He has achieved considerable success. He is well acquainted with the problems that are inherent in the gospel and with the solutions that have been

offered. The reading of the first five chapters raises hope that here at last is the book that has been so long desired. With a clear grasp of important facts and with a flair for simple expression of those facts the writer carries his readers with him. Even here, however, there are occasional suggestions of that which later becomes increasingly evident. It is the tendency, later to become almost the practice, of failing to carry a stark historical or interpretive fact through to its actual significance but of subtly harmonizing it with certain biblical thoughts, principally Pauline, and also with subsequent Christian interpretations of matters connected with salvation and the saviour. This makes the work a halfway house instead of a "consummation devoutly to be wished."

The term "universal" is loosely used, and some of the concepts to which it is applied do not qualify for that designation. That the writer of the Fourth Gospel emancipated certain central ideas of primitive Christianity from interpretations that were essentially Jewish and made them current coin for the Græco-Roman world is beyond doubt, but "universal" is a broad term. It is overworked both in quality and quantity. A fuller treatment of the logos idea of this gospel and a firmer attitude toward the mysticism of the document might have modified the overburdened thought of universalism as the achievement of the evangelist. So much excellent work indicating the enlargement of earlier Christian concepts appears in this book that it is disappointing to have to say that in this respect the author's reach has exceeded his grasp.

Some of the best interpretive work in the volume concerns the symbolism of the gospel. For the popular presentation of this we are under obligation to him. But it seems to this reviewer that the writer is in danger of finding symbolism in doubtful places. The sacramentalism of the gospel, especially with reference to the Eucharist, is too slightly treated. Possibly the popular purpose of the book may be urged as a reason for this; if so, its validity remains questionable. Too many popular books on the Bible blunt the edge of historical meaning for pragmatic reasons. It is too costly a procedure. The same purpose may explain some phrases which do not add to the strength or the dignity of the presentation. Such are: "Rather he was in cahoots with demons" (p. 141), "the vitamins of eternal life" (pp. 132, 133).

One of the penalties of being a reviewer is the necessity of criticizing a volume which has much valuable interpretive material. It is a better book than most of the popular treatises on the Fourth Gospel; it is unfortunate that certain elements in the discussion prevent its being a "great" book of its type. The influence of Heitmüller's brilliant interpretation of the ideas of the gospel is evident, but the majesty of his unifying concepts is lacking. In spite of its failure to reach its goal many who are interested in the latest of our canonical gospels will be grateful for this volume.

ERNEST W. PARSONS

The College Seeks Religion, by Merrimon Cuninggim, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947, pp. x, 319, \$4.

The title of this book implies an attitude toward religion on the part of American higher education scarcely supported by the data presented. It is an attempt to do three principal things: 1. to tell the story of the place of religion in higher education since 1900, 2. to outline a philosophy of education in which religion is the centre, and 3. to describe certain typical programs of college religion in the light of an ideal program which the author has in mind and states in the final chapter of the

book. The thesis is presented that, as a matter of fact, all three types of institution, church-related, independent, and tax-supported, during this century have tended to develop a more favorable attitude toward religion. Evidences are submitted from the statements of presidents and other officials, from statements in catalogues, and from the programs carried on by typical institutions in each classification. Three types of emphasis or activity are considered as comprising the program of religion: worship, teaching, and counseling or other service activities. If one accepts the "adequate program" of religion on the college level as a valid goal, then there is a reasonable question, not only with reference to the achievements of the large number of American colleges, but also with reference to their desire to "seek religion" or a knowledge of the end to be sought.

It seems to the reviewer that Dr. Cuninggim has done a much better job at the writing of a philosophy of religious education at the college level than he has of making a description of what the colleges of various types are trying to do to work out an "adequate program" in the light of their own situations. Where he does attempt to describe what specific institutions are doing, he lays himself open to the danger of arbitrary selection. In fact, he seems to be impressed by what the larger institutions are doing and has not given sufficient attention to what the smaller colleges are actually attempting and accomplishing in the face of their very real limitations. For this reason, the book is more useful as a philosophy of education than as a description of an inclusive situation and process.

It is clear that the author has a definite set of criteria in mind for the religious emphasis and program of a college, although he does not make it explicit. He does evaluate each one of the typical programs presented, pointing out elements of strength or what must be assumed to be weakness. The book would have been more useful had he presented in one chapter his own detailed answer to the question, What specific goals should an institution of higher learning strive to attain and why? This would not be any more dogmatic than is the actual statement of an "adequate program" in the final chapter.

One of the assumptions made is that the religious program should always be under the direction of a specialist, by whatever name, and that the direction of the religious program should be his major responsibility. Perhaps many institutions should employ a "director," or "chaplain," or "dean" who may be recognized as the specialist in religion. But that is quite unrealistic for many of the smaller institutions, and that means the majority of the colleges. Furthermore, it is not demonstrated that the "specialist" approach is any better than another approach, provided the leader is trained, has good sense, and is accepted by his colleagues as well as by the students. It may be that the professor of religion, provided he has what any successful leader must have, is in a much better position to provide the leadership for the religious program than the "specialist" would be.

There is here some excellent analysis and clear insight into the nature of religion and its significance for education. There is also a head-on attack upon secularism and its devastating influence upon the whole process of higher education. Certainly, there can be no denial of the fact that any significant religious program starts from men and women in positions of authority and leadership who are aware of the truth about religion and education and who are committed to the purpose of finding a central loyalty for the educational process. Perhaps it is not realistic to suppose that any appreciable number of our American colleges and universities will be willing to make religion a recognized and proclaimed centre of the education process. But it is not too much to expect that more and more

college and university people will become concerned about the development of an educational philosophy which will give honest consideration to the value and significance of religion. This would be pure gain. Dr. Cuninggim's book should help greatly to accomplish this end.

CHARLES M. BOND

Labor's Relation to Church and Community, edited by Liston Pope, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. ix, 182, \$2.50.

This volume is an excellent addition to the already impressive *Religion and Civilization Series* of the Institute for Religious and Social Studies. Its seventeen lectures, delivered in New York between 1944 and 1946, present the relation between religion and labor in compelling form. The opening addresses, designedly the most scholarly ones, often with exact quotations, citations, and footnotes, show labor's place in the community, including articles by such authorities as T. North Whitehead, of Harvard, Katharine F. Lenroot, of the Department of Labor, Carter Goodrich, of Columbia, and Mark Starr, educational director of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. These emphasize the long-standing advocacy of education by organized labor and the manner in which labor has improved the domestic and international scenes. Included in this same section are articles on the problems and rights of minorities by the international president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and the former chairman of the FEPC. Examples, case studies, and moral judgments are freely employed.

A second section by Bernard E. Clausen, for religion, and Kermit Eby and John Ramsay, for labor, gives in short compass a suggestive analysis of the natural alliance between religion and labor and of the manner in which this relationship has been carried into action, despite the conventional tendency to view these two major aspects of life as fairly disconnected.

The real essence of the lectures lies in the concluding section of spiritual autobiographies of labor leaders. Six men and women tell in free and easy fashion why their work for C. I. O. or A. F. of L. constitutes the best expression of their religious faith, Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish. A young woman states that it dignifies personality. A minister's daughter, influenced by the writings of Rauschenbusch and Hocking and by the example of certain humble workers in the cause of labor, matures as a Y. W. C. A. secretary and switches to a position as southern public relations representative of the C. I. O. A transport organizer comes back to the church, convinced that dogmatism has no place in either labor or religion and that spiritual values prevent social vision from degenerating into mere class warfare. Graduating from a liberal seminary, a young minister deliberately leaves a comfortable city church for an industrial parish, becomes converted to educational work for organized labor through a discussion of the NRA by Secretary Frances Perkins, and finds peace through solving industrial conflicts as an official of the A. F. of L. He seems also to share the conviction of his daughter who attains her satisfaction through the Society of Friends.

These lectures, in many cases were obviously delivered extemporaneously. Edited by Professor Liston Pope and able stenographic assistants, they are on the whole warm human documents of persons who have made the labor movement the equivalent of a religious experience. They may tend to stress one particular aspect to the exclusion of others, and some statements and interpretations are subject to qualification. But every minister may well read this book. If he can improve upon it in word or action, society will be the gainer, and the vitality and adaptability of religion will once more be demonstrated.

EARL CRANSTON

Hermes the Thief: The Evolution of a Myth, by Norman O. Brown, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1947, pp. vi, 164, \$3.

One of the most interesting little studies I have seen for a long time, this book exemplifies the combination of thorough learning, imaginativeness, and courage out of which alone scholarship can build her house. Brown has made the evolution of Hermes from primitive times to the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* a model introduction to the early spirit and development of Greek religion in general, because he never forgets that a religion is not understood until we understand its place in the lives of its devotees. The accepted opinion has been that the *Hymn* gives the original core of the mythology of Hermes, and that Hermes' rôle as cattle thief reflects the primitive days when each little community normally practised such raids against its neighbors, and the successful raider stood high in local esteem. So the god of such people, or at least one of the gods, would himself exemplify the art.

Brown finds several difficulties with this. Cattle raiding was open robbery, and was a community activity rather than a stealthy theft carried out by an individual. Hermes is throughout Greek tradition the god of deceit and theft, never of organized robbery; and Homer and Hesiod connect Hermes only with sheep raising, not with cattle at all. Actually Hermes the thief is secondary to Hermes the trickster, as in his connection with the Pandora story, and as in his function as a tricky god of love. Further analysis suggests to Brown that as the trickster is behind the thief, so Hermes the magician is behind the trickster. This especially appears in the rod which is the attribute of a magician and of a herald as well. And Hermes is both magician and herald. But there is good reason, it is shown, to believe that heralds were originally priests who became subordinated to the king when kings first organized Greek society. "The craft of the pre-Homeric 'herald,' the leader in both the rituals and in incantations of primitive magic, inspired the mythological concept of the deity who is himself both a herald and a magician" (p. 30).

Hermes the god of boundaries was represented as a pile of stones or an ithyphallic herm. Two things, Brown shows, happened most conspicuously at the boundary: (a) the meeting of people from both sides for the exchange of goods, and (b) the meeting for the exchange of women. So Hermes, as patron of the boundary, became patron of trade and exchange. One could wish that Brown had gone on to develop the obviously possible connection between Hermes as love god, represented by the ithyphallic herm, and the primitive licentiousness which he shows carried on far into historic times in festivals celebrated at borders. Indeed when he later speaks of the "humor of the risqué type" (p. 128) which still appears in the *Hymn* itself, he connects this only with the mores of the new age when he thinks the *Hymn* was written, and does not mention the inherently licentious nature of Hermes himself, as the herms must always have kept it vivid in the Greek mind. Returning to Hermes the trader, Brown shows that Hermes became *agoraios* as he moved into the *agora*, that is, as trade shifted from the border to the market place of the new city-state, where he became patron of the new class of trader and craftsman as these now came into existence.

The contribution of Homer to the development of Hermes seems to have been to subordinate (or to record the subordination of) the primitive priest-magician-herald to Zeus. Hesiod dislikes Hermes, Brown convincingly shows, precisely because Hermes represents the new class of trader and craftsman which Hesiod throughout bitterly opposes. So in Hesiod Hermes is the villain of the Pandora story, comparable to Satan in Eden, because he gives woman her "stealthy disposition." Brown is not so convincing in seeing the same notion in Hesiod's story

of the relations of Zeus with Metis, in which Hermes, Prometheus, and Hephæstus, all gods of the craftsmen, bring Athena, the city goddess, into the world. When in the story Zeus goes on to marry Themis, Brown seems to confuse Themis with Dikē. But Brown has justified his major conclusion that Hesiod disliked Hermes because he impersonated the spirit of the new civilization.

With this background Brown can now go into a careful analysis of the *Hymn* itself, the best part of his study. This analysis is very compact, and cannot be digested. In point after point Brown shows that the *Hymn* expresses none of the primitive social conditions with which it has been associated, but the ideals of the rising merchant class of the cities who in social, cultural, and cultic realms were struggling for equality with the old aristocracy, and getting it. This is essentially the meaning of Hermes the *Wunderkind* who on the very day he was born could go forth and challenge Apollo, the patron of the aristocrats, steal his cattle (with anachronisms which show that the poet knew little of primitive cattle stealing), teach Apollo himself to play the lyre, outwit the older god on point after point, and finally come to an agreement with him whereby they mutually shared their honors and powers. This is just what the new merchant classes wanted and attained. Their god remained in the *agora*, and Apollo on the acropolis, but each had recognition from everyone. The virtues of Hermes (which Brown might well have compared to the virtues of Jacob) reflect ethical standards sanctioning trickery and deceit which have been none the less followed because aristocrats like Solon, Plato, and Aristotle detested them. One reads Brown's analysis here with delight, especially his trenchant scorn of the traditional tendency of scholars to "reduce Greek religion to a series of syllogisms, leaving no room for the influence of environmental conditions on religion, or for the emergence of genuine novelties in response to changes in the environment" (pp. 96 f.). The *Hymn*, he points out, was never popular in the literature of later aristocrats, but the god was one of the most popular throughout Greek history.

When and where was the *Hymn* written? Brown brings out detail after detail which so exactly fits the conditions in Athens in the years 520-519 B.C. that he has quite convinced me that the poem was written there and then, in spite of my antecedent prejudice against dating so precisely any such piece of ancient literature. The details of this demonstration do not allow briefer treatment than Brown has given them.

This book, which seems to have been a doctor's dissertation, may, we suspect, well be the first product of a brilliant career.

ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH

Theodore Parker, by Henry Steele Commager, Boston, Beacon, 2nd ed., 1947, pp. viii, 339, \$3.

The first edition of this book was published in 1936. "If I were to rewrite it now," says the author in the present reissue (p. viii), "I might change it in some details, . . . But I should not change it in any essentials. It is, after all, an interpretation, and I am content to abide by it." There is little reason why he should change it. At its first appearance the reviewers treated it kindly. One made the suggestion that it should be read together with George Santayana's *The Last Puritan* and another said that it had both the virtues and the defects of the Gamaliel Bradford school of biography. The ensuing years have done little to require a new interpretation, but they have brought us to a time "when we are tempted to judge every act by its immediate political and economic consequences, and when pragmatism is invoked

to justify expediency," and thus has made "Parker's insistence upon the timelessness of the moral law and the validity of moral judgment . . . peculiarly relevant" (p. viii).

For Theodore Parker religion was an eternal truth inherently valid, without recourse to the pronouncements of any authority such as the church, the Bible, or even Jesus himself. If none of them had ever existed or all of them were now to be destroyed, Christianity would remain unaltered, except for the better for having no encumbering pseudo validifications. Small wonder that even his Unitarian friends denounced him roundly and refused to exchange pulpits with him. Less wonder that he moved into Music Hall and preached to crowded houses.

A man of insatiable intellectual curiosity he read omnivorously and voraciously; wrote, edited, translated, and answered his own question, "What shall I do if I am sent to gaol?" by planning to "1. Write one sermon a week, and have it read at Music Hall, and printed the next morning. Who can read it? Write also prayer, etc. 2. Prepare a volume of sermons from old mss. 3. Write Memoirs of Life, etc. 4. Vol. 1 of 'Historical Development of Religion,' i.e., the Metaphysics of Religion. 5. Pursue Russian studies." On the social questions of his day he was a flaming prophet and a "universal reformer," not of the fanatic type, but one who believed in the perfectability of man and in the doctrine of progress, and worked hard for both. One great problem engaged his powers and almost took his life: slavery. Parker helped to finance John Brown and was one of his secret committee of six; he despised the Fugitive Slave Law and helped slaves to circumvent it.

To all this and to much more of the character of Parker, Commager gives testimony in a volume that is far removed from the "he was born on—and died on—" chronicle of dates, places, and persons. The dates are factors rather than facts, the places are three-dimensional, and the persons are living beings who somehow do not get completely lost in the background. A convincing life study, it presents Parker as a giant, albeit a credible one. Twenty pages of the concluding chapter are given to a description of his character that is a masterful summary of the man. If the reader has become absorbed in the overemphasis on history (Commager is professor of American history at New York University) he is brought back to the man in true Emersonian fashion.

One closes the book with a profound respect for both its subject and for its author. The former was indeed a "Yankee Crusader"; the latter is a writer with a broad view and a fine pen. Finally, we need the message and the courageous faith of Theodore Parker today. Let him speak just once, not in one of his caustic comments like that famous denunciation of a seminary, nor in his definition of a democracy, which was very probably the immediate inspiration for the similar words used by Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address. Rather let him be heard as he preaches his own installation sermon on "The True Idea of the Christian Church."

"A Christian Church should be the means of reforming the world, of forming it after the pattern of Christian ideas. . . . The noblest monument to Christ, the fairest trophy of religion, is a noble people, where all are well fed and clad, industrious, free, educated, manly, pious, wise and good."

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Animal Analogy in Shakespeare's Character Portrayal, by Audrey Yoder, New York, King's Crown, 1947, pp. x, 150, \$2.50.

Shakespeare and his writings have been submitted to countless examinations and analyses. On the borderline between scholarship and æsthetics is the newly fashion-

able study of imagery on psychological principles. Introduced by William Whiter in 1794, probed by William Spalding in 1833, the subject waited for the twentieth century to develop its resources for knowing the dramatist. The student's basic text is *Shakespeare's Imagery and What It Tells Us* by Caroline Spurgeon, published in 1935, following her earlier introductory studies. Audrey Yoder pursues the matter within the restricted area of animal analogy.

Æsop has become the protagonist for presenting fables of animals behaving like men. A tradition fundamentally related to Æsop is animal physiognomy, which presents men whose physical characteristics are like those of animals and, hence, whose character and behaviour are also similar. Such characteristics actually became the basis for predictions. These two traditions were old even in Shakespeare's time, and he inherited a familiar dramatic technique with which Elizabethan audiences were quite familiar. The extent and elaboration of this technique is Miss Yoder's present inquiry.

She has made a thorough search of the materials and presents convincing conclusions. Thus, she shows that Shakespeare used comparison to animals most frequently with evil intent, to enhance the portrayal of his villains. There is scathing censure and less cruel burlesque. The "manifest morality" of Falstaff, for example, is depreciated by animal comparisons. In heroic characters, however, there is little characterization, except through nobility or courage images and, occasionally, through gentle animal references by lovers and friends. He employs the technique boldly on groups of characters in conflict, in his generalizations on mankind, and in cases where abstractions are personified. For verification and further study the author has provided full notes, an excellent bibliography, and six appendices, including an engaging one on Shakespeare's stage animal figures and some suggestions as to how they might have been presented on the stage.

Animal Analogy does not seek to make Shakespeare unique in his use of imagery, since the method was in frequent current use and persists even to the present time. It does, however, show his method and purpose in using it, and, as such, is both a contribution to the information of his audience and readers, as well as a suggestion to further searchers among the pages of his plays.

Incidentally, we sincerely hope that "Revelations" on p. 90 is only a typographical error!

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Religious Radio, by Everett C. Parker, Elinor Inman, and Ross Snyder, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xiv, 271, \$3.

"Whenever a new book appears in this department, buy an old one." A certain professor, tired of reading new books in his field, said that. He was thinking of new books, the newness of which consisted only of a new cover design or a rephrasing of old truth. But here is a book in place of which one may not buy an old one. This is the first authoritative book of its kind published in this field.

The authors do not lend it authority; they *give* it. Everett C. Parker is an ordained minister with many years of experience in church life, in a local radio station, as a staff member of one of the networks, and as director of the Joint Religious Radio Committee representing several of the major denominations. His committee has produced such outstanding radio productions as "All Aboard for Adventure," "Building for Peace," "The Radio Edition of the Bible." This spring he is making an on-the-spot radio survey of the Far East. Elinor Inman is the director of Religious Broadcasts, Columbia Broadcasting System. She has charge

of the *Church of the Air* programs, two half-hour broadcasts over CBS each Sunday. In that capacity she reads 104 sermons each year. She knows from audience reaction just what constitutes a good radio sermon. She presents some very stimulating ideas in this book. Ross Snyder is the associate professor of religious education on the Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago, and dean of the Religious Radio Workshop, University of Chicago. He emphasizes the seeking of the service goals of religious broadcasting and the techniques of worship by radio.

Radio is a powerful force in the life of America. Religious leaders have used it, abused it, misused it, refused it, and confused it. It has an unmatched mass appeal. It is a personal, intimate, and immediate means of approach.

This book seeks to lead the reader to the answers to many questions. "What are the elements of a good religious radio program? What kinds of programs are needed . . . ? To what listeners should the programs be beamed?" It points out methods of program planning for the total community. It indicates the types of programs that seek to meet the human need.

Of the utmost importance is an understanding of the radio style of writing for the ears alone. "Without a knowledge of the principles of radio writing, the religious broadcaster will fail in his purpose before his program reaches the air. . . . You can assume a mood on the part of people in a great cathedral; you can assume a desire to learn on the part of people in a classroom. But such assumptions are not true of a radio audience." These are the words of Sterling Fisher, advisor on public affairs and education, of the National Broadcasting Company. Through six excellent chapters the authors explain the "how" of aural writing. These chapters should be thoroughly mastered by all ministers. Good radio writing would have the most helpful reaction in sermon preparation. The homiletics courses of a generation back are not for this world. The contemporary scene has been so thoroughly impressed with the radio style of approach (five hours listening each day for the average American family) that old-fashioned sermons prepared in the literary style of writing leave the hearer unimpressed.

There are such additional chapters as "The Live Side of the Microphone," "Music in Your Program," "How's Your Voice?" "Finding An Audience," "The Educational Use of Radio Broadcasts," and "Training Leadership for Religious Radio." For further resources an excellent list of reference material is given.

The book is recommended for the library of every radio station having difficulty with some local minister who has all the answers for good radio without ever having seriously studied the medium. The book is recommended by this reviewer for the library of every seminary where the members of the faculty may assume that radio requires no special understanding, and where the ministerial students are hungry for an understanding of this means of communication which they will be called upon to use (too often without knowledge). This book is recommended for the libraries of all ministers and religious education leaders that this medium may be handled more successfully and well. "Whenever a new book appears in this department, buy an old one." Since this is the first authoritative book of its kind in this field, there is no old one to buy. Get this one and use its insights to great advantage.

CHARLES H. SCHMITZ

A Handbook of Judaism, by Meyer Waxman, New York, Bloch, 1947, pp. xii, 195, \$3.50.

This book was written as a succinct statement of the traditional Jewish pattern of life and thought for the average Jew, and non-Jew as well. While it is simply written and the subjects treated are limited to those things which are really fundamental to Jewish life, the book aims to be more adequate than the usual elementary introductions to Judaism. The point of view is "rather close to the orthodox" and avoids any particular partisan emphasis. The effort is to present the basic aspects of Judaism as they have been held by a majority of Jews through the ages. This aim has been achieved in a very satisfactory way. Technicalities of scholarship have been omitted. Hebrew words are given in transliteration and are always carefully defined. An excellent glossary defines the following terms: *Oral Law*, *Halakah*, *Agada*, *Mishnah*, *Tannaim*, *Talmud*, *Amoraim*, *Midrashim*, *Shulchan Aruk*.

Part I deals with the institutions of Judaism. Here one finds a clear and reasonably full discussion of the Sabbath, the festivals, prayer, dietary laws, and the family and its institutions. Part II takes up the principal views of Judaism. This section covers God and the world, man and Israel in relation to God, and ethical and social ideals. The author's illuminating introduction on "What is Judaism?" really belongs in this second division, for in it perhaps more than anywhere else in the book he seeks to state the essential elements of the Jewish religion.

Throughout the book the words *faith* and *theology* are avoided. Preference is shown for *views*, *concepts*, and *abstract notions*. Little weight is allowed to current biblical scholarship with its documentary analysis and suggestions that other theologies of the ancient Orient have left their imprint on the Hebrew creation stories. All traces of an early Hebrew polytheism or henotheism are denied. Instead we are informed "that the firm belief in one universal God with all that follows from it was indigenous in Israel from the moment it stepped forth on the arena of history." The author admits that some Hebrews did not live up to this great faith all the time, but this was only natural, he holds, for "an idea like monotheism, even if divinely revealed, could only become the firm conviction of the few and select."

Judaism involves three basic elements, each of which is fully as important as the other. These are its *faith*, its *race*, and its *nation*. The three are inextricably integrated into a unity. Judaism must preserve its faith, maintain its blood, and achieve nationhood in order to attain full expression. "No one born a Jew can ever divest himself from Judaism entirely, no matter how much he may strive to attain this complete emancipation, for much of the spirit of Judaism, physical tendencies, even abilities and inclination, come by heredity."

The author points out that although his book is intended to be all-embracing, it nevertheless "omits certain other phases of Jewish life," for Judaism "includes a system of civil, criminal, and social laws, as well as other regulations bearing upon life in a body politic." In other words, Judaism ideally is still today, as it was in antiquity, a state religion. It could never become a universal religion, and Jews must regard themselves as aliens in strange lands until they can one day reassemble in their own "Land of Israel." Non-Jews in particular would find it instructive to read a handbook setting forth the Jewish civil, criminal, and social laws also. Otherwise, they never see a complete picture of Judaism. Reform Jews would of course repudiate this interpretation of their faith. The only nationalism they recognize is Americanism.

S. VERNON MCCASLAND

BOOK NOTICES

Journey through the Bible, by Walter D. Ferguson, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xi, 364, \$3.50.

Journey through the Bible is the work of a teacher in the department of English in Temple University. Like most journeys, it is selective, directed largely by personal interest. Hence no attempt is made either to present all phases of biblical thought or to suggest close-knit genetic relations. Late traditions, folk tales, crucial experiences, literary gems, and heroic personalities largely occupy the stage. The author is a master of virile English, has marked dramatic gifts, and a facile, almost Oriental, imagination; always interesting, suggestive, and stimulating—even when not convincing. He is a layman, and like Amos is an amateur, in the best sense of that word. Hence it would be too much to ask that there should be no slips in Palestinian geography, ancient history, social customs, economic conditions, or that he should be up to the minute in the minutiae of well-established scholarship. At times outmoded traditions are treated at face value, and an occasional interpretation rests solely on fanciful insights. Nevertheless the author is well aware of, and in full sympathy with, the general trends of modern thought. Indeed the volume is likely to be of greater value to the average reader than a cumbersome tome of meticulous scholarship. Always permanent religious values are to the fore, and are so presented that the result is both wholesome and stimulating. The intelligent conservative is not likely to be shocked by the critical conclusions, and the thoughtful liberal should not be impatient with the outcroppings of traditionalism. Professor Ferguson has opened windows revealing some of the most fascinating vistas in religious history, and through it all makes the reader aware that the Bible is a peculiarly modern book interested throughout in the pressing realities of human experience.

I. G. MATTHEWS

Prophet in the Wilderness, by Hermann Hagedorn, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 221. \$3.

After World War I, a flood of books and articles upon Albert Schweitzer, the genius who went to the African jungle, appeared. Even Adolph Hitler had to attempt to stem the enthusiasm for Schweitzer by a counterattack in *Mein Kampf*. At the present time the Schweitzer literature is again in bountiful harvest. Hagedorn's interpretation seems to be gaining in popularity every day. Locally the demand greatly exceeds the supply. In July, 1913, then thirty-eight, Schweitzer went to Lambarene in equatorial Africa to engage in an undenominational and international humanitarian work among African Negroes. Well, have not many others? Listen, he was a successful professor of the New Testament, had published half a dozen best sellers, had won fame as a composer, as an organist, and as an interpreter of J. S. Bach. Thereupon, with a worshiping world at his feet, he took a grueling medical course and later set out *on his own* to a lonely spot in equatorial Africa. Why? Let him tell us why. "A heavy guilt rests upon our culture. What have not the whites of all nations since the era of discovery done to the colored peoples! What does it signify that so many peoples where Christianity came, died out and others are vanishing or at least disintegrating? Who will describe the injustices and atrocities committed by Europeans! Who would estimate what alcohol and the awful diseases we transmitted to them have done to them? If history told all that has

happened between whites and blacks, many pages would be turned without reading them. *A heavy guilt rests upon us. We must serve them. When we do good to them, it is not benevolence; it is expiation; it is atonement.*" One missionary is in Africa today to make reparation for the sin of the western world against the Negro. And in the course of his ministry, he discovered religion to be "reverence for all life." "Go thou and do likewise."

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

Hindu Philosophy, by Theos Bernard, New York, Philosophical Library, 1947, pp. xi, 207, \$3.75.

In just 145 pages this book attempts an outline of the orthodox "six systems" of Hindu philosophy (Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta), plus Kashmir Śaivism. There follow eleven pages of bibliography and fifty-one pages of glossary (Sanskrit words). The author rightly thought it important to cite, and try to explain in English, as much as possible of the original terminology. But he allowed himself, or was allowed, room for little more than a skeletal catalogue of such terms. The explanatory connecting tissue hardly suffices to enlighten the uninitiated; sometimes even the relatively well-informed may be mystified. And yet much precious space is wasted. The glossary often repeats, verbatim or nearly so, what has been said in the body of the text. Its new features include many etymologies, nearly all of which are irrelevant, and some of which are downright misleading. Elimination of these etymologies, which are useless or worse, would have made some room for clearer accounts of what the technical terms really mean.

FRANKLIN EDGERTON

Not As the World Giveth, by Philippe Vernier, [New York], Fellowship Publications, ©1947, pp. 96, \$1.50.

This little volume of quietest meditations reveals the spirit of a consecrated pastor whose life is doubtless far more significant than what he has set down on paper. The translator's foreword discloses the fact that Vernier has achieved a spiritual poise which enables him to inspire courage in the hearts of the impoverished Belgian miners to whom he gives all of himself in the name of Christ. The meditations themselves are piously simple, if not naive, and suggest nothing new or arresting. Under such captions as Love, Faith, Grace, Humility, Obedience, Holiness, and Joy, we find eighty brief meditations averaging three hundred words in length, and seeking to enlarge upon verses of Scripture chosen at random. Obviously the purpose of these passages is to instruct the reader rather than to disclose the mind of the writer, for they are pedantic rather than inspirational, and savor not a little of conscious superiority. A few lines quoted below may justify this reviewer's impression. "So instead of piling up virtues, as some people claim to do, it is more important to be girded by your Master with the preserving cord of an essential love." "Do not be satisfied with being a niggardly and timid stream, allowing only a narrow thread of water to trickle through, and which a pebble dislodged by the hoof of an ox is enough to choke." "If it is the Master you want to serve, then your dignity, the feeling of your worth, your self-respect, are useless furnishings, awkward baggage."

MILTON C. WESTPHAL

The Negro Spiritual Speaks of Life and Death, by Howard Thurman, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. 56, \$1.

If this small volume, the Ingersoll Lecture at Harvard for 1947, did nothing else than offer some little known negro spirituals, that in itself would have justified its existence. Consider the knowledge of how death comes hinted at in the following:

"I want to die easy when I die.
 I want to die easy when I die.
 Shout salvation as I fly,
 I want to die easy when I die."

Or the realism here:

"You needn't mind my dying,
 You needn't mind my dying,
 You needn't mind my dying,
 Jesus goin' to make up my dying bed."

"In my dying room I know,
 Somebody is going to cry.
 All I ask you to do for me,
 Just close my dying eyes."

"In my dying room I know,
 Somebody is going to mourn.
 All I ask you to do for me,
 Just give that bell a tone."

Kierkegaard himself could hardly have improved on this one:

"I've got to walk my lonesome valley,
 I've got to walk it for myself.
 Nobody else can walk it for me,
 I've got to walk it for myself!"

But Dr. Thurman has done much more than just print some new songs. He has helped us to see that the spirituals as a whole present a point of view that is not limited by race or condition. Their insight rests back on experiences that all human beings share. For the slave they gave an intolerable lot spiritual significance. For him and for the rest of us they not only express a hope but help to build a philosophy.

J. S. BIXLER

American Tariff Policy towards the Philippines—1898-1946, by Pedro E. Abelarde, New York, King's Crown, 1947, pp. 233, \$2.75.

A Filipino scholar offers a careful interpretation of American tariff legislation as it has concerned the Philippine Islands during the last fifty years. Sympathetic with the aspirations of his people and also with the attitudes and actions of American statesmen, he takes a favorable view of most of the legislative and executive procedures which have emanated from Washington. William Howard Taft and Franklin Delano Roosevelt are considered sponsors of farsighted policy. Special attention is paid to the well-known Payne-Aldrich and Underwood Tariffs and to the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934. Particular merit attaches to the summaries of the essential arguments used by senators and representatives in all the great debates involving matters of Philippine trade. The efforts of certain American vested interests and pressure groups to initiate or alter laws and policies to their own advantage seem not to have been as successful as is sometimes imagined. The author sees the half-century experiment as one by which both the United States and the Philippines have benefited, and indicates that the newest legislation, under which the Philippine Republic has been established, contains provisions which if properly applied and administered can continue cordial and profitable relationships. Conversely, he points out complications which may arise through misguided or inept conduct by either party. The volume, which appears to be the author's doctoral dissertation, is based upon studies made by him on both sides of the Pacific. Much of his original material was lost in the Japanese attack upon his homeland six years ago, but has been replaced by later research at Columbia University. Pertinent appendices, an ample bibliography consisting largely of government documents, and an abundance of

citations in footnotes authenticate the monograph and give it lasting value as a work of analysis and reference.

EARL CRANSTON

Best Sermons, 1947-1948 Edition, edited by G. Paul Butler, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xxii, 318, \$2.75.

This is the third of the proposed annual series of "Best Sermons" and follows the plan of selection and arrangement used in the previous volumes. A rather full summary of the enterprise was given by this reviewer in the CROZER QUARTERLY, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, pp. 383-385. It may be only a personal reaction, but the present volume seems to have achieved a higher level of sermons and a far more direct appeal to the Christian conscience of the hearers. The inclusion of European sermons extends the spiritual geography of the material. A few of the criticisms in the earlier review are still in point, but others are less pertinent to this latest selection.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Sovereign Emblem, by Ernest Wall, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 117, \$1.25.

The sovereign emblem is the Cross, and this little book is like many others on the same subject. It does not add much to understanding, and appreciation of this type is hardly needed. It seems pointless and wordy. Except for a helpful statement concerning "the feast of the Cross," communion, the book is out of this world. All illustrative material is biblical or from the author's missionary experience in Africa or of the tear-jerking evangelistic kind; no effort is made to draw from life. The result is about as close to contemporary living as is the average religious radio program. But it is all couched in the language of Zion; to those who appreciate that language the book should be welcome.

HARMON M. GEHR

Commentary on the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, by John Calvin, translated and edited by John Owen, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1947, pp. xxxvii, 592, \$4.50.

This is the first of the proposed American edition of Calvin's commentaries. The volume is a photographic reproduction of the 1849 edition. The several *errata* noted in the English edition have been corrected in this printing. There is also a jubilant introduction by Professor Louis Berkhof, in which attention is called to the value of Calvin's works to combat the horrid Arminianism and Pelagianism rampant in many churches of the land in the form of modernism, now in an impasse. It will be interesting to see the reception given these volumes, long out of print and hard to obtain, which have left an indelible mark for good or ill on Christian theology.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Therefore Choose Life, by Edith Lovejoy Pierce, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. 76, \$1.75.

The poems in this volume further enhance the position of Edith Lovejoy Pierce as one of the foremost writers of religious verse of our day. In theme they cover a wide range. Here one finds the height of the devotional experience of a twentieth-century mystic along with terse comments on contemporary social problems such as war, peace, and even Saturday movies for children. Whatever the theme, there is always a deep insight and the readings of life are many. Impression and feeling are conveyed with an economy of expression. The apt use of figure reminds one of some of the best of the seventeenth-century poets of England. There is a dearth of real religious poetry today. Here is a volume that will sharpen the awareness of the reader who wishes to feel the real forces that cause spiritual life and death. It will be a real help to those who seek to choose life.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

BOOKS RECEIVED

- **Not by Might*, by A. J. Muste, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xiii, 227, \$2.50.
- **Albert Schweitzer: an Anthology*, edited by Charles R. Joy, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. xxviii, 323, \$3.75.
- **Whitehead's Philosophy of Time*, by William W. Hammerschmidt, New York, King's Crown, 1947, pp. ix, 108, \$2.
- **Books of Faith and Power*, by John T. McNeill, New York, Harper, ©1947, pp. viii, 183, \$2.
- **Doing Likewise*, by Walter R. Alexander, Nashville, S. S. Board of the S. Baptist Convention, ©1947, pp. 146, 75 cents.
- **Christian Nurture*, by Horace Bushnell, with an introduction by Luther A. Weigle, New Haven, Yale University Press, ©1916 and reprinted 1947, pp. xl, 351, \$4.
- **Abraham Lincoln's Autobiography*, by Robert Dale Richardson, Boston, Beacon, 1947, pp. xiv, 45, \$1.50.
- **Pillars of Faith*, by Nels F. S. Ferré, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 128, \$1.50.
- **The Kingship of Christ*, by W. A. Visser 'tHooft, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 158, \$1.75.
- These Shared His Passion, Cross and Power*, by Edwin McNeill Poteat, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xii, x, xvi, 131, 192, 182, \$1.95.
- A one-volume edition of three books published separately as *These Shared His Passion* (1940), *These Shared His Cross* (1941), and *These Shared His Power* (1941).
- **History in the* *ENCYCLOPEDIA*, by Nelly Noémie Schargo, New York, Columbia University Press, 1947, pp. 251, \$3.
- **The Goodly Fellowship of the Prophets*, by John Paterson, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. xi, 313, \$3.
- The Four Gospels*, by Charles Cutler Torrey, New York, Harper, ©1947, 2nd ed., pp. xx, 331, \$2.50.
- This edition shows several changes from the first (1933). A "Preface to the Second Edition" calls attention to them, reports with fine optimism the progress of things Aramaic during the decade and a half, and laments that though "recognition of the fact of Semitic Gospels has gained steadily," in the new *American Standard Revision* the "same false and foolish readings" still persist.
- **The Bible in the Church*, by Robert M. Grant, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. 194, \$2.50.
- **The Witness of the Prophets*, by Gordon Pratt Baker, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 213, \$2.25.
- **Revive Thy Church Beginning with Me*, by Samuel M. Shoemaker, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xi, 127, \$1.50.
- **Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture*, edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. Maciver, New York, Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion [distributed by Harper], 1947, pp. xx, 703, \$6.50.
- **Alternative to Futility*, by Elton Trueblood, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 124, \$1.
- **Kingship and the Gods*, by H. Frankfort, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1948, pp. xxiii, 444, \$5.
- **On the Resolution of Science and Faith*, by Wendell Thomas, New York, Island Press, ©1946, pp. xii, 300, \$3.50.

**Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language*, by Sister Miriam Joseph, New York, Columbia University Press, 1947, pp. xiv, 423, \$3.75.

**Psychology for Pastor and People*, by John Sutherland Bonnell, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. xii, 225, \$2.50.

**Letters of the Scattered Brotherhood*, edited by Mary Strong, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. 192, \$2.

**Christianity and the Children of Israel*, by A. Roy Eckardt, New York, King's Crown, 1948, pp. xvi, 223, \$3.

**A History of the World's Young Women's Christian Association*, by Anna V. Rice, New York, Woman's Press, ©1947, pp. 299, \$2.

**Discovering Wayside Treasure*, by William N. Hutchins, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1948, pp. 122, \$2.

**Religion in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Vergilius Ferm, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1948, pp. xix, 470, \$5.

**Church in World*, by Edward F. Ouellette, New York, Interseminary Movement, 1947, pp. 79, \$1.

**What Shall I Preach?* by George Brown Thomas, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 239, \$2.50.

Begin with Genesis 1:1 and go to Revelation 22:21; choose 2,200 verses; give them titles, some like *Divine Face-Lifting* (Gen. 4:6-7), *The First Phonograph Record* (Gen. 4:10), *The Septuagint says "Virgin"* (Matt. 1:23a), *Pillars or Caterpillars* (Rev. 3:12), *Free Drinks* (Rev. 21:6); add seventy pages of topical index—and you save the price of the book.

Genesis Rhymes, by Ovid R. Sellers, Chicago, McCormick Coöperative Store, ©1947, pp. 63, \$1.

Twenty-six nursery rhymes, tunes, and accompanying pen-and-ink sketches. These songs, written years ago to edify a young daughter, are now printed and should prove very attractive to other children whose fathers are not so versatile as is this eminent McCormick professor of Old Testament.

**The Doctrine of Our Redemption*, by Nathaniel Micklem, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1948, pp. 155, \$1.50.

**Confessions of an Agnostic Clergyman*, by E. Stanton Hodgins, Boston, Beacon, 1948, pp. 235, \$2.50.

**The Christian Way in Race Relations*, edited by William Stuart Nelson, New York, Harper, ©1948, pp. ix, 256, \$2.50.

**Thomistic Philosophy in Social Casework*, by Mary J. McCormick, New York, Columbia University Press, ©1948, pp. ix, 148, \$2.

**Church, Law and Society*, by Gustaf Aulén, New York, Scribner, 1948, pp. xvi, 114, \$2.

**Wellsprings of the American Spirit*, edited by F. Ernest Johnson, Institute for Religious and Social Studies [distributed by Harper], ©1948, pp. ix, 241, \$2.50.

New Testament Literature: an Annotated Bibliography, edited by William Nelson Lyons and Merrill M. Parvis, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1948, pp. xiv, 392, \$4.

This is a very valuable tool for all who have occasion to work in the field of the New Testament and early Christian literature. It is intended to be an exhaustive bibliography of all germane books, articles, and book reviews which appeared during the period covered. The present volume covers 1943-1945, together with some earlier items which for one reason or another failed to be included in the earlier annual volumes. Brief indication of the content and scope of some of the items, and a full index add to the value of this volume. Additional volumes are planned to appear every two or three years.

* To be reviewed.